DARDEN, J.
The trial court commenced a three-day jury trial on February 16, 2010. Prior to the presentation of evidence, the trial court gave the following preliminary instruction as an admonishment to the jury:
Evidence may be presented to you of incidents unrelated to the offenses charged. These incidents are only to be considered as they describe the relationship between G.[S]., and [Velasquez]. You may not consider it for any other reason. Specifically, you may not consider it as being evidence of [Velasquez]’s character, nor may it be considered as evidence that [Velasquez] acted in conformity with the acts charged.
. . . .
The State argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on character evidence because it did so “before the State ever offered any character evidence, or even gave an opening statement . . . .” . . . Citing to Evidence Rule 105, the State maintains that the trial court should have admonished the jury on character evidence at the time the State sought to admit such evidence, if any.
Generally, “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b). Such evidence, however, may “be admissible for other purposes . . . .” Id.
When evidence which is admissible . . . for one purpose but not admissible . . . for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and admonish the jury accordingly.
Evid. R. 105. Although Evidence Rule 105 provides that the trial court shall admonish the jury “upon request,” it “does not preclude trial courts from giving a limiting admonition or instruction sua sponte as a matter of discretion[.]” Humphrey v. State, 680 N.E.2d 836, 839 (Ind. 1997).
In this case, the State argues that Evidence Rule 105 allows for a limiting instruction or admonishment only at the time the evidence is offered and admitted. Where a trial court’s evidentiary ruling involves the interpretation of a rule of evidence, we apply a de novo standard of review. Tyler v. State, 903 N.E.2d 463, 467 n.4 (Ind. 2009).
We do not read Evidence Rule 105 as allowing an admonishment or limiting instruction only at the time evidence is offered. Instead, the purpose of the rule is “to enable a party to request a limiting admonishment at the time the evidence is offered, rather than waiting until the jury instructions.” Humphrey, 680 N.E.2d at 839 n.7 (citing 12 ROBERT L. MILLER, JR., INDIANA PRACTICE § 105.104 (3rd ed. 2007) (Evidence Rule 105 “requires the trial court . . . to inform the jury of the limited use to which evidence may be put at the time the evidence is offered, rather than waiting until the end of trial.”)). Thus, a party may seek a limiting instruction or admonishment either prior to trial or at the time evidence is admitted. See id.
In this case, Velasquez’s counsel sought a limiting instruction prior to the presentation of evidence. While the more common practice may have been to admonish the jury at the time the character evidence was offered, and a limiting instruction is “usually” given after the presentation of evidence, see id., we cannot say that the trial court in this case abused its discretion in giving a preliminary limiting instruction.
The State had filed notices of intent to introduce evidence pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) and admittedly “did present evidence that Velasquez had used a stick to punish G.S. . . . .” . . . Thus, it was not ultimately speculative for the trial court to give a limiting instruction or admonishment prior to the presentation of evidence. . . . .
. . . .
Generally, “statements attributing fault or identity are typically inadmissible under” Evidence Rule 803(4). Nash, 754 N.E.2d at 1025. In Nash, however, this court determined that in cases “where injury occurs as the result of domestic violence, which may alter the course of diagnosis and treatment, trial courts may properly exercise their discretion in admitting statements regarding identity of the perpetrator.” Id. In so determining, the Nash court looked to other jurisdictions in which courts had admitted statements of children indentifying an individual as the perpetrator of the offense. Those jurisdictions have held that “the identity of the child abuser is not only pertinent to treating the child’s emotional and psychological injuries, but also necessary to prevent a child from being returned to an abusive environment.” 754 N.E.2d at 1025 (citing United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 437-38 (8th Cir. 1985)).
The underlying rationale for this hearsay exception requires a two-step analysis for evaluating whether a statement is properly admitted pursuant to Evid. R. 803(4): (1) whether the declarant is motivated to provide truthful information in order to promote diagnosis and treatment; and (2) whether the content of the statement is such that an expert in the field would reasonably rely upon it in rendering diagnosis or treatment.
Nash, 754 N.E.2d at 1024.
In this case, Velasquez objected when the State asked Kline, “What, if anything, did [G.S.] say to you about not wanting to see [Velasquez?]” (Tr. 179). The State therefore made an offer of proof, during which Kline stated that she “didn’t diagnose” G.S. and that it was for a psychiatrist to determine whether G.S. had falsely accused Velasquez. (Tr. 187). Kline further testified that her “job as a clinical social worker is not whether [she] believe[s] [G.S.] or not, it’s to help her work through the issues that she’s dealing with.” (Tr. 182-83).
