BRADFORD, J.
Appellant-Petitioner Kimberly Devlin (“Mother”) and Appellee-Respondent Daniel Peyton (“Father”) were divorced in 2004, and the matter was disposed of in Marion Superior Court (“the Dissolution Court”). The marriage produced two children (“the Children”), of whom Mother was awarded sole physical and legal custody. In 2007, Mother married Dan Devlin, and in 2009, Devlin filed a petition to adopt the Children in Hendricks Superior Court (“the Adoption Court”). In this appeal from the Dissolution Court, Mother appeals from the Dissolution Court’s conclusions that (1) it had jurisdiction over Devlin’s adoption petition rather than the Adoption Court and (2) Father’s consent to the adoption of the Children was necessary. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
. . . .
Mother contends that the Dissolution Court erroneously addressed issues involving Devlin’s petition to adopt the Children. We agree. The simple fact is that Devlin’s adoption petition is still pending in the Adoption Court, and, as such, the Dissolution Court cannot properly exert jurisdiction over the issue. Indiana Trial Rule 75(B)(1) (2009) provides that the mechanism for addressing improper venue (the claim that Father has made regarding the adoption proceeding) is a motion to transfer the case filed in the court where the action was originally filed:
Whenever a claim or proceeding is filed which should properly have been filed in another court of this state, and proper objection is made, the court in which such action is filed shall not then dismiss the action, but shall order the action transferred to the court in which it should have been filed.
As previously mentioned, Father moved the Adoption Court to transfer the case to the Dissolution Court, and that motion was denied. At this point, had Father wished to pursue the question of the venue of the adoption case further, the only way to do so was to appeal that denial pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 14(A)(8) (2009), which provides for an interlocutory appeal of right from a trial court’s “refus[al] to transfer a case under Trial Rule 75[.]” Father, however, did not pursue any such appeal. Devlin’s adoption petition was filed in the Adoption Court, and there it remains.
Even assuming that transfer might otherwise be appropriate, Father points to no authority, and our research has revealed none, that allows a trial court, absent the approval of the originating court or appellate court, to sua sponte assume jurisdiction over a case pending in another trial court. [Footnote omitted]. Consequently, to the extent that the Dissolution Court’s findings and conclusions related to whether it had jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding and addressed the merits of the adoption, those findings and conclusions are vacated. [Footnote omitted]. Because Mother does not take issue with the Dissolution Court’s ruling regarding Father’s parenting time, we affirm the Dissolution Court’s judgment to the extent that it addresses that issue.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
KIRSCH, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
Read Full Opinion