CRONE, J.
On March 23, 2010, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer David Drennan initiated a traffic stop because he saw Edmond disregard a stop sign. Edmond pulled over immediately. When Officer Drennan approached Edmond’s vehicle, he smelled a strong odor of burnt marijuana coming from Edmond’s vehicle and breath. Officer Drennan checked Edmond’s identification and learned that he had only a learner’s permit. Edmond was not accompanied by licensed driver, so Officer Drennan issued a citation. [Footnote omitted.]
Officer Drennan planned to have the vehicle towed, so he asked Edmond to get out of the vehicle. Edmond was polite and cooperative and did not make any furtive movements or threats. Officer Drennan conducted a pat-down search and felt a bulge in Edmond’s pocket, which he believed to be marijuana. Officer Drennan removed a baggie containing material that was later confirmed to be marijuana.
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Edmond concedes that he was validly stopped for a traffic violation, nor does he dispute that Officer Drennan had a valid basis for commanding him to exit his vehicle. . . . He also concedes that the smell of marijuana coming from his vehicle would have established probable cause to search the vehicle.3 [3In his reply brief, Edmond argues that, although the odor of unburned marijuana would indicate the presence of marijuana, the odor of burnt marijuana merely indicates that marijuana was present at some time in the past. In support, he cites People v. Hilber, 269 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Mich. 1978), in which the court held that the odor of burned marijuana did not supply probable cause for an arrest or search when the officer could not testify as to how long ago the marijuana had been burnt. However, the Michigan Supreme Court later rejected this distinction between the odors of burnt and unburned marijuana. People v. Kazmierczak, 605 N.W.2d 667, 674 n.13 (Mich. 2000) (stating that “the smell of burned, burning, and unburned marijuana, when immediately apparent, are equally incriminating”). We agree with the latter view. Even if the marijuana was smoked at some time in the past, it is not uncommon for officers to find marijuana residue or the ends of marijuana cigarettes after detecting the odor of burnt marijuana. See, e.g., Sebastian v. State, 726 N.E.2d 827, 828-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (after smelling burnt marijuana emanating from a car, a pat-down search of the driver yielded a metal pipe containing marijuana residue), trans. denied. In addition, if the odor of burnt marijuana is indicative that marijuana may yet be present in a car – a proposition that Edmond does not contest – it seems equally likely that marijuana on a person’s breath is indicative that that person may possess marijuana.] . . . .
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Although we have previously held that the odor of burnt marijuana establishes probable cause to search a vehicle, Hawkins, 766 N.E.2d at 752, it appears that we have never determined whether the smell of burnt marijuana alone may constitute probable cause to support an arrest and search incident to arrest. See Sebastian, 726 N.E.2d at 830 (noting that we have never expressly decided that issue, but suggested in Shinault v. State, 668 N.E.2d 274, 278 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), that the odor of marijuana coming from the defendant’s person might establish probable cause for arrest and search incident thereto). Because the odor of burnt marijuana might linger in a vehicle for a period of time, that odor does not necessarily indicate illegal activity by a current occupant; however, we note that Officer Drennan specifically smelled marijuana on Edmond’s breath in addition to the odor coming from his vehicle. Furthermore, Edmond was alone in the vehicle. Under these circumstances, we conclude that a person of reasonable caution would be warranted in the belief that Edmond possessed marijuana; therefore, Officer Drennan had probable cause to arrest him and had a lawful basis to search his person. [Footnote omitted.]
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While the evidence against Edmond may not have been as strong as that in many other cases involving drugs, the evidence was nevertheless sufficient to establish probable cause for arrest; therefore, we conclude that the degree of suspicion weighs in the State’s favor. Although the search of a person’s body is a substantial intrusion, a police officer is authorized to conduct a thorough search of an arrestee. Officer Drennan conducted only a pat-down search of Edmond’s clothing; thus, the degree of intrusion was minimal under the circumstances. . . . A search incident to arrest serves important purposes, such as ensuring that the arrestee is unarmed, preventing the arrestee from bringing contraband into jail, and preventing the destruction of evidence. Andrews v. State, 588 N.E.2d 1298, 1303 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). Therefore, we conclude that law enforcement needs also weigh in the State’s favor. As all three factors support the officer’s action in this case, we conclude that Edmond’s rights under Article 1, Section 13 were not violated. [Footnote omitted.] Because Edmond’s rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 13 were not violated, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the marijuana found in his pocket into evidence.
ROBB, C.J., and NAJAM, J., concur.