DARDEN, J.
On July 16, 2010, the trial court issued an order denying Boston’s motion to suppress blood alcohol test results. On August 9, 2010, Boston filed a motion for certification of interlocutory appeal, which motion was granted on August 10, 2010. On August 30, 2010, he filed a motion to accept jurisdiction of an interlocutory appeal. On October 12, 2010, we accepted jurisdiction of Boston’s interlocutory appeal.
Boston argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of his blood alcohol test. Specifically, he argues the State failed to satisfy the foundational requirements of the version of Indiana Code section 9-30-6-6 that was in effect at the time of his arrest. We disagree.
1. Statutory Amendment
In relevant part, Indiana Code section 9-30-6-6 governs chemical tests on blood, urine, and other bodily substances for evidence of intoxication. The version of the statute that was in effect at the time of Boston’s arrest (“the 2006 version3”) differs significantly from the version (“the 2010 version”) that was in effect at the time of the suppression hearing. [3 The version of the Indiana Code section 9-30-6-6 that was in effect at the time of Boston‟s arrest in 2009 resulted from legislative amendments made in 2006. During the 2010 legislative session, our legislature made further amendments to the statute that are of particular relevance to our inquiry herein.] Boston argues that the trial court improperly applied the 2010 version of the statute retroactively in denying his motion to suppress the blood alcohol test results.
As a general rule, statutes will not be applied retroactively absent strong and compelling reasons. Bourbon Mini-Mart, Inc. v. Gast Fuel and Services, Inc., 783 N.E.2d 253, 260 (Ind. 2003). An exception exists for remedial statutes, i.e. statutes intended to cure a defect or mischief that existed in a prior statute. Id. “Ultimately, . . . whether a statute applies retroactively depends upon the intent of the General Assembly.” Id. (citing Martin v. State, 774 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Ind. 2002)). Thus, when considering a remedial statute, the court must construe it to carry out the legislative purpose of the statute, “unless doing so violates a vested right or constitutional guaranty.” Id.
Both the 2006 and the 2010 versions of Indiana Code section 9-30-6-6(j) enumerate certain “persons who are trained in obtaining bodily substance samples,” for purposes of conducting blood draws pursuant to law enforcement investigations. Among these, the 20064 version of the statute included “[a] certified phlebotomist.” I.C. § 9-30-6-6(j)(7)(2006). [4 Indiana Code section 9-30-6-6(j) provided as follows at the time of Boston’s arrest:
A law enforcement officer may transport the person to a place where the sample may be obtained by any of the following persons who are trained in obtaining bodily substance samples and who have been engaged to obtain samples under this section:
(1) A physician holding an unlimited license to practice medicine or osteopathy.
(2) A registered nurse.
(3) A licensed practical nurse.
(4) An emergency medical technician-basic advanced (as defined in IC 16-18-2-112.5).
(5) An emergency medical technician-intermediate (as defined in IC 16-18-2-112.7).
(6) A paramedic (as defined in IC 16-18-2-266).
(7) A certified phlebotomist.] On March 12, 2010, the General Assembly approved an
amendment, designated “effective upon passage,” whereby it eliminated the “certified phlebotomist” language and added that “[subsection (j)] does not apply to a bodily substance sample taken at a licensed hospital . . . .” I.C. § 9-30-6-6(j)(2010); see P.L. 36-2010.5 [5 The 2010 amendment of Indiana Code section 9-30-6-6(j) altered the statute as follows:
(j) This subsection does not apply to a bodily substance sample taken at a licensed hospital (as defined in IC 16-18-2-179(a) and IC 16-18-2-179(b)). A law enforcement officer may transport the person to a place where the sample may be obtained by any of the following persons who are trained in obtaining bodily substance samples and who have been engaged to obtain samples under this section:
(1) A physician holding an unlimited license to practice medicine or osteopathy.
(2) A registered nurse.
(3) A licensed practical nurse.
(4) An emergency medical technician-basic advanced (as defined in IC 16-18-2-112.5).
(5) An emergency medical technician-intermediate (as defined in IC 16-18-2-112.7).
(6) A paramedic (as defined in IC 16-18-2-266).
In Brown v. State, 911 N.E.2d 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), handed down on August 21, 2009, we analyzed whether a certified lab technician was a person “trained in obtaining bodily substance samples” for the purposes of Indiana Code section 9-30-6-6(j)(2006). The panel concluded that the certified lab technician did not meet the statutory requirements, noting,
If the General Assembly intended subsection (j) to include certified lab technicians instead of, or in addition to, certified phlebotomists, it easily could have done so. It did not do so, however, and therefore we must conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the results of Brown’s blood test [into evidence].
Id. at 673. Accordingly, we granted Brown’s motion to suppress the results of his blood test. On December 17, 2009, our Supreme Court granted transfer in Brown. Soon thereafter, on March 12, 2010, in amendments deemed effective “upon passage,” our General Assembly quickly amended Indiana Code section 9-30-6-6(j) by eliminating the “certified phlebotomist” language and adding that “[subsection (j)] does not apply to a bodily substance sample taken at a licensed hospital . . . .” Notably, on May 26, 2010, our Supreme Court rescinded its grant of transfer and vacated its order.
The State asserts that the 2010 amendment was “remedial in nature,” reflecting “the legislature’s intent to allow blood draws such as the one that occurred in this case to be admitted into evidence.” State’s Br. at 11. In its brief, it argues that
the legislature acted immediately in response to Brown and amended the statute to eliminate the confusion created by the “certified phlebotomist” language, since there is no Indiana certification for phlebotomy that exists, and to make sure that blood draws performed by trained individuals at licensed hospitals are admissible into evidence. Furthermore, they did so through an emergency provision that would be effective immediately upon passage. This shows the legislature’s desire to remedy this problem quickly to prevent any other blood draws from being deemed inadmissible. Indeed, the whole purpose behind this subsection was to protect the welfare of the suspect and the integrity of the sample by making sure that blood draws are performed by people with the proper training and qualifications.
Cannon undeniably has the requisite training and qualifications, and [Boston] has not presented any evidence even suggesting that [Cannon] did anything improper when she drew [his] blood. The Brown Court’s interpretation of the subsection threatened to thwart the legislature’s purpose by needlessly excluding samples drawn by qualified individuals in a manner that the General Assembly had never intended when blood draws were being performed at hospitals and thus presumably in keeping with the statute’s concerns.
State’s Br. at 11. We find the State’s arguments to be persuasive.
Various strong and compelling reasons justify the retroactive application of the 2010 amendments. . . . .
The changes to Indiana Code section 9-30-6-6 are not substantive in nature. Rather, the General Assembly’s acts of (1) removing “certified phlebotomist[s]” from the list of persons authorized to perform blood draws, and (2) interjecting that the “authorized person” determination need not be made where the bodily substance sample is “taken at a license hospital,” evince its acknowledgment that blood draws which are performed in state-licensed hospitals observe and embody the “technical adherence” to a physician’s directions or to a physician’s protocol required by our evidentiary rules for the admission of blood test results. See Hopkins v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1297, 1303 (Ind. 1991); see also Combs, 895 N.E.2d at 1256.
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the 2010 amendments to Indiana Code 9-30-6-6 were remedial in nature, motivated by strong and compelling reasons aimed at public safety and welfare. As such, we find no abuse of discretion from the trial court’s retroactive application of the 2010 amendments and reliance, thereon, in denying Boston’s motion to suppress the results of his blood alcohol test.
NAJAM, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.