SULLIVAN, J.
Ronald Keith Fromme, a defendant in a child molesting prosecution, contends that he has a constitutional right to inspect the records of a nongovernmental counseling agency, notwithstanding the General Assembly’s enactment of a “victim advocate privilege” shielding such records from discovery. Because neither the Due Process Clause nor the Sixth Amendment requires disclosure of information protected by this privilege in the present case, we enforce the victim advocate privilege as enacted.
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After being charged with two counts of child molesting, Fromme asked the Dubois Circuit Court to require Crisis Connection to provide him with all records in its possession relating to the alleged victims, M.Y. and D.Y., and their mother. Crisis Connection argued that Indiana‘s “victim advocate privilege,” codified at Indiana Code section 35-37-6-9, gave it authority to refuse record requests in such circumstances. The court ordered Crisis Connection to deliver the records to the court for its in camera review to determine their relevance before turning them over to Fromme.
Before proceeding further, the court agreed to Crisis Connection’s request that its decision be reviewed by the Court of Appeals. State v. Fromme (In re Subpoena to Crisis Connec-tion, Inc.), 930 N.E.2d 1169, 1172 (Ind. Ct. App.), aff‘d on reh‘g, 933 N.E.2d 915 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). That court concluded that “[t]he interest in privacy asserted by Crisis Connection, while important, [was] not strong enough to bar an in camera review of its records.” Id. at 1190.
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The General Assembly enacted Indiana’s “victim advocate privilege” in 1987. Pub. L. No. 136-1987, § 5, 1987 Ind. Acts 1872, 1874-77. This privilege protects victims, victim advocates, and victim service providers [footnote omitted] from being “compelled to give testimony, to produce records, or to disclose any information concerning confidential communications [footnote omitted] and confidential information [footnote omitted] to anyone or in any judicial, legislative, or administrative proceeding.” Ind. Code § 35-37-6-9(a) (2008). [Footnote omitted.] The General Assembly has expressly provided that the victim advocate privilege applies in cases like the present one. [Footnote omitted.] Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that this privilege applies to Crisis Connection’s records, In re Subpoena to Crisis Connection, 930 N.E.2d at 1175; we adopt that portion of its opinion and incorporate it by reference, App. R. 58(A)(1).
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The Court of Appeals did not grant Fromme’s request that Crisis Connection‘s records be provided directly to him. But the court did hold that they should be turned over to the trial court for determining the records to which Fromme was entitled. In re Subpoena to Crisis Connection, 930 N.E.2d at 1190. The court’s decision was grounded in Fromme having met a three-step test we have established for the discoverability of records by a criminal defendant in certain circumstances: (1) there must be sufficient designation of the items sought to be discovered (particularity); (2) the requested items must be material to the defense (relevance or materiality); and (3) if the first two requirements are met, the trial court must grant the request unless there is a showing of “paramount interest” in nondisclosure. State v. Cline (In re WTHR-TV), 693 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind. 1998) (citing Kindred v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1161, 1174 (Ind. 1989)). [Footnote omitted.]
In another case handed down today, Crawford v. State, No. 49S05-1106-CR-370, — N.E.2d — (Ind. 2011), we apply this test to determine the discoverability of information not protected by privilege. But this test is not reached when the question is the discoverability of information that is otherwise privileged. The General Assembly has made this information off-limits and we are compelled to uphold its decision unless it violates the Constitution.
The case law makes clear that the three-step test applies only to discover nonprivileged information. In Jorgensen v. State, we applied this test to determine the discoverability of nonprivileged information held by a psychologist under the homicide exception to the psychologist-patient privilege . . . . 574 N.E.2d 915, 917-18 (Ind. 1991). We explicitly stated that the test applied “[w]ith respect to non-privileged information.” . . . .
To the extent that the decisions of the Court of Appeals have applied the three-step test to “privileged” information, they are distinguishable. For example, in Williams v. State, the privilege making prescriptions confidential contained an exception that allowed the information to be disclosed “in connection with a criminal prosecution.” 819 N.E.2d 381, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Similarly, the privilege in Sturgill v. State contained a provision granting the court access to the information. 497 N.E.2d 1070, 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). [Footnote omitted.]
In the cases discussed above, some exception to an otherwise-applicable privilege existed to allow the court to review the information – the court either reviewed the information because some of the information was or could have been nonprivileged or the privilege itself authorized review. But unlike those cases, an in camera review of the information in this case would not reveal any nonprivileged information and the privilege does not give the court that authority. As we have already recognized, there is no dispute that the records Fromme seeks from Crisis Connection are covered by the victim advocate privilege, and the General Assembly has expressly provided that the privilege applies in cases like this to prohibit any disclosure. Put differently, there is no chance that the information sought in this case is anything other than privileged, and under our decisions in Jorgensen and Pelley, that ends the inquiry.
We acknowledge, of course, that the privilege must yield to Fromme’s constitutional rights. And he contends that invoking it to prevent his access to Crisis Connection’s records violates his rights under the Sixth Amendment [footnote omitted] to confront witnesses against him and to compel witnesses in his favor, as well as his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment [footnote omitted] to due process of law. [Footnote omitted.] . . . .
The Supreme Court‘s Confrontation Clause cases have been divided generally into two broad categories: “cases involving the admission of out-of-court statements and cases involving restrictions imposed by law or by the trial court on the scope of cross-examination.” . . . .
