SHEPARD, C.J.
Today we address the importance of protective orders for Hoosiers in two cases. In this case we hold that a minor defect in the service of a protective order was cured by Joslyn’s statements to police and his testimony at trial. Allowing protective order respondents to evade enforcement through technicalities is counter to the purpose of the Civil Protection Order Act and simply dangerous for those whom the act is designed to protect. Therefore, we affirm Joslyn’s convictions for stalking and invasion of privacy.
. . . .
Joslyn’s convictions were based on his violation of the protective order obtained by Livingston. We first note that the statutes defining the crimes of stalking and invasion of privacy do not require actual service of a protective order for a conviction. Invasion of privacy does require “knowingly or intentionally violat[ing]” an order, and the stalking statute requires that the “person has been given actual notice of the order.” Ind. Code §§ 35-46-1-15.1, 35-45-10-5(b)(2). Joslyn argues that implicit in these crimes is a requirement that the protective order was properly served under the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure. (Appellant’s Br at 6–7.)
The Court of Appeals affirmed Joslyn’s convictions in accordance with earlier decisions holding that actual notice was sufficient for a conviction if the defendant received actual notice of the protective order from an agent of the State. Joslyn v. State, No. 49A04-0908-CR-460, slip op. at 3–4, (Ind. Ct. App. June 30, 2010); see Dixon v. State, 869 N.E.2d 516 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Hendricks v. State, 649 N.E.2d 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
In the present case, a process server testified that she left a copy of the order at Joslyn’s home. There was no indication that she also sent a copy of the order to his house by first class mail as required under our Trial Rules. See Ind. Trial Rule 4.1(B) (requiring a copy be sent by mail when an order is left at a dwelling house).
The trial court admitted, over objection, a recording and transcript of a statement Joslyn made to police:
Q: OK, and you’re aware you have a restraining order against you?
A: Yeah. Yeah, I know I got a restraining order. I ain’t, I haven’t been callin’ her or talkin’ to her or seein’ her. Uh, as a matter of fact, she’s been callin’ my house . . . .
* * * * *
Q: Do you know, do you know when your protective order was effective?
A: It was more like the 20th or somethin’. . . .
* * * * *
Q: Uh, how about the 10th and it was serve [sic] to you on the 13th?
A: OK.
* * * * *
Q: OK. Right now, you need to help yourself.
A: This, No…November 10th was when the restraining order or whatever was and then I got it three days later, so the 13th, so I’ve only had it for a couple weeks now (sigh) and nothin’s been goin’ on and then all of a sudden (pause) Sh** happens?
(State’s Ex. 16, pp. 3–4, 44.) Joslyn also testified at trial admitting that he found the protective order at his residence, but could not recall when. (Tr. at 285–86.)
We agree with the Court of Appeals that Joslyn’s admission of receipt is sufficient to sustain his convictions. As the court noted, the purpose of the Indiana Civil Protection Order Act is to promote the protection and safety of all victims of domestic violence and prevent future incidents. It would run contrary to this purpose if we were to embrace Joslyn’s contention that a defendant does not violate the criminal code because of some defect in civil process even where the court had in fact issued a protective order and the defendant in fact knew it had done so.
. . . .
One need only brush the surface of domestic violence statistics to realize the importance of protective orders in the prevention of domestic and family violence. The declared legislative intent that these provisions in the Code be interpreted in a way that will “promote the: protection and safety of all victims of domestic or family violence in a fair, prompt, and effective manner; and [the] prevention of future domestic and family violence.” Ind. Code § 34-26-5-1 (2008). Joslyn’s proposed rule that one who acknowledges actual receipt at his home