BROWN, J.
Sean Thomas Ryan (“Husband”) appeals the denial of his motion for relief under Ind. Trial Rule 60(B). Husband raises three issues, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for relief from judgment without hearing pertinent evidence. We reverse and remand.
The relevant facts follow. Husband and Dee Anna Ryan (“Wife”) were married on February 28, 2000, and had children in August 2001 and June 2003. Husband filed a verified petition for dissolution of marriage on March 5, 2008. On September 19, 2008, the trial court issued a decree of dissolution of marriage which incorporated a Property Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”). Section 5 of the Settlement Agreement set forth the parties’ agreement as to the division of their real estate which included a parcel and house located in Granger, Indiana (the “Granger House”), and a parcel and house located in Union, Michigan (the “Lake House”).
Section 5 of the Settlement Agreement also provided that the proceeds from the sale of the Granger House and Lake House would be divided pursuant to a private agreement. The Private Agreement provided in part that either party could bind the other to accept an offer to purchase one of the properties so long as the resulting net proceeds would equal at least $1,100,000 in the case of the Granger House or $300,000 in the case of the Lake House. Following the decree of dissolution, the parties listed the Granger House for sale at a listing price of $1,349,000 and the Lake House at a price of $349,000.
On May 14, 2010, Husband filed a motion for relief from judgment under Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(8) and argued that the Granger House and the Lake House could not be sold under the terms of the Settlement Agreement and Private Agreement in light of housing prices in St. Joseph County, Indiana, and Cass County, Michigan, respectively, and thus the court’s duty under Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4 to divide the property of the parties could not be effectuated without equitable relief. . . .
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… Husband filed his motion pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(8). “The trial court’s residual powers under subsection (8) may only be invoked upon a showing of exceptional circumstances justifying extraordinary relief.” Id. (citation omitted). “Among other things, exceptional circumstances do not include mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect, which are set out in [Trial Rule] 60(B)(1).” This court has explained:
T.R. 60(B)(8) is an omnibus provision which gives broad equitable power to the trial court in the exercise of its discretion and imposes a time limit based only on reasonableness. Nevertheless, under T.R. 60(B)(8), the party seeking relief from the judgment must show that its failure to act was not merely due to an omission involving the mistake, surprise or excusable neglect. Rather some extraordinary circumstances must be demonstrated affirmatively. This circumstance must be other than those circumstances enumerated in the preceding subsections of T.R. 60(B).
Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
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We observe that the court need not modify the terms of the Settlement Agreement or Private Agreement in order to effectuate relief under Trial Rule 60(B). The Settlement Agreement and Private Agreement do not contain any terms or provisions which address circumstances such as those presented when the dollar amounts set forth in the agreements make it impossible, as a practical matter, to implement the intended sale of the properties due to a sustained decline in residential housing prices.
We conclude that Husband may request and the trial court has authority to grant relief from judgment pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(8) under the circumstances presented in this case, and the court erred in its determination that it did not have the authority to hear Husband’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion and that the motion should have been characterized as one under Trial Rule 60(B)(1).3 See Beike, 805 N.E.2d at 1267-1229 (noting that, although the value of the pension plan marital asset at issue was not completely settled, both parties believed they understood the value of the plan at the time of the dissolution decree which contained the property settlement agreement, that a subsequent change which neither party could have predicted affected the value of the plan assets, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting relief from the property settlement agreement under Trial Rule 60(B)(8)); see also Dillard, 889 N.E.2d at 33 (noting that court is not precluded from granting relief under Trial Rule 60(B)); Parham v. Parham, 855 N.E.2d 722, 726-728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that the trial court did not err in treating the wife’s motion as one for relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(8) where the husband’s 401(k) plan value significantly depreciated after the date of the dissolution decree), trans. denied; Dusenberry, 625 N.E.2d at 461 (“Upon motion by a party, and after a hearing, the trial court retains equitable jurisdiction under Rule 60(B) to modify a division of property.”).
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Based upon the record, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Husband’s motion under Rule 60(B)(8) without first holding an evidentiary hearing. We remand with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing at which the parties are given the opportunity to present evidence in support of or opposition to Husband’s motion for relief from judgment and for the court to grant relief as appropriate after considering the evidence presented at the hearing. We reiterate that the court on remand need not modify the terms of the Settlement Agreement or Private Agreement in order to provide relief under Trial Rule 60(B) but may issue an order providing additional terms to the extent the Settlement Agreement and Private Agreement are silent, i.e., what steps would be taken to accomplish the intended sale of the properties under the circumstances. See Rothschild v. Devos, 757 N.E.2d 219, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for relief from judgment without hearing pertinent evidence and allowing for discovery).
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ROBB, C.J., and RILEY, J., concur.