DAVID, J.
We hold that once concealment has been established, statutes of limitations for criminal offenses are tolled under Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(h) (2008) until a prosecuting authority becomes aware or should have become aware of sufficient evidence to charge the defendant. We also hold that under the facts of this case there was no double jeopardy violation because each challenged offense was established by separate and distinct facts.
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I. Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(h)(2)
For misdemeanors and most classes of felonies, Indiana has enacted statutes of limitations, which permit the commencement of criminal proceedings against defendants only within a fixed period of time from the commission of a crime. These statutes’ primary purpose is to protect defendants from the prejudice that a delay in prosecution could bring, such as fading memories and stale evidence. See Kifer v. State, 740 N.E.2d 586, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). They also “strike[] a balance between an individual‘s interest in repose and the State‘s interest in having sufficient time to investigate and build its case.” Heitman v. State, 627 N.E.2d 1307, 1309 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
A tolling provision allows for an interruption of the statute-of-limitations period under certain circumstances. Essentially, these provisions allow prosecution to commence after the statute-of-limitations period would have otherwise run.
Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(a)(1) applies to most classes of felonies, including Sloan‘s Class C felony child-molesting charge, and sets a five-year limitation period for those crimes. Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(h)(2), a concealment-tolling provision, tolls a statute of limitations if “the accused person conceals evidence of the offense, and evidence sufficient to charge the person with that offense is unknown to the prosecuting authority and could not have been discovered by that authority by exercise of due diligence[.]” [Footnote omitted.]
Sloan last molested M.A. in 1991. M.A. did not disclose the molestations to authorities until 2008. Sixteen years after the last occurrence of molestation, prosecution commenced.
Sloan contends that under Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(a)(1) the statute of limitations has run for his Class C felony child-molesting charge, and thus the trial court should have dismissed that charge. The State does not dispute that prosecution commenced more than five years after the last act of molestation. But the State argues that the concealment-tolling provision found in Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(h)(2) permitted the delayed prosecution. The State explains that because the defendant had taken affirmative acts to conceal the abuse—namely, telling M.A. she would go to jail if she disclosed the molestations—the statute of limitations was tolled until M.A. disclosed the abuse to the authorities in 2008. Sloan concedes that he committed affirmative acts of concealment through his intimidation of M.A. but argues that the concealment, and tolling, ended in 1991 when his “coercive influence” over M.A. ceased. [Footnote omitted]. Sloan asserts that because prosecution commenced sixteen years after that point, it was well beyond the applicable five-year limitation period.
Resolution of this issue turns on the interpretation of Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(h)(2): once concealment is established, when does tolling end?
This Court interpreted Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(h)(2) in Crider v. State, 531 N.E.2d 1151 (Ind. 1988), also a child-molest case. In Crider, the defendant was convicted of a number of crimes, including child molesting, which were subject to a five-year statute-of-limitations period. Id. at 1153–54. The defendant had filed a motion to dismiss the counts, arguing that the charges were brought after the applicable statute-of-limitations period and that the prosecutor failed to produce evidence that the alleged crimes were committed within that period. Id. at 1154. The trial court denied the motion. This Court affirmed, finding that the concealment-tolling provision of Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(h)(2) applied. Because the defendant had committed positive acts of intimidation that amounted to concealment against his victim–daughter, “the statute of limitations did not run until the victim made her disclosure to authorities.” Crider, 531 N.E.2d at 1154.
In determining when the tolling ended in Sloan‘s case, the Court of Appeals did not find Crider “determinative” and decided that “wholesale application of Crider’s ‘disclosure to authorities’ language” would be inappropriate. Sloan, 926 N.E.2d at 1099. The Court of Appeals explained that multiple Court of Appeals decisions after Crider suggest that the proper inquiry to determine when tolling ends under the concealment statute is not when the victim disclosed the crime to authorities but when the defendant‘s acts of concealment terminated. [Footnote omitted.] Id. at 1099–1101. The Court of Appeals also noted that Crider lacked some factual details, such as whether the defendant‘s threats continued after the last incident of molestation. Id. at 1099. The Court of Appeals finally noted that to hold that tolling continues until the victim discloses the crime to authorities—without regard to when the acts of concealment terminated—would contravene the statute‘s intended purpose. Id. at 1101. Engaging in a fact-specific inquiry, the Court of Appeals determined that under Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(h)(2) concealment ended in 1991 when the molestations ceased and Sloan and M.A. had less contact with each other. Id. at 1101–02. This is a prudent approach to the issue. However, the rules of statutory interpretation compel us to reach a different conclusion.
It is true that exceptions to statutes of limitations must be “construed narrowly and in a light most favorable to the accused.” State v. Holmes, 181 Ind. App. 634, 637, 393 N.E.2d 242, 244 (1979). But the overarching principle in statutory interpretation is to first decide “whether the legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question.” Rheem Mf‘g Co. v. Phelps Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 941, 947 (Ind. 2001). If a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts do not apply any rules of construction other than giving effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language. Id.; e.g., Benham v. State, 637 N.E.2d 133, 136 (Ind. 1994). Thus, this Court will not delve into legislative intent unnecessarily if no ambiguity exists. See Ott v. Johnson, 262 Ind. 548, 552, 319 N.E.2d 622, 624 (1974).
