SULLIVAN, J.
A juvenile challenges the admissibility of his confession in a delinquency proceeding on grounds that he was not afforded an opportunity for meaningful consultation with his mother and that the waiver of his rights was not knowing and voluntary. We conclude that there was substantial evidence of probative value to support the juvenile court’s decision to admit the confession. We also conclude that the juvenile waiver form used by the police in this case should be clarified.
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In Indiana, there are thus four requirements that must be satisfied before a juvenile’s statements made during a custodial interrogation [footnote omitted] can be used in the State’s case-in-chief. First, both the juvenile and his or her parent [footnote omitted] must be adequately advised of the juvenile’s rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 467-74, 478-79; Lewis, 259 Ind. at 439, 288 N.E.2d at 142. Second, the juvenile must be given an opportunity for meaningful consultation with his or her parent. I.C. § 31-32-5-1(2); Lewis, 259 Ind. at 439, 288 N.E.2d at 142. Third, both the juvenile and his or her parent must knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the juvenile’s rights. I.C. § 31-32-5-1(2); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-76. Finally, the juvenile’s statements must be voluntary and not the result of coercive police activity. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
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To prove that “actual consultation of a meaningful nature” occurred, the State needs only to prove that the police provided a relatively private atmosphere that was free from police pressure in which the juvenile and the parent could have had a meaningful discussion about the “allegations, the circumstances of the case, and the ramifications of their responses to police questioning and confessions.” . . . The interrogating officer cannot dictate or even recommend how they should use this time. . . .“What is important is that the child and adult be aware of and understand the child’s rights in order to discuss them intelligently.” . . . Once such an opportunity is provided, it is up to the juvenile and the parent to use this opportunity to their advantage. . . . The State need not show that the consultation was beneficial in helping the juvenile and his or her parent decide whether to waive or stand on the juvenile’s rights. . . . Rather, the extent to which the conversation aids in the waiver decision “is a circumstance among many others which the trial court may consider in arriving at its decision as to whether the waiver is voluntary and knowing.” . . . .
D.M.’s primary argument is that the “uncontested evidence” establishes that Mother was told that she could not talk to her son until she signed a waiver, and, therefore, the decision to waive his rights was made prior to the opportunity for consultation. We cannot characterize Mother’s testimony as “uncontested.” Although the State did not directly contradict Mother’s testimony, it did attempt to impeach her credibility. For example, it challenged her memory by showing that she could not remember how many times she had signed the juvenile waiver form. . . . .
Even accepting Mother’s testimony as true, other facts in the record demonstrate that the actual procedure utilized was sufficient to remedy any prior ambiguity and that D.M.’s rights were not waived until after an opportunity for meaningful consultation had been provided. Quigley advised both D.M. and Mother of D.M.’s rights, after which they acknowledged an understanding of those rights and signed the advisement section of the waiver form. At this point, D.M. had not waived any rights or been interrogated. Quigley then told D.M. and Mother that they could have as much time to talk as they needed. He showed them that he was turning off his tape recorder and told them he would take it with him while they talked. He then left them sitting in his car, alone, and walked about 20 feet away from the car to talk to some of the uniformed officers. At this distance he could not overhear their conversation, and there is no evidence that any other police officer was near the car or could overhear their conversation. Quigley returned to the car after several minutes and asked them if they were done talking, and Mother said that they were. He then read the waiver section of the form to them and allowed them to read it. It is unclear whether Mother actually read the form, but both she and D.M. signed the waiver. After the waiver was signed, Quigley began the interrogation by asking D.M. to tell him what had happened that day. Thus, D.M.’s rights were not waived until after he and Mother had had an opportunity for meaningful consultation free from police pressure. Moreover, this was not a case where “the precise forces [the consultation requirement] was designed to protect against had already been fully applied by overzealous police activities.” Hall, 264 Ind. at 453, 346 N.E.2d at 587.
D.M. also argues that the atmosphere was too intimidating for a “meaningful consultation” because he and Mother were in the backseat of a police car, there were many uniformed officers and firefighters on scene, Mother was concerned that their conversation was being recorded (despite Quigley’s statement to the contrary), and some of the firefighters were glaring at and making hostile comments to Mother prior to Quigley’s arrival. The atmosphere here is analogous to the atmosphere in Fowler v. State, 483 N.E.2d 739, 743 (Ind. 1985). In that case, we concluded that the juvenile and his mother had had sufficient privacy to discuss the waiver decision even though they talked in a laboratory reception area at the police station where people were “coming and going” while the interrogating officer stood on the opposite side of a sliding-glass window. Id. To be sure, the consultation in Fowler occurred at the stationhouse instead of a police car, but this is a distinction without significance. The reception area in Fowler was not accessible to the public, so the people who were “coming and going” through the area would have been officers or other government employees, and, in general, many police officers are present in and around police stations. In point of fact, D.M. and Mother arguably had more privacy and less intimidating surroundings than the juvenile in Fowler because they were left alone in a car through which people were not “coming and going” and were in the familiar surroundings of their neighborhood, rather than the unfamiliar atmosphere of a police station. Mother’s concern that they were being recorded is not relevant here to whether the police complied with the requirement – Quigley told them that he would not record their private conversation and there is no evidence that he was attempting to trick them. Furthermore, had he recorded them, the confession would have been excluded under the precedent of the Court of Appeals. See Bryant v. State, 802 N.E.2d 486, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (secretly recording consultation was impermissible police presence), trans. denied; see also S.D. v. State, 937 N.E.2d 425, 431 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (videotaping consultation was impermissible police presence), trans. denied. . . . .
