RILEY, J.
[T]he Officers ordered both Douglas and Griffin to exit the car and asked them for identification. The Officers could not run the vehicle’s license plate because it had a temporary plate, but Douglas claimed that the car belonged to his ex-girlfriend. Officer Alford opened the door, looked in, and discovered “burnt marijuana” in the form of a blunt in the center console. (Tr. p. 19). The blunt was located behind the car’s stick shift, halfway between the driver and passenger seats, and Officer Alford did not have to move anything in the car in order to see it. Both Griffin and Douglas claimed that they did not own the blunt.
. . . .
In the instant case, constructive possession is at issue because Griffin did not have direct physical control of the blunt. We do not need to address the issue of whether 5
Griffin was capable of exerting dominion and control over the marijuana because he concedes that the blunt was within his reach and that he was capable of exerting control over it; instead, Griffin argues that the State did not prove that he had knowledge of the presence of the blunt and the intent to control it. Specifically, although the blunt was within his reach, it was not within his plain view. We must examine this issue based on the additional circumstances indicating Griffin’s knowledge of the blunt since he did not have exclusive possession of the vehicle in which he and Douglas were sitting.
The case that Griffin requests us to consider is Gray v. State, WL 794517 (Ind. Ct. App. March 8, 2011). In Gray, two police officers were dispatched to Gray’s residence to investigate a complaint of marijuana dealing. Id. at 1. Gray signed a written consent form allowing the officers to search her apartment, and the officers subsequently discovered a bag of marijuana in plain view under the coffee table in her living room. Id. Two juvenile male visitors were sitting behind the coffee table, but there was no evidence that Gray “was near the marijuana, could see the drugs, or was aware that marijuana was in her home.” Id. at 3. Accordingly, we determined on appeal that Gray did not have the intent to constructively possess the marijuana.
We agree with Griffin that our decision in Gray is relevant here, but we think that the facts of the instant case distinguish it from Gray. Unlike Gray, Griffin was close in proximity to the marijuana and even conceded that it was within his reach. Moreover, Griffin should have been aware there was a possibility that marijuana was in the vehicle because Officer Alford testified that there was a strong odor of marijuana when he stepped out of his car. Officer Alford was immediately able to tell that the odor came from the parked vehicle in which Douglas and Griffin were sitting, and he was able to smell marijuana on Griffin’s clothing when Griffin got out of the vehicle. In addition, Officer Alford also testified that he did not have to move anything inside of the car in order to see the blunt. These circumstances are markedly different than the circumstances in Gray where there was no evidence to show that Gray “was near the marijuana, could the see drugs, or was aware that marijuana was in her home.” Id. at 3. Instead, these facts are evidence of Griffin’s knowledge of the marijuana blunt and his intent to maintain dominion and control over it. When we interpret this evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment, it is sufficient to support an inference that Griffin constructively possessed marijuana.
DARDEN, J., and BARNES, J., concur.