ROBB, C.J.
….
Because we may affirm a trial court’s summary judgment on any theory or basis in the record, we first consider the parties’ arguments as to whether Price has standing to maintain this legal malpractice action. We begin by noting principles of bankruptcy law under which, while Price’s bankruptcy was pending, the malpractice claim against Kuchaes belonged to the trustee and not to Price. “The Bankruptcy Code provides that the bankruptcy estate consists of all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” Hammes v. Brumley, 659 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 n.4 (Ind. 1995) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)). “Once a debtor files bankruptcy, any unliquidated lawsuits, including any personal injury cause of action, become part of the bankruptcy estate.” Id. “Unless scheduled by the debtor and abandoned by the trustee in bankruptcy, such rights of action may no longer be pursued by the debtor.” Id. “[E]ven if scheduled, the debtor is divested of standing to pursue any cause of action and suit must be brought by the trustee.” Id. at 1026. This is so even after the bankruptcy is completed and the debtor’s debts are discharged by the bankruptcy court. See United States ex rel. Gebert v. Transp. Admin. Servs., 260 F.3d 909, 912-13 (8th Cir. 2001); Hammes, 659 N.E.2d at 1025-26 (stating debtor-plaintiffs’ negligence actions violated the above bankruptcy principles; personal injury causes of action existed when bankruptcies were filed yet were not scheduled as assets, and plaintiffs filed their actions after bankruptcy court discharged their debts); cf. Cannon-Stokes v. Potter, 453 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating under the doctrine of judicial estoppel that “a debtor in bankruptcy who denies owning an asset, including a chose in action or other legal claim, cannot realize on that concealed asset after the bankruptcy ends”), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1099 (2006). If, however, the claim at issue is both (1) disclosed and (2) abandoned by the trustee, the debtor may pursue the claim. Robson v. Texas E. Corp., 833 N.E.2d 461, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
Price did ultimately disclose to the bankruptcy court, albeit not in his initial filing, his malpractice claim against Kuchaes. Yet Price does not allege, and the record does not indicate, that the trustee abandoned the claim. The present case, however, involves the different scenario where the Price bankruptcy has been dismissed rather than completed. Thus we distinguish this case from Cannon-Stokes, Gebert, and Hammes, which addressed situations where a debtor sought to pursue an unscheduled claim after having debts discharged by the bankruptcy court.
In Shewmaker v. Etter, this court, and our supreme court by adoption, concluded that the dismissal of the plaintiff’s bankruptcy, after the bankruptcy court permitted him to amend his schedule to include a previously undisclosed personal injury cause of action, returned the cause of action to him, and therefore the plaintiff was not divested of standing. 644 N.E.2d 922, 927-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)), opinion expressly adopted, Hammes, 659 N.E.2d 1021 (Ind. 1995). Like the plaintiff in Shewmaker, Price was permitted by the bankruptcy court to amend his schedule to include the previously undisclosed malpractice claim. Then, as indicated by the bankruptcy court’s order, Price’s bankruptcy was dismissed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 1307(b). App. at 552. While section 1307(b) has no language setting forth the effect of a dismissal, section 349 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “[u]nless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a case other than under section 742 of this title . . . (3) revests the property of the [bankruptcy] estate in the entity in which such property was vested immediately before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case.” 11 U.S.C. § 349(b). “The word ‘entity’ means debtor.” Shewmaker, 644 N.E.2d at 928 (citing In re Baylies, 114 B.R. 324 (Bankr. D. D.C. 1990)). Thus, the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing Price’s bankruptcy had the effect of returning the malpractice action from the bankruptcy estate to Price. See Cent. N.J. Freightliner, Inc. v. Freightliner Corp., 987 F. Supp. 289, 294 (D. N.J. 1997) (stating that “dismissal of a bankruptcy case essentially restores the parties to the position they assumed prepetition”); cf. Kunica v. St. Jean Fin., Inc., 233 B.R. 46, 53-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (addressing scenario where debtor’s claims were never disclosed at any time during bankruptcy and concluding that dismissal of bankruptcy did not then restore debtor’s standing to pursue such claims).
In sum, Price was divested of standing to pursue the malpractice action while his bankruptcy was pending. Yet the dismissal of his bankruptcy in July 2009, before the trial court ruled on either party’s motion for summary judgment, returned ownership of the action to him. Therefore, he now has standing to pursue the action against Kuchaes, and the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Kuchaes cannot be sustained on the basis of standing.
NAJAM, J., and CRONE, J., concur.