The trial court sustained Velasquez’s objection, stating:
[G.S.] may have been motivated indeed to provide truthful information to promote diagnosis and treatment. At the same time, I am concerned that it doesn’t fit, [sic] expert in the field would reasonably rely on it in rendering diagnosis and treatment. I believe that that runs into relying upon something that was not assessed by this witness.
(Tr. 192).
Subsequently, the trial court explained its ruling as follows:
Indeed testimony may be admissible if it meets the two parts [sic] test that first of all, the person being treated knew that they were seeking treatment and indeed that predicate was met . . . . But the second prong of that test is that the statement was made in furtherance of diagnosis or treatment and Ms. Kline specifically said that she does not make diagnosis. That she leaves that to the psychologist. . . . [O]nce again, I find that that exception to the hearsay rule is not applicable to the testimony in front of us because the predicate was not met and prong two, that it is . . . necessary for both the treatment and also . . . for the diagnosis. It is an [“]and.[”] It is not an [“]and or[”] or [“]or.[”] It is an [“]and[”] and therefore, it is not admissible.
(Tr. 246).
Although the State presents an extensive argument regarding whether the State satisfied the first part of the two-part test for determining the admissibility of statements under Evidence Rule 803(4), we need not address that issue as the trial court found that the State had met this requirement. Thus, we need only determine whether the trial court properly found that the State failed to meet the second requirement for the admission of statements under Evidence Rule 803(4); namely, whether an expert in the field would reasonably rely upon G.S.’s statements to Kline in rendering diagnosis or treatment. See Nash, 754 N.E.2d at 1024.
We cannot say that in order for statements to be admissible under Evidence Rule 803(4), they must be in furtherance of diagnosis and treatment. Rather, case law states that the statements must be relied upon either to render a diagnosis or provide treatment. See Nash, 754 N.E.2d at 1024 (stating that the content of the statement must be “such that an expert in the field would reasonably rely upon it in rendering diagnosis or treatment” (emphasis added)).
We also cannot say that the statement must be made to the individual who ultimately will render a diagnosis or provide treatment. See McCain v. State, 675 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ind. 1996) (recognizing that “’[s]tatements made to hospital attendants, ambulance drivers or even family members might be included’” within the exception (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee’s note)). It is necessary only that “the statement is made to promote diagnosis or treatment.” Id. (emphasis added).
Here, Kline testified that she is a clinical social worker, specializing in “sexual abuse and domestic violence.” (Tr. 175). She further testified that DCS referred her to G.S. to “do an assessment and therapy . . . .” (Tr. 175). According to Kline’s testimony, the purpose of an assessment is to determine “what the family’s needs are, and what kind of services they might want.” (Tr. 176).
Kline’s testimony clearly shows that her purpose was to provide treatment for G.S. and G.S.’s family. Thus, any statements made by G.S. to Kline, upon which Kline, or another therapist, would have reasonably relied to provide treatment, including therapy, to G.S., were admissible. We therefore find that the trial court erred in excluding G.S.’s statements under the premise that Kline did not rely upon the statements to render a diagnosis.
b. Qualifying witness as an expert
The State further argues that the trial court “abused its discretion by concluding that the State had qualified Kline, a licensed clinical social worker, as an expert witness.” . . . The State maintains that this qualification limited Kline’s testimony, contrary to Indiana Code section 25-23.6-4-6, which provides that a “social worker licensed under [Article 23.6] may provide factual testimony but may not provide expert testimony.”
“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Our supreme court has stated, “Under this rule, a witness may be qualified as an expert by virtue of knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.’” And only one characteristic is necessary to qualify an individual as an expert. As such, a witness may qualify as an expert on the basis of practical experience alone. It is within the trial court’s sound discretion to decide whether a person qualifies as an expert witness. On appeal, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.
Burnett v. State, 815 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
To the extent the State contends that a question of law exists as to whether someone who may qualify as an expert is precluded from giving factual testimony under Indiana Code section 25-23.6-4-6, we find in the negative. .. . .
While Indiana Code section 25-23.6-4-6 prohibits a licensed clinical social worker from providing expert testimony, it does not prohibit an expert from providing factual testimony. It also cannot prohibit a licensed clinical social worker from being qualified as an expert as Evidence Rule 702(a) allows that a witness may qualify as an expert on the basis of experience alone. See Evid. R. 702(a); Burnett v. State, 815 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“[A] witness may qualify as an expert on the basis of practical experience alone.”). Nevertheless, it does not appear from the record that this was the basis for the trial court sustaining Velasquez’s objection to Kline’s testimony.
BRADFORD, J., and BROWN, J., concur.