SULLIVAN, J.
In In re Subpoena to Crisis Connection, Inc., No. 19S05-1012-CR-678, — N.E.2d — (Ind. 2011), another case handed down today, we hold that the three-step test for the discoverability of information outlined in State v. Cline (In re WTHR-TV), 693 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind. 1998), is not reached when information is protected by an unqualified privilege unless a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights would be violated by enforcing the privilege. Because no privilege is at issue in this case, we apply the three-step test and conclude that the defendant has not satisfied the requirements for the discoverability of the information he seeks.
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We reiterate that although both this case and In re Subpoena to Crisis Connection involve requests for production to private third-parties, the primary difference between the two is that the information sought in this case is not protected from disclosure by a privilege. The requested information [from a private production company, Lucky Shift] at issue here includes:
Request #18: Footage of any and all statements of officers, agents, or affiliates of [Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”)] or any reenactment thereof.
Request #19: Footage of anyone interviewed or questioned, or any reenactment thereof, in connection with the investigation of the death of Gernell Jackson.
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Pursuant to the Trial Rules, we have held that the following three-step test should be used to determine the discoverability of information in criminal cases: (1) there must be sufficient designation of the items sought to be discovered (particularity); (2) the items requested must be material to the defense (relevance or materiality); and (3) if the first two requirements are met, the trial court must grant the request unless there is a showing of “paramount interest‖ in nondisclosure. In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d at 6 (citing Kindred v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1161, 1174 (Ind. 1989)). [Footnote omitted.] The Court of Appeals concluded that the requests at issue failed to even make the first showing (particularity). Crawford, 946 N.E.2d at 1228. We agree.
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With respect to Request #18 and Request #19, Crawford argues that he “was, in effect, simply seeking footage of interviews of potential witnesses, either police or civilian [and] either known to [him] or unknown, who might have information pertinent to [his] defense.” Pet. to Transfer 7. Although we understand why Crawford might want this information, we agree with the lower courts that he has failed to state with reasonable particularity what he wants. He seeks “footage of any and all statements of [IMPD] officers, agents, or affiliates” and “footage of anyone interviewed or questioned . . . in connection with the investigation of the death of [the murder victim].” Arguably, he requests something more particular than “give me everything related to the case,” but he is still basically asking for anything anyone has ever said to Lucky Shift with regard to this case. We see no real difference between the two. In each of the challenged requests, Crawford does not state with reasonable particularity what footage or statements or interviews he seeks – he is merely fishing for it. But, as we have noted, “discovery rights do not entitle a criminal defendant to commandeer the efforts of third parties as a substitute for independent defense investigation.” WTHR-TV v. Milam, 690 N.E.2d 1174, 1176 (Ind. 1998).
. . . We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in quashing these discovery requests.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.