FRIEDLANDER, J.
Carolyn Boss brings this interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss the charging information on double jeopardy grounds. Boss presents one issue for our review: Did the trial court properly deny Boss’s motion to dismiss the charging information when it concluded that the enforcement of various city ordinances did not constitute punishment and that the current prosecution was therefore not a second prosecution for the same offense?
We affirm.
Because no trial has yet occurred, we glean the facts from the probable cause affidavit. Boss maintained three dogs on her property. [Footnote omitted.] Carrolle Bales was walking in an alley near Boss’s property when the dogs attacked her. One of the dogs latched onto Bales’s left arm and the other two dogs bit her legs until she fell to the ground. . . . Both Bales and Wimberly suffered serious bodily injury to their upper and lower extremities. After the attack, Boss could not provide proof of rabies vaccinations for the dogs. Also, officers responding to the attack noted that there was inadequate shelter for two of the dogs and that one of the dogs was inappropriately chained.
On November 8, 2008, the City of Indianapolis issued Boss five citations for each of the dogs, resulting in a total of fifteen citations for ordinance violations. On December 15, 2008, Boss admitted to twelve of the fifteen violations and the remaining three allegations were dismissed. . . . .
Following Boss’s admissions to the violations, the court imposed fines totaling $1150.00 and court costs of $114.00. Additionally, Boss voluntarily surrendered the three dogs to the City of Indianapolis and agreed “to be permanently enjoined from allowing an animal kept by her to be at large in the city or to attack and injure a person without being provoked” and “to be permanently enjoined from violating [§] 531-401 . . . .” . . . .
On December 8, 2008, the State charged Boss by information with six counts of dog biting resulting in serious bodily injury [footnote omitted] as class A misdemeanors and six counts of harboring a non-immunized dog [footnote omitted] as class B misdemeanors. The charges stemmed from the same incident involving Boss’s dogs from which the ordinance violations arose. . . . .
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We begin by noting that it has long been established that prosecution for the violation of a city ordinance in which a monetary penalty only is sought is a civil and not a criminal action. . . . .
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In light of the General Assembly’s limitation on the authority to pass ordinances duplicative of statutes defining criminal liability and limits on the types and amount of sanctions that may be imposed for violations, the text of the ordinances themselves, and the mechanism established by the General Assembly for enforcement of ordinances, we conclude that the General Assembly intended that the ordinances at issue are civil in nature, not punitive.
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Considering all of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, we conclude that there is little evidence, much less the clearest proof, that the ordinance enforcement actions serve a punitive purpose. Therefore, this prosecution does not place Boss in jeopardy a second time for the same offense. Finding no violation of double jeopardy principles, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Boss’s motion to dismiss the charging information.
MATHIAS, J., concurs.
MAY, J., concurs in result with separate opinion:
I cannot find fault with the majority’s methodical analysis of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, especially in light of the Hudson statement that only the clearest proof will suffice to “override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” 522 U.S. at 100. As there is case law to support the majority’s double jeopardy analysis, I must reluctantly concur in the result.
I nevertheless feel compelled to address why I find this criminal prosecution unjust. While Boss may not have been subjected to double jeopardy, the nature and sequence of these proceedings leaves me wondering whether this subsequent criminal prosecution by the State should be permissible in a system that presumes a defendant’s innocence. The City fined Boss under ordinances that appear invalid, and the resolution of the ordinance proceeding, via Boss’s admission of guilt when she had no counsel, could effectively deprive her in this subsequent criminal prosecution of the presumption of innocence and her right to effective assistance of counsel.