RUCKER, J.
In this opinion we discuss among other things whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution precludes the State from retrying a defendant where in the first trial the jury acquitted the defendant of murder with respect to one victim but failed to return a verdict on a charge of attempted murder with respect to another victim. We conclude it does not.
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The State charged Coleman with murder, a felony, for the death of Jermaine and attempted murder, a Class A felony, for shooting Dye. During a jury trial conducted in February 2008 Coleman testified and admitted the shootings, but contended that his actions against both Jermaine and Dye were justified on the basis of self-defense. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the murder charge, but was unable to reach a verdict on the attempted murder charge. The trial court thus declared a mistrial on that count and scheduled another trial. Prior to retrial Coleman filed a motion to dismiss contending a subsequent trial on attempted murder was barred by collateral estoppel and would therefore violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of both the United States and Indiana Constitutions. . . . After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. A retrial ensued, at the conclusion of which the jury found Coleman guilty as charged. Thereafter the trial court sentenced him to a term of forty-five years. Coleman appealed raising several issues for review. In a divided opinion the Court of Appeals reversed Coleman’s conviction on grounds of collateral estoppel. Coleman v. State, 924 N.E.2d 659 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Having previously granted transfer thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals, see Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A), we now affirm Coleman’s conviction. . . . .
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Coleman contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the attempted murder charge following the first trial. He argues the second trial violated his protection against double jeopardy by allowing the State to relitigate an issue already definitively decided in the first trial, namely, that he acted in self-defense when shooting Dye. According to Coleman, “the jury’s acquittal of Coleman on the murder charge could only have been based on its determination that Coleman acted in defense of himself and/or another person.” . . . .
. . . Thus, the conclusion is that Coleman’s general fear of death or great bodily harm applied equally to Jermaine and Dye. This argument is unavailing. To begin, Coleman was charged separately with the murder of Jermaine and the attempted murder of Dye. . . . It is true that in the first trial, the trial court did not instruct the jury on the elements of self-defense separately with respect to each victim. . . . However, during summation Coleman’s counsel specifically addressed the separate shootings and argued each was justified by Coleman’s reasonable imminent fear of death or serious bodily injury from Dye, and then from Jermaine. . . . .
Further, for the sake of argument we accept as true that the jury’s acquittal of Coleman on the murder charge in the first trial was based on its belief that Coleman acted in self-defense. But, the jury could have rationally concluded that the act of self-defense was in response to the conduct of Jermaine only. The jury was not bound to believe that Coleman likewise acted in self-defense with respect to Dye. . . . In essence the acquittal relating to the murder of Jermaine even if based on self-defense did not amount to the jury determining that Coleman acted in self-defense with respect to the attempted murder of Dye. Thus, in retrying Coleman the State did not relitigate an issue that was necessarily decided by the jury in the first trial. Instead, the jury was asked to make the determination of whether Coleman acted in self-defense when he shot Dye. This issue was not decided during the first trial. Thus, collateral estoppel did not bar relitigation. And the trial court correctly denied Coleman‟s motion to dismiss.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and David, JJ., concur.