BAILEY, J.
On April 14, 2009, Brown pled guilty to Operating a Motor Vehicle after License Forfeited for Life, as a Class C felony. On May 27, 2009, the trial court imposed a three year sentence, and ordered Brown to serve it in the Marion County Community Corrections Home Detention Electronic Monitoring Program.
During the 2010 legislative session, the Indiana General Assembly amended the statute concerning credit time eligibility for persons serving on home detention in community corrections programs. 2010 Ind. Acts 1217-36. Before amendment, the statute stated:
(a) As used in this subsection, “home” means the actual living area of the temporary or permanent residence of a person. The term does not include a:
(1) hospital;
(2) health care facility;
(3) hospice;
(4) group home;
(5) maternity home;
(6) residential treatment facility;
(7) boarding house; or
(8) public correctional facility.
A person who is placed in a community corrections program under this chapter is entitled to earn credit time under IC 35–50–6 unless the person is placed in the person’s home.
(b) A person who is placed in a community corrections program under this chapter may be deprived of earned credit time as provided under rules adopted by the department of correction under IC 4–22–2. 4
I.C. 35-38-2.6-6 (2004).
The statute, amended and effective July 1, 2010, currently states:
(a) As used in this subsection, “home” means the actual living area of the temporary or permanent residence of a person. A person who is placed in community corrections under this chapter is entitled to earn credit time under IC 35-50-6.
(b) A person who is placed in a community corrections program under this chapter may be deprived of earned credit time as provided under rules adopted by the department of correction under IC 4-22-2.
I.C. 35-38-2.6-6.
On July 15, 2010, Marion County Community Corrections filed a Notice of Community Corrections Violation, alleging that Brown failed to comply with the rules and regulations of his placement because he twice tested positive for marijuana. The trial court held a hearing on the alleged violations on July 22, 2010, where Brown admitted to the violations. It then ordered that Brown serve the balance of his original three-year sentence in the Department of Correction (“DOC”). He received credit for the 412 days served in community corrections, but received no credit time for this period. [Footnote omitted.]
On July 29, 2010, Brown filed a Motion for Additional Credit Time, arguing that the Indiana General Assembly intended the amended version of I.C. § 35-38-2.6-6 to apply retroactively, and consequently, he was eligible for (and should receive) credit time in addition to his credit for time served while in community corrections. . . . .
. . . .
Brown’s principal argument for credit time eligibility is that Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-6 is a remedial statute that the General Assembly intended to apply retroactively.4 [4Brown served time in community corrections home detention both before the July 1, 2010, amendment and after the amendment. He does not, however, make a separate argument on appeal addressing any differences in the amendment’s applicability to his time served after July 1, 2010. However, the trial judge made statements at the hearing tending to indicate that the two periods could potentially be treated differently. Tr. 5. This approach is incorrect. “The sentencing statute in effect at the time a crime is committed governs the sentence for that crime.” Harris v. State, 897 N.E.2d 927, 928-29 (Ind. 2008). An exception exists when a penalty is decreased by a statute enacted after the commission of the crime but prior to the defendant’s trial and sentencing. Pritscher v. State, 675 N.E.2d 727, 733-34 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Under the doctrine of amelioration, when the penalty for a crime is decreased by an amendment enacted after the commission of the crime but prior to sentencing, the defendant may take advantage of the ameliorative statute. Id. Here, Brown was sentenced well before the amended statute came into effect and therefore, because the statute is not retroactive, he does not receive the benefit of the change in law. See id. at 734.]
[N]ot all remedial statutes are automatically applied retroactively—”[i]t has long been the law in this jurisdiction that although statutes and rules concerning procedural and remedial matters may be made to operate retroactively, it is not the case that they must apply retroactively.” . . . Retroactive application must also not violate a vested right or constitutional guaranty. . . . Therefore, retroactive application of a statute is appropriate when: (1) the new statute is remedial; (2) a strong and compelling reason exists for applying it retroactively; and (3) retroactive application does not violate a vested right or a constitutional guaranty. See Walsman v. State, 855 N.E.2d 645, 650 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
Thus, the first issue to address is whether the amendment to I.C. § 35-38-2.6-6 is remedial in nature. A statute is remedial when it is “intended to cure a defect or mischief that existed in a prior statute.” Pelley, 828 N.E.2d at 919. We have also found statutes to be remedial when they are enacted in response to case law, Hurst v. State, 890 N.E.2d 88, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), or are a particular type of law which are inherently remedial. Bourbon Mini-Mart, 783 N.E.2d at 260-61. In deciding whether a statute is remedial, we look to, among other things, the alleged mischief or defect the statute seeks to cure. State ex rel. Indiana State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Judd, 554 N.E.2d 829, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). If a statute is remedial, it should be liberally construed to advance the remedy for the mischief for which it was enacted. State ex rel. Griswold v. Blair, 32 Ind. 313, 316 (1869).
