DAVID, J.
Konopasek argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence elicited by the State regarding his probation. The Court of Appeals decided the evidence was inadmissible but ultimately found harmless error. Konopasek, 934 N.E.2d at 766. For the reasons explained below, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the evidence was relevant and admissible.
On direct examination, defense counsel elicited testimony from Konopasek about the days immediately following the incident:
Q: Were you, in fact, on probation at the time?
A: Yes, sir, I was.
. . .
Q: And did you meet with your probation officer?
A: Yes, sir, I did.
Q: And did you tell him about Mitch Green pushing you at Ryan Eaton’s house?
A: Absolutely.
. . .
Q: [D]id your probation officer do a drug screen on you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did you pass it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: [L]ater that afternoon, did you go over to the police station and give a statement to the police?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So without the police contacting you, you went over to the police department and gave a statement in regards to this incident that we‘re here today for?
A: Yes, sir.
A: You didn’t have to be summonsed or prompted or have the sheriff come talk to you; you went there?
Q: Yes, sir. My probation officer strongly suggested that I make my statement.
On cross-examination, the State further inquired into Konopasek’s probation:
Q: [Y]ou testified you‘re on probation, right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Okay. And you testified that Todd Hudkins is your probation officer?
A: That’s correct.
Q: Okay. And when you went to your probation meeting a day after you had continued it to the next day, he gave you a drug screen? Right?
A: That’s correct.
Q: And he gave you a drug screen because you’re on probation for a meth case out of Circuit Court?
A: That’s correct.
Q: Okay. And you’ve got quite a bit of time hanging over your head?
Before the defendant answered, the following colloquy took place:
[Defense counsel]: Objection to that, Your Honor. It’s not relevant to today’s proceeding.
[State]: Judge, I think he’s opened the door for that in the nature of the questions he’s asked his client.
[Defense counsel]: I don’t know that it depends—he’s admitted he’s on probation. I don’t know that it depends on how much time he’s got hanging over his head.
The Court: Yeah, I think the door has been opened to this line of questioning. I’ll, I’ll allow it. I’ll overrule it. Go ahead.
. . .
A: I have five years left, sir.
Q: Okay. And I’m not gonna beat the issue to death, but you—there’s been a petition filed based on this charge, right?
A: That’s correct.
Q: I mean you’re, you’re pending a review of probation with those five years potentially being unsuspended as a result of this charge?
A: That’s correct.
. . . .
Indiana Evidence Rule 401 provides a liberal standard for relevancy, and we review a trial court’s ruling on relevance for an abuse of discretion. Id. Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Ind. Evidence Rule 401. Indiana Evidence Rule 616 explicitly makes “evidence of bias, prejudice, or interest of the witness for or against any party” relevant and admissible for impeachment purposes, as this evidence can impact the weight of the witness’s testimony. See Dorsey v. State, 802 N.E.2d 991, 993 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). However, relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[.]” Evid. R. 403.
On direct examination, Konopasek testified to his probationary status in an effort to support his credibility. By stating that he was forthright about the incident with his probation officer, Konopasek wanted to leave the impression that he was an honest individual. The State further inquired into Konopasek’s probation to show a different effect Konopasek’s probation could have on his credibility: because Konopasek was facing significant revocation time, he had an interest to falsify his testimony and claim self-defense. This was a classic “he said–he said” case, and evidence impeaching Konopasek was significantly relevant. [Footnote omitted.]
We further find that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by unfair prejudice. See Evid. R. 403. In cases where trial testimonies are the bulk of the evidence, credibility is a key factor. As a result, impeachment evidence can be highly probative. As a probationer, Konopasek knew he faced significant jail time if convicted of this subsequent offense and thus had an interest in lying. Furthermore, this testimony is not unfairly prejudicial. Arguably, this same evidence could work in Konopasek’s favor. The fact that Konopasek faced significant revocation time could support a theory that Konopasek would not have risked violating his probation by committing a subsequent crime. In short, the probative value of the testimony was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, and Rucker, JJ, concur.