ROBB, C.J.
Sneed filed a motion to reduce bail, in which she stated she “is without funds with which to purchase a bond for her release and the amount of the bond now set is excessive and has the effect of punishing [Sneed] in advance of trial.” . . . The trial court held a hearing on Sneed’s motion. Sneed testified she has lived in Decatur County for the past three years and before that lived in Wayne County, Indiana for eighteen years. Her three teenage daughters live with her, and all her remaining family and close relatives reside in Indiana. Sneed testified she was not employed at the time of her arrest because she was physically disabled, had applied for Social Security disability benefits, and her claim was pending a scheduled hearing. Sneed has two prior misdemeanor convictions – operating while intoxicated in 1994 and neglect of a dependent in 2005, the latter for driving under the influence of prescription medication while her daughter was in the car. She testified that in both cases she successfully completed probation and never failed to attend a court hearing. Sneed further testified she has never been charged with a violent crime or with using a false identity and has never owned a handgun. She requested that the trial court reduce her bail to a ten percent cash bond or allow a surety bond to be posted. The State did not present any evidence in opposition but asked the trial court to consider the gravity of the charges and the potential penalties.
At the conclusion of the hearing, and without articulating its reasoning, the trial court issued its verbal ruling denying Sneed’s motion to reduce bail. Sneed now appeals. [Footnote omitted.]
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Sneed’s $25,000 bail is not unusual or prima facie excessive, and the severity of the charges against her sufficiently counterbalances her ties in the community and history of appearing in court, such that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to reduce the amount of her bail. We need not say whether the amount of Sneed’s bail is completely appropriate, for the trial court abuses its discretion only if the amount is clearly excessive, and on this issue Sneed has shown no abuse of discretion. See Perry, 541 N.E.2d at 919 (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to reduce $62,000 bail when defendant was charged with three counts of Class B felony dealing in cocaine and alleged to be habitual offender, despite defendant’s claim he had ties in the community and never had failed to appear in court).
In addition to a reduction in the amount of bail, Sneed also requested that the trial court allow her to post a surety bond rather than requiring her to deposit the entire amount in cash. By statute, a trial court has several options regarding the manner of executing bail; it may require the defendant to: execute a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties; deposit cash or securities in an amount equal to the bail; deposit cash or securities in an amount not less than ten percent of the bail, as a court-sponsored bond; execute a bond secured by real estate in the county, with requirements for the tax value of the real estate; post a real estate bond; or perform any combination of the above requirements. Ind. Code § 35-33-8-3.2(a). This statute, like the statute governing the amount of bail, “also places the manner of executing the bail within the discretion of the trial judge.” Mott, 490 N.E.2d at 1129 (interpreting similarly-worded predecessor statute, former Indiana Code section 35-33-8-3). In reviewing the trial court’s exercise of discretion, we look to the same factors as are relevant to setting the amount of bail. Id.
The record shows Sneed was without the funds to post the entire $25,000 in cash. Thus it is only proper to consider the type of bail set by the trial court. In effect, by denying Sneed the option of a surety bond provided by a bail bondsman, [footnote omitted] the trial court condemned her to jail pending trial without explicitly ordering her to be held or articulating any reason for doing so. While the severity of the charges supported a bond set at $25,000, the absence of any other factors suggesting Sneed was a flight risk leads us to conclude the trial court should have granted Sneed’s request for the option of a surety bond. Cf. Mott, 490 N.E.2d at 1129 (concluding based on statutory factors that trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring a surety bond rather than ten percent cash bond).
We recognize and reaffirm that “the inability to procure the amount necessary to make bond does not in and of itself render the amount unreasonable.” Id. at 1128. Nonetheless, we conclude under the facts and circumstances of this case that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring cash only bail and denying Sneed’s request for the option of a surety bond. While we affirm the trial court’s decision not to reduce the amount of Sneed’s bond, we remand with instructions that the trial court give Sneed the option of a surety bond.
RILEY, J., and BROWN, J., concur.