Brown particularly directs our attention to Martin v. State, where our supreme court found remedial a statute concerning credit for time served while on home detention as a condition of probation, and applied it retroactively. 774 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Ind. 2002). In that case, while Martin’s credit for time served appeal was pending, the General Assembly amended the statute to provide that a person earns credit for time served on home detention as a condition of probation; previously, the law was silent on the matter. Id. at 44. As a result of the statute’s past silence, a split in authority emerged in the Indiana Court of Appeals, eventually leading us to encourage the General Assembly to address the issue because, as it stood, the area was laden with contradiction and confusion. Id. at 45. The General Assembly “apparently responded” to the judiciary’s request by amending the law, and in light of that response, our supreme court concluded that the General Assembly’s amendment was remedial because it cured the prior statute’s defect of silence. Id. The Court then applied the statute retroactively to Martin’s case to carry out the amendment’s legislative purpose. Id.
Despite the similarity in subject matter between Martin and the case here, we find the purpose for the change easily distinguishable from Martin. Prior to July 1, 2010, I.C. § 35-38-2.6-6 explicitly excluded those serving out sentences on home detention from receiving credit time; the amendment lifted that restriction. Thus, Brown essentially argues that the “defect” that the General Assembly sought to remedy was its explicit intent, expressed through the statute’s language. The General Assembly even took an extra step in the prior statute by defining “home” and listing enumerated exceptions to the term. I.C. § 35-38-2.6-6 (2004). Dissimilar to Martin, the legislature’s intent was unambiguous and the judiciary readily interpreted the language: “Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-6 deprives the offender serving time on home detention of the ability to ‘earn credit time under Ind. Code § 35-50-6.’” Purcell, 721 N.E.2d at 223 (emphasis in original removed).
Thus, whereas in Martin the legislature offered no statutory guidance as to its intent, leading to confusion in the courts (thus, the defect), here, the General Assembly was very specific regarding its intent on the matter of credit time eligibility. That is it has now reversed course on the underlying policy in the statute so there is no reason to view the prior statute as defective. We also note that I.C. § 35-38-2.6-6 was enacted as part of a broader package of amendments concerning community corrections programs, 2010 Ind. Acts 1217-36 (“An Act to amend the Indiana Code concerning corrections”), which suggests that the General Assembly was engaged in wholesale changes to community corrections programs and not seeking to cure a singular defect or mischief of the prior statute. Therefore, we decline to find I.C. § 35-38-2.6-6 to be a remedial statute.
Even if I.C. § 35-38-2.6-6 were remedial by nature, Brown’s retroactivity argument still fails. . . . .
Reading I.C. §35-38-2.6-6 retroactively yields a result which we presume the legislature would not intend. Although the Indiana Code does not define “credit time,” our supreme court has stated that it is “a statutory reward for a lack of conduct that is in violation of institutional rules.” Boyd v. Broglin, 519 N.E.2d 541, 542 (Ind. 1988). Also, we have previously held that “[t]he purpose of the legislature in enacting ‘good time’ credit statutes was to encourage inmates of penal institutions to behave well while confined, to improve their morale, and thus help prison authorities to maintain order and control.” State v. Eckhardt, 687 N.E.2d 374, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). We do not think that, in amending I.C. § 35-38-2.6-6, the General Assembly intended to incentivize offenders’ past behavior. We are equally doubtful that it would allow for, essentially, the post-hoc halving of sentences without at least some indication that it was intentionally pursuing such an end. Absent any indication to the contrary, we decline to retroactively apply the credit time statute to Brown’s case.
NAJAM, J., and DARDEN, J., concur.