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In sum, there is substantial evidence of probative value that D.M. and Mother were afforded an opportunity for meaningful consultation free from police pressure. The meaningful consultation requirement is a safeguard in addition to Miranda intended to ensure that police action does not overcome the juvenile’s will and result in a compelled statement. Mother’s apparent reluctance to engage in any meaningful dialogue with D.M. concerning D.M.’s rights and the waiver of those rights was not due to any police pressures. Rather, the police provided D.M. an opportunity for meaningful consultation with his custodial parent before the waiver of his rights.
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The dispute in this case may have been averted had the juvenile waiver form been clearer. Although the form was not so deficient that it violated the constitutional requirements of Miranda or the essential statutory requirements of Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1, it could have provided more accurate and clear guidance such that there would be no dispute here.
At the top of the form, the words “JUVENILE WAIVER” are printed in large, approximately 40-point, font size using all capital letters. The form itself is divided into two parts: the top part of the form is the “Warning of Rights” (“advisement section”), and the bottom part of the form is the “Waiver” (“waiver section”).
We perceive several deficiencies with the waiver form. First, and most important, is the last sentence of the advisement section – “My parents and/or legal guardian and I have been allowed time by ourselves without the presence of a police officer to discuss the waiver of my rights before signing the waiver of rights.” By using the past tense “have been,” the form suggests that the opportunity for consultation occurred before the advisement, or at least before signing the acknowledgment of the advisement. But in this case, the opportunity for consultation occurred after the advisement and before the waiver. This is as it should be. In fact, a consultation can only be meaningful where both the juvenile and the parent are advised of the juvenile’s rights prior to the consultation:
To ensure that a juvenile’s waiver of constitutional rights is voluntary, Lewis prescribed the procedural safeguards to be followed by the police. First, both the juvenile and the parent or guardian must be informed of the right to an attorney and the right to remain silent. Second, the juvenile must be given a meaningful opportunity to consult with his [or her] parent, guardian or attorney about the waiver decision. A meaningful opportunity for the parent-juvenile consultation requires timeliness: pursuant to Lewis, the consultation must occur after the advisement of rights but prior to the decision to execute a waiver and make a statement. To be meaningful, the consultation must be held in the absence of pressures which result from police presence.
Douglas, 481 N.E.2d at 111 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). [Footnote omitted.]
We acknowledge that there is dicta in Cherrone v. State, 726 N.E.2d 251, 255 n.1 (Ind. 2000), and Brown, 751 N.E.2d at 670, indicating that it remains an open question as to whether a consultation can be meaningful when it occurs before the parent has been advised of the juvenile’s rights. We disavow these dicta to the extent that they conflict with Douglas.
This deficiency can be remedied simply by changing the past tense to the present or future tense: “My parents and/or legal guardian and I will be allowed time by ourselves without the presence of a police officer to discuss the waiver of my rights before signing the waiver of rights.”
A second deficiency in the waiver form involves its style and presentation. The form contains both an advisement-of-rights section and a waiver-of-rights section. But the title of the form is “JUVENILE WAIVER,” and it is emblazoned across the top of the page in font that is more than three times larger than any other font. This is bound to cause confusion, especially in cases like the present one where a parent is allegedly told by officers that he or she must “sign a waiver” before speaking to the juvenile. Such statements are ambiguous because the form is titled “Juvenile Waiver” and the parent signs the form before speaking to his or her child, but this signature does not waive any rights. Alternatively, such statements by officers could mean that the parent has to waive the child’s rights before speaking with the child, which is clearly incorrect under Indiana law. The form itself does nothing to dispel this ambiguity when it is titled, in large font and all capital letters “JUVENILE WAIVER.” The more accurate title for such a form is “Juvenile and Parent (or Guardian) Advisement & Waiver of Rights.” Related to this is the subheading “Warning of Rights,” which sounds and looks similar to “Waiver of Rights.” It would therefore be clearer to use a subheading such as “Advisement of Rights” for the top part of the form and “Waiver of Rights” for the bottom part of the form. Finally, instead of the officer acknowledging these signings only at the end of the form (after both the advisement and waiver), the officer should separately acknowledge both sets of signatures and provide the time at which each occurred.
Lastly, the waiver section does not clearly indicate that both the juvenile and the parent are required to waive the juvenile’s rights. The three statements are phrased such that they apply only to the juvenile, which suggests that it is only the juvenile who is waiving his or her rights. To be sure, the signature line requires the signature of the parent, rather than a mere witness. Cf. Garrett, 351 N.E.2d at 33. But the form could more clearly indicate the parent’s role.
Written waiver forms are not required to satisfy the constitutional demands of Miranda or the statutory requirements of Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1, but they are particularly strong evidence.21 [21 We request that the Judicial Conference of Indiana‟s Juvenile Justice Improvement Committee develop a form for juvenile and parent (or guardian) advisement and waiver of rights.] When they are used, they should be clear and unequivocal. Had a clearer form been used in this case, any putative confusion likely would have been resolved as soon as the form was read by D.M. and Mother. A clear form following the guidelines provided here should serve to clarify any ambiguities that arise prior to signing the form and thereby prevent a court from undertaking an in-depth look at how ambiguous and innocent pre-custodial-interrogation occurrences affect the actual custodial interrogation and the requisite procedures applicable to such interrogation.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson and David, JJ., concur.
Rucker, J., concurs in result.