BRADFORD, J.
Appellant-Defendant James Bellamy appeals the trial court’s finding that he was in direct criminal contempt. Alternatively, Bellamy argues that the trial court erred in refusing him the opportunity to explain himself. We affirm.
. . . Bellamy failed to timely appear at the August 11, 2010 pre-trial hearing. The trial court subsequently issued a warrant for Bellamy’s arrest. Bellamy was later located and was brought before the trial court. The trial court released Bellamy on his own recognizance after the trial court warned him that he would be found in contempt and taken into custody if he failed to timely appear for future scheduled court proceedings.
Bellamy eventually appeared before the trial court fifty-four minutes after his trial was scheduled to begin. In light of his failure to timely appear for trial, the trial court found that Bellamy was in direct contempt of the trial court’s previous order and sentenced Bellamy to five days [footnote omitted] of incarceration in the Marion County Jail. . . . .
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In Hopping, the Indiana Supreme Court held that “where … the court has firsthand and immediate knowledge of acts demonstrating a clear disregard for its authority which threaten to undermine the integrity of the judicial process and impede the performance of court work, summary proceedings for direct criminal contempt are available.” Id. at 1297. The Indiana Supreme Court further held that “[w]e do not seek to ascertain the presence of a formal hearing but merely that the inappropriate behavior bears a close relationship to the court’s judicial activities.” Id. Thus, our review of the trial court’s determination that Bellamy acted in direct contempt of court should focus on two inquiries: “(1) whether the act stands in disregard of judicial authority, thereby threatening the integrity of the court and impeding its work, and (2) whether the judge possessed personal knowledge of the contemptuous act.” Nasser, 644 N.E.2d at 96.
Bellamy does not dispute that his acts stood in disregard of judicial authority or that the trial court possessed personal knowledge of his contemptuous act. Rather, Bellamy contends that the trial court erred in finding him in direct criminal contempt following his failure to timely appear before the trial court because of his status as a layperson. In support, Bellamy relies on Rice v. State, 874 N.E.2d 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) and Williams v. State ex rel. Harris, 690 N.E.2d 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), in which this court concluded that a layperson litigant’s failure to appear constitutes indirect contempt rather than direct contempt.3 Rice, 874 N.E.2d at 991; Williams, 690 N.E.2d 317-18. Thus, this court concluded that a layperson litigant could not be found in direct contempt for failing to appear for a scheduled court hearing. Rice, 874 N.E.2d at 991; Williams, 690 N.E.2d 317-18.
The instant matter, however, is easily distinguishable from Rice and Williams. While it is undisputed that Bellamy is a layperson, unlike the defendants in Rice and Williams, Bellamy had been expressly warned after previously failing to timely appear before the trial court that any subsequent failure to timely appear would result in a contempt finding and incarceration. Again, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that “[a]ny act related to a current or pending proceeding which tends to deter the court from the performance of its duties may support a contempt proceeding, and [a]ny act which manifests a disrespect and defiance of a court may constitute direct criminal contempt.” Hopping, 637 N.E.2d at 1297 (emphases in original). In light of the instant circumstances, we do not believe that Bellamy is immune from punishment for what the trial court determined was disrespectful behavior merely because he is a layperson. Thus, despite his status as a layperson, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding Bellamy in direct contempt of the trial court. Bellamy’s failure to timely appear after receiving an express prior warning from the trial court that such a failure would result in a contempt finding distinguishes the instant matter from Rice and Williams, and demonstrates the requisite interruption to the scheduled court proceedings and disrespect for the trial court.
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While we agree that the better practice would have been for the trial court to allow Bellamy the opportunity to explain his tardiness, we conclude that, in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding the instant matter, any challenge to the error relating to the trial court’s failure to allow Bellamy to explain his tardiness was waived. Bellamy was represented below by counsel, and his counsel neither made an offer to prove nor provided additional argument relating to the reason for Bellamy’s tardiness. See Wilson v. State, 931 N.E.2d 914, 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (providing that the failure to raise an objection or challenge an issue at trial results in waiver of the issue on appeal), trans. denied. Moreover, any error relating to the trial court’s failure to allow Bellamy to explain his tardiness was harmless because, as the record reflects, Bellamy expressed the reasons for his tardiness immediately after the trial court found him in contempt and while he was being escorted from the courtroom. The reasons expressed by Bellamy were largely the same as the excuses Bellamy had given the court upon being questioned about his prior failure to timely appear before the trial court. The trial court would have heard Bellamy’s explanations and could have changed its finding that Bellamy was in direct contempt of its prior orders if it was persuaded by Bellamy’s explanations.
BAKER, J., and MAY, J., concur.