DICKSON, J.
In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the execution of a search warrant by police forcing their way into his residence without first knocking and announcing their presence. The Court of Appeals reversed. Lacey v. State, 931 N.E.2d 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). We granted transfer and hold that the Indiana Constitution does not require prior judicial authorization for the execution of a warrant without knocking and announcing when justified by exigent circumstances known by police when the warrant was obtained. Because judicial officers may issue advance authorizations for police to bypass the knock and announce requirement, however, the better police practice is to minimize legal uncertainty by seeking such advance approval when supported by facts known when the warrant is sought.
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As to the remaining issue, the manner of execution of the warrant, the defendant’s argument on appeal contends that the exigent circumstances asserted by the State to justify the “no-knock” entry were known when the warrant was sought but were not provided to the issuing magistrate, and the police neither sought nor received explicit authorization from the magistrate to dispense with the knock and announce procedure. While asserting that Indiana Code § 35-33-5-7(d) provides for a knock and announce requirement, the defendant acknowledges that Indiana law permits the execution of a warrant without an announcement of presence and purpose if exigent circumstances exist. The defendant’s interlocutory appeal does not argue that the factors actually relied on by the police were inadequate exigent circumstances to justify the no-knock entry but rather that they should have been previously presented to a magistrate and a no-knock warrant obtained.
The State responds that the knock and announce procedure is not absolute and that the no-knock entry here was justified because of the concern for police officer safety after police thoughtfully considered the two co-defendants’ histories including an arrest for criminal recklessness, a conviction for dealing in cocaine, a bond revocation warrant that indicated Lacey may be armed, and a conviction for armed robbery and resisting arrest. [Footnote omitted.] The decision whether to knock and announce, the State argues, must be made by police considering the circumstances at the time a warrant is executed, not in advance by a magistrate when issuing the warrant.
This Court has long recognized that the Indiana Constitution’s provision dealing with searches and seizures requires “that the police knock and announce their authority before conducting a search of a dwelling.” State v. Dusch, 259 Ind. 507, 512, 289 N.E.2d 515, 517 (1972). This requirement, however, “is not to be adhered to blindly regardless of the particular circumstances confronting the authorities at the time the search is to be conducted.” Id. In Dusch, this Court noted that such requirement may not apply when the facts present sufficient exigent circumstances. Id. at 512–13, 289 N.E.2d at 518. Subsequent Indiana appellate decisions have applied Dusch to find that police should knock and announce their authority before conducting a search; such procedure is not absolute, being subject to exigent circumstances; and reasonableness of police conduct is the touchstone for consideration. . . . .
In recent years, this Court has expressed that “[t]he legality of a governmental search under the Indiana Constitution turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the circumstances.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005) (citing Moran, 644 N.E.2d at 539). To determine whether a residential entry violated Article 1, Section 11, we apply a “totality-of-the-circumstances test to evaluate the reasonableness of the officer’s actions.” . . . .
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The major thrust of the defendant’s argument is that the Search and Seizure Clause in Ar-ticle 1, Section 11 should be interpreted to require law enforcement to obtain prior express autho-rization from the judicial officer issuing the warrant if the grounds for bypassing the knock and announce procedure are based solely upon facts known when the warrant is sought. The use of no-knock warrants has been previously approved. Id. at 47. But Indiana jurisprudence has not confronted whether police must obtain no-knock warrants when justified solely by information known at the time of warrant application.
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As noted above, the touchstone for applying Indiana’s Search and Seizure Clause is rea-sonableness under the totality of the circumstances. In formulating the rule for Indiana, we are informed by the prevalent national view expressed in judicial decisions that prior judicial autho-rization based on information known when a warrant is obtained is not required for unannounced police entries. As noted above, in the review of claims asserting that a residential entry violated the Indiana Constitution’s Search and Seizure Clause, courts apply a totality-of-the-circumstances test to evaluate reasonableness. Duran, 930 N.E.2d at 17. We decline to superimpose upon this standard a constitutional requirement for police to seek a no-knock warrant when it appears justified by facts known when the warrant is obtained.
While inherently impossible to anticipate the myriad of circumstances that could consti-tute exigent circumstances justifying a no-knock entry, such circumstances have been recognized when the facts give police reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence would permit “escape or the destruction of evidence,” Davenport, 464 N.E.2d at 1305 (quoting Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1636, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 746 (1963)), or “would be dangerous, futile, or inhibit the effective investigation of the crime,” Beer, 885 N.E.2d at 44 (citing Richards, 520 U.S. at 394, 117 S. Ct. at 1421, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 624). In Beer, the Court of Appeals determined that there was a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence before executing a warrant would be dangerous to the police based on the presence of weapons and threats of violence against police. Id. at 47. Whatever arguably exigent factors may be known by police when a warrant is obtained, their significance at the moment the warrant is executed may vary considerably due to the then-existing circumstances. The reasonableness of a decision by police to enter without first knocking and announcing their presence must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances at the time of such entry.
In conclusion, we hold that Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable search or seizure, does not require prior judicial authorization for the no-knock execution of a warrant when justified by exigent circumstances, even if such circumstances are known by police when the warrant is obtained. Rather, courts will assess the reasonableness of entry based on the totality of the circumstances at the time the warrant was served. Constitutional uncertainty may be minimized when police, knowing in advance of the need to execute a warrant without complying with the knock and announce requirement, present the known facts when seeking the warrant and obtain express judicial authorization for a no-knock entry. This is certainly the better practice.
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.