BRADFORD, J.
Hoglund contends that the admission regarding whether A.H. was fabricating her story of child abuse was an abuse of discretion requiring reversal.
No witness, whether lay or expert, is competent to testify that another witness is or is not telling the truth. Shepherd v. State (1989), Ind., 538 N.E.2d 242. In the context of child molesting, however, [the Indiana Supreme] Court has recognized that where children are called upon to describe sexual conduct, a special problem exists in assessing credibility since children often use unusual words to describe sexual organs and their function and since they may be more susceptible to influence. Therefore, testimony is allowed which permits some accrediting of the child witness in the form of opinions from parents, teachers, and others having adequate experience with the child, that the child is not prone to exaggerate or fantasize about sexual matters. Such opinions … facilitate an original credibility assessment of the child by the trier of fact….
Lawrence [v. State], 464 N.E.2d [923 ,] 925 [(Ind. 1984)]. These adult witnesses are allowed to state an opinion as to the child’s general competence and ability to understand the subject, Settle v. State (1988), Ind., 526 N.E.2d 974, but are prohibited from making direct assertions as to their belief in the child’s testimony, as such vouching invades the province of the jury to determine what weight to place on the child’s testimony. Head v. State (1988), Ind., 519 N.E.2d 151.
Stewart v. State, 555 N.E.2d 121, 125 (Ind. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. 1992).
In this case, the three witnesses who testified regarding whether A.H. had a tendency to fabricate were a pediatrician, a mental health counselor, and a clinical psychologist. A parent or teacher, both of whom would have countless hours of contact with a child is distinguishable from a therapist or counselor, who may meet with a child for a few hours or less. In addition to cases involving parents and teachers, the case law recognizes that a therapist, social worker, psychologist, or even a police officer can fall under the Lawrence rule. . . . In summary, the case law recognizes that a witness can fall under the Lawrence rule if he or she either (1) knows the child very well or (2) has had some experience with the child coupled with other relevant experience, such as having had extensive contact with many victims of child molestation.
In any event, Hoglund does not dispute that the evidence at issue here is indirect vouching by an expert under Lawrence. He argues, however, that Lawrence is no longer good law. Hoglund argues that Lawrence was effectively overruled by Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 498-99 (Ind. 1995). In Steward, the Indiana Supreme Court addressed the question of admissibility of evidence of Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (“CSAAS”), which deals with behaviors typical of child molesting victims. Id. at 499. The Steward Court held that CSAAS evidence could not be used to show that child abuse occurred, noting that “the reliability of such evidence for the purpose of proving abuse is at present extremely doubtful and the subject of substantial and widespread repudiation by courts and scientists.” Id. 8
There are some similarities in the types of evidence at issue in Lawrence and Steward, as they both tend to bolster the credibility of child molestation victims. Steward, however, does not mention Lawrence, much less explicitly overrule it. Moreover, we conclude that the rationale for the Steward holding simply does not apply to the type of evidence at issue in Lawrence and this case. Hoglund does not claim, and there is no indication in the record, that any of the opinions expressed regarding the possibility of A.H. fabricating her story of molestation were based on anything of dubious reliability, as was the case in Steward. Unlike evidence regarding CSAAS, there is no indication of any widespread repudiation of the idea that persons who know a child very well, or experts who know the child and also have other relevant experience, can offer an opinion on the child’s tendency to fabricate. While it may be that the Indiana Supreme Court will revisit Lawrence, [footnote omitted] we conclude that its decision in Steward left it intact, and so it remains the law in Indiana. [Footnote omitted.]
BROWN, J., concurs.
DARDEN, J., concurs in result with opinion:
While I cannot disagree with the legal reasoning of the majority, I am troubled by the possible effect of the cumulative vouching testimony. . . . .