Criminal defendants in cases like the present one have traditionally argued a violation of this second protection – by denying access to records necessary to prepare his or her defense, so the argument goes, the trial court has interfered with the defendant‘s right of cross-examination. . . . .
A plurality of the Supreme Court, however, has rejected this argument under the Confrontation Clause. [Footnote omitted.] Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 51-54. In Ritchie, the State of Pennsylvania had created an agency to investigate cases of suspected mistreatment and neglect called Children and Youth Services (“CYS”). . . . After being charged with several sex offenses against his daughter, Ritchie subpoenaed CYS for her records. Id. CYS claimed that the records were privileged under a Pennsylvania statute similar to the one at issue in the present case. Id. Ritchie argued that his ability to question his daughter at trial was hindered without the CYS material because he did not know what types of questions would expose the weaknesses in her testimony, if she had made statements inconsistent with her trial testimony, or if she had acted with an improper motive. . . . Thus, according to Ritchie, he had been denied his right to cross-examine his daughter effectively. . . .
But the plurality opinion refused to conclude that Ritchie’s Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination had been violated. Instead, it reasoned that such a broad interpretation of the Confrontation Clause would ‘transform [it] into a constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial discovery.” . . . Basing its conclusion on precedent, the plurality categorized the right of confrontation as a “trial right.” . . . It instructed that “[t]he ability to question adverse witnesses . . . does not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony.” Thus, the plurality concluded, “[W]ith respect to this issue, the Confrontation Clause only protects a defendant’s trial rights, and does not compel the pretrial production of information that might be useful in preparing for trial.” . . . . [Footnote omitted.]
Relying on the fact that Ritchie represented only a plurality view, the Court of Appeals concluded that Fromme had a Confrontation Clause right to have these documents inspected before trial. We do not agree. . . . [A]ccording to the predominate view of the Confrontation Clause, as long as the trial court does not improperly prevent Fromme from cross-examining the alleged victims at trial, his rights under the Confrontation Clause will not be violated.
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Ritchie is also the touchstone for analyzing Fromme’s arguments under the Compulsory Process and Due Process Clauses. . . . .
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The Court in Ritchie expressed no opinion on privileges that prohibit all disclosure whatsoever, including disclosure to judicial personnel or law enforcement. . . . .
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The substance of Indiana’s victim advocate privilege is similarly distinguishable from that in Ritchie. As mentioned above, the privilege protects victims, victim advocates, and victim service providers from being “compelled to give testimony, to produce records, or to disclose any information concerning confidential communications and confidential information to anyone or in any judicial, legislative, or administrative proceeding.” I.C. § 35-37-6-9(a) (emphasis added). It does not authorize any balancing of interests or in camera review in criminal prosecutions; unlike the privilege in Ritchie, it makes no exception for the disclosure of confidential communications or information by court order. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57-58.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the Court in Ritchie grounded its due process analysis on the government’s obligation under Brady v. Maryland “to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment.” . . . Some jurisdictions have therefore also distinguished their privileges from that in Ritchie by finding that they do not protect agents of the State from disclosure; as such, Brady does not require disclosure of the information. [Footnote omitted.] . . . .
Indiana’s victim advocate privilege is again similarly distinguishable. The definition of “victim service provider” excludes groups that are affiliated with law enforcement. I.C. § 35-37-6-5. The definition of “victim advocate” further excludes law enforcement officers, employees or agents of law enforcement officers, prosecuting attorneys, and employees or agents of prosecuting attorneys. I.C. § 35-37-6-3.5(b). Moreover, the privilege expressly states that it does not “relieve a prosecuting attorney of the constitutional and ethical obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence.” I.C. § 35-37-6-14(a)(1). Thus, by its terms, Indiana’s victim advocate privilege avoids Brady issues by excluding from its protection persons affiliated with the State; to be sure, it seems to support compliance with the obligations imposed by Brady.
In sum, “[t]he dispositive issue in Ritchie was the government’s obligation under the Due Process Clause to provide discovery of records in its possession containing evidence both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment.” Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 559 (Ky. 2003) (emphasis in original deleted).
For many courts then, a finding that a privilege does not protect the government from disclosure ends the inquiry – Ritchie does not require an in camera review. But at least one court has not stopped there. In a case where the information was not in the government‘s possession, the Kentucky Supreme Court analyzed the privilege with reference to the Compulsory Process Clause, an analysis expressly not considered by the Supreme Court in Ritchie. Id. at 563 (concluding that criminal defendants have a right under the Compulsory Process Clause to obtain and present exculpatory evidence in the possession of a third party that would otherwise be privileged); see Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56 (“[W]e need not decide today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
Although we are reluctant to engage in an uncertain Compulsory Process Clause analysis, we agree with the Kentucky Supreme Court that our inquiry into defendants’ constitutional rights should not end here. . . . .
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In sum, by providing a complete ban to disclosure in cases like the present one, Indiana’s victim advocate privilege advances the State’s compelling interest in maintaining the confidentiality of information gathered in the course of serving emotional and psychological needs of victims of domestic violence and sexual abuse. For the reasons stated above, this interest is not outweighed by Fromme’s right to present a complete defense. Accordingly, Fromme does not have a constitutional right to an in camera review of Crisis Connection’s records. In the absence of a violation of Fromme’s constitutional rights, we apply the victim advocate privilege as provided by the General Assembly.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.