SULLIVAN, J.
The defendant in this criminal case wrote the judge a few months prior to trial complaining that his public defender, who had a well-documented history of neglecting clients, had been neglecting his case. The judge passed the complaint along to the county public defender’s office, reasoning that she had no authority to take further action. The judge’s failure to inquire further did not violate Johnson’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. We hold, however, that a judge faced with similar circumstances must at the very least receive assurances from the public defender’s office that the complaint has been adequately addressed. But because Johnson failed to renew his objection at trial and because defense counsel appeared at trial and subjected the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, we affirm.
On June 3, 2009, approximately three months prior to trial, Johnson sent a letter to the trial court judge complaining that his public defender, Patrick Schrems, was ignoring his case. In the letter, Johnson in some detail complained that he had not seen his attorney since August, 2008 (“and then only briefly”); that his attorney did not answer his numerous letters or return his brother’s phone calls; and that when they saw each other at pretrial hearings, the attorney would tell him that he would be coming to see him at the jail but never did. Id. at 898. When the judge got Johnson’s letter, she “forwarded Johnson’s complaint to the Public Defender’s Office and notified Johnson that [her] authority [was] limited to the appointment of the Monroe County Public Defender Office and that it [was] the Office’s internal obligation to assign cases to individual public defenders.” Id. Neither the judge nor Johnson took further action on the matter prior to trial. Johnson’s jury trial was conducted on September 2 through September 4, 2009, and he was sentenced on October 6, 2009. Neither Johnson nor his counsel raised any objections to the representation during the trial or the sentencing hearing. [Footnote omitted.]
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Even though the Sixth Amendment did not impose a duty on the trial court judge to inquire into Johnson’s complaint, we think that, under circumstances similar to those in the present case, a judge should do more than simply pass the complaint along.
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Although indigent defense counsel must have professional independence, judges cannot take a complete “hands-off” approach and totally rely on a bureaucratic agency, lest we develop problems similar to those that occurred in England. In fact, the standard for independence requires only that appointed defense counsel “’be free from political influence and should be subject to judicial supervision only in the same manner and to the same extent as are lawyers in private practice.’” Standards for Indigent Defense Services in Non-Capital Cases, supra, Standard A cmt., at 2 (quoting Standards for Criminal Justice: Providing Defense Services Standard 5-1.3, at 13 (3d ed. 1990)).
In reforming our public defender system, the General Assembly intended for the trial judge to retain some authority with regard to indigent defense counsel. For example, a county’s decision to adopt the Commission’s standards and seek reimbursement “does not prevent a court from appointing counsel other than counsel provided for under the board’s plan for providing defense services to an indigent person when the interests of justice require.” I.C. § 33-40-7-10(a). And a judge can make a written request to the state public defender to have a qualified attorney appointed if the judge determines either “(1) that an attorney provided under the county public defender board’s plan is not qualified or available to represent the person; or (2) that in the interests of justice an attorney other than the attorney provided for by the county defender board’s plan should be appointed.” I.C. § 33-40-7-10(b).
To be sure, trial court judges often receive letters from disgruntled defendants complaining about their appointed lawyers, and many of these complaints – we are willing to assume most – will be unfounded. It would be impossible and unreasonable for a judge to investigate every such complaint. But in instances like this, where appointed counsel has a track record of the professional misconduct complained of, the judge should at minimum require assurance from the public defender’s office that the issue will be resolved. This would neither inhibit the independence of public defenders nor impose an onerous burden on our trial judges.
Although the trial court judge failed to receive assurance from the public defender’s office in this case, that failure did not prejudice the defendant. Johnson sent his letter three months before trial and then did not raise the issue again until after his sentencing hearing. Counsel appeared several times on Johnson’s behalf prior to trial, and both Johnson and his counsel were at trial. Counsel gave an opening statement, cross-examined the prosecution’s witnesses, and gave closing arguments. The only witness called by defense counsel was the defendant himself, and his testimony essentially denied everything established by the victim’s testimony and that of other prosecution witnesses. The jury, however, found the victim’s testimony and the testimony of other prosecution witnesses more reliable and found the defendant guilty. There is nothing to suggest that the outcome would have been different or that the trial was not reliable solely be-cause the trial court failed to receive assurances from the public defender’s office that Johnson’s complaint had been addressed.
We emphasize that this duty stems not from the Sixth Amendment or any provision of the Indiana Constitution, but from this Court’s supervisory powers and a trial court judge’s inherent authority over the parties and proceedings before it.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.