FRIEDLANDER, J.
Grange Mutual Casualty Company (Grange) appeals the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of West Bend Mutual Insurance Company (West Bend) on the parties’ cross claims for declaratory judgment in an insurance coverage dispute.
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The provisions of the insurance policies at issue in this appeal are substantially similar. In fact, with respect to the relevant provisions, both policies provide:
1. Insuring Agreement
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of … “property damage” to which this insurance applies….
b. This insurance applies to … “property damage” only if:
(1) The … “property damage” is caused by an “occurrence” that takes place in the “coverage territory”;
(2) The … “property damage” occurs during the policy period; and
(3) Prior to the policy period, no insured… and no “employee” authorized by you to give or receive notice of an “occurrence” or claim, knew that the … “property damage” had occurred, in whole or in part….
c. “[P]roperty damage” which occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to the policy period, known to have occurred…, includes any continuation, change or resumption of that … “property damage” after the end of the policy period.
Appellant’s Appendix at 318 and 340. (footnotes omitted).
Grange argues that the date of the occurrence, here the negligent fracturing of the storm drain pipe, determines coverage. Thus, Grange contends that West Bend’s policy provides liability coverage for the water damage because the drain pipe was damaged during West Bend’s policy period and that occurrence caused the later flooding. West Bend, on the other hand, asserts that there were two separate occurrences: 1) the broken pipe and 2) the flooding.
The parties incorrectly focus on the timing of the occurrence(s) in this case. Even assuming Grange is correct that there was only one “occurrence” here (i.e., McCurdy’s breaking of the storm drain pipe), this fact is not determinative. With regard to an occurrence, the policies require merely that the occurrence takes place at a location within the coverage territory. Thus, the timing of the occurrence is not particularly relevant to the determination of coverage.
As the trial court indicated, the pertinent consideration is the timing of the property damage because the policies require that the damage occur during the policy period. In granting summary judgment in favor of West Bend, the trial court explained in part:
Both policies require that the property damage must occur during the policy period. West Bend argued that the property damage did not occur until the water flooded the school in June 2006, during Grange’s policy coverage. Grange argued that the property damage was continuous and began when the pipe was damaged during West Bend’s policy period.
The Court rules that the property damage was not continuous, and that the property damage occurred when the flooding took place in June 2006. Accordingly, Grange’s liability policy covered the property damage and West Bend’s policy did not.
Appellant’s Appendix at 16. The trial court seemed to proceed under the theory that this was an either-or determination. It is not.
With respect to Grange, it cannot be disputed that significant property damage actually occurred during its policy period as a result of the flooding. Further, it has not been argued that prior to the commencement of Grange’s policy period the insured was aware of the damage to the storm drain pipe that had been caused by McCurdy during West Bend’s policy period. Applying the plain language of the insuring agreement, therefore, Grange’s liability policy covered the property damage that resulted from the flood. Specifically, the fracturing of the pipe and resulting damage took place in the coverage territory, property damage (water damage) occurred during the policy period, and the insured did not have prior knowledge of any related property damage or occurrence. Thus, coverage under the Grange policy was triggered when the flooding occurred during its policy period, regardless of when the original negligence took place.
Coverage under Grange’s policy, however, does not equate to lack of coverage under West Bend’s policy. In support of its argument against coverage, West Bend directs us to a Minnesota case, Parr v. Gonzalez, 669 N.W.2d 401 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003), and seizes on the following statement: “An occurrence takes place not when the policyholder engages in the wrongful act, ‘but the time the complaining party was actually damaged.’” Id. at 406 (quoting Singsaas v. Diederich, 238 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Minn. 1976)). Thus, West Bend argues that we should look to when the actual damage occurred, not the time of negligence. See Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 638 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (“the trigger for coverage is the time when the complaining party was damaged”).
As expressed above, we agree that the time of the damage, as opposed to the time of the alleged negligent conduct that caused the damage, is the triggering event. We do not agree, however, that no damage occurred during West Bend’s policy period to trigger coverage under its policy with McCurdy. Although the damages resulting from McCurdy’s negligence became apparent only after they evolved over time, some damage clearly resulted when the drain pipe was fractured, which was within West Bend’s policy period.
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In the instant case, the undisputed facts show that the storm drain pipe was damaged by McCurdy during the West Bend policy period. Further, West Bend’s policy provides that this initial property damage “includes any continuation, change or resumption of that …‘property damage’ after the end of the policy period.” Appellant’s Appendix at 318. Pursuant to this provision, as well as for the reasons expressed in Parr, we hold that because the West Bend policy was triggered at the time McCurdy negligently fractured the drain pipe, the policy covers all damages that flowed from the original damage, including the extensive flood damage.
In sum, the undisputed facts establish that both policies were triggered in the instant case. The first policy, West Bend’s, was triggered by the original fracturing of the storm drain pipe which resulted in immediate damage to the pipe and the subsequent flooding. The second policy, Grange’s, was triggered by the flood damage that occurred during its policy period. Thus, both policies cover the flood damage at issue. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1049 (in the case of evolving damages that span over multiple policy periods, more than one policy may be triggered).(footnote omitted)
The policies at issue have similar other insurance clauses that provide for contribution by equal shares between primary insurers, such as here. “Under this approach each insurer contributes equal amounts until it has paid its applicable limit of insurance or none of the loss remains, whichever comes first.” Appellant’s Appendix at 333. On remand, therefore, the trial court is directed to apportion damages accordingly.
MATHIAS, J., concurs.
MAY, J., dissents with separate opinion:
After explicitly holding the West Bend policy covers all damages that flowed from the original damage, including the extensive flood damage, the majority then says the Grange policy also “cover[s] the flood damage at issue” (id. at 9), and instructs the trial court on remand to “apportion damages accordingly.” (Id.)
There is nothing to “apportion.” The majority is correct that the West Bend policy covers “all damages,” and I would accordingly decline to hold there could be damages in addition to “all damages” or that any such additional damages could be assigned on remand to Grange.