The language of Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(h)(2) is free of ambiguity. The tolling provision affords a bright-line rule: once concealment has been found, tolling ends when evidence sufficient to charge the defendant becomes known to the prosecuting authority if that authority could not have discovered the evidence by the exercise of due diligence. [Footnote omitted.] Crider interpreted Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(h)(2) accordingly. In cases where threats or intimidation of a victim amount to concealment, the means by which a prosecuting authority becomes aware of sufficient evidence is often through the victim‘s disclosure to that authority. Crider did not detail the facts surrounding the concealment, such as if or when the defendant‘s threats ceased, because they were irrelevant under the tolling provision‘s clear and unambiguous language. Once concealment is found, the relevant inquiry is when the prosecuting authority becomes aware or should have become aware of sufficient evidence to charge the defendant. At that point, tolling ends, and the statute of limitations begins to run.
We recognize that this strict reading may be problematic for some. For example, it is plausible that a woman, who at the age of ten was fondled and threatened one time by her twenty-year-old uncle, does not disclose the molestation to authorities until she is fifty. Her uncle, now sixty-years old, may be subjected to prosecution for Class C felony child molesting, a crime he committed forty years earlier. But problems may also arise with an alternative, fact-specific approach that probes into whether the coercive influence over the victim has ceased. Suppose a five-year-old girl is fondled by her neighbor, who threatens her over the course of a year. The threats then cease, and the girl avoids her neighbor. However she is too scared to report the fondling to anyone. At the age of twelve, the girl, no longer scared, finally discloses the molestation, but the statute of limitations has run and bars prosecution for Class C felony child molesting. [Footnote omitted.]
We also acknowledge that a strict reading of Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(h)(2) could toll the statutes of limitations for many other crimes, not only Class C felony child molesting. Courts will still need to determine whether concealment exists in the first place. But once concealment is established, the statute of limitations ceases to run until authorities know or should have known sufficient evidence to charge the person with the crime. In essence, tolling could continue indefinitely—a result that seems at odds with the purposes underlying statutes of limitations. But we are “careful to avoid substituting [our] judgment for those of the more politically responsive branches.” Sanchez v. State, 749 N.E.2d 509, 516 (Ind. 2001); see also State v. Rendleman, 603 N.E.2d 1333, 1334 (Ind. 1992) (“[W]e do not substitute our belief as to the wisdom of a particular statute for those of the legislature.”). This Court will avoid invading the province of the legislature by strictly interpreting the language of Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(h)(2). We leave it to the legislature to modify the statute if it deems necessary. [Footnote omitted.]
In the meantime, public policy and a strict reading of the statute favor the prosecution of alleged crimes over the protection of defendants who have intimidated victims or otherwise concealed evidence. Until the legislature chooses to speak on the issue, prosecutors will have to do what they have always done: evaluate the various factors that affect the strength of a case and then decide whether to proceed against a defendant.
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Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, J., concur.
SULLIVAN, J., dissents with a separate opinion in which Rucker, J., concurs.
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I believe that the Court has expanded the tolling period beyond that specified by the statute. The statute does not provide that “once concealment has been found,” tolling continues until the prosecutor knows or could have known of the evidence. Rather, it provides that tolling continues during the “period in which: . . . the accused person conceals evidence of the offense, and evidence . . . .” I.C. § 35-41-4-2(h)(2).
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My own view of the statute and Crider brings me to an intermediate position. I do not agree with the Court of Appeals that once the defendant ceases threats and intimidation, the statute begins to run. Here the majority is most persuasive in pointing out that a victim may be “too scared to report” a molestation long after any specific threats or intimidation have ended. Slip op. at 7. A defendant should not benefit from the statute of limitations in such circumstances.
In my view, the statutory tolling period should cease at the point in time when the victim no longer reasonably fears material retaliation or other adverse consequences from a defendant‘s threats or intimidation. That is, I think the statutory “period in which: . . . the accused person conceals evidence of the offense” extends beyond the time of actual threats or intimidation but no longer than the victim reasonably fears material retaliation or other adverse consequences from a defendant‘s threats or intimidation.
I acknowledge that this line may be difficult to draw in some cases, but I think that prosecutors and courts will be able to do so and that, in any event, this is what the Legislature has pro-vided. In this case, I think it is clear that well over five years passed between the time M.A. ceased reasonably fearing material retaliation or other adverse consequences from Sloan’s “warn[ing] M.A. not to tell anyone” and telling her on at least one occasion that “she would go to jail if she disclosed the molestations.” Slip op. at 2. The last molestation and intimidation occurred when M.A. was thirteen. The incidents were reported to the prosecutor when she was thirty.
Finally, I emphasize that this analysis applies only to Sloan‘s conviction for child molesting as a Class C felony. His other conviction and forty-year sentence for child molesting as a Class A felony remains intact as that charge is not subject to any statute of limitation.
Rucker, J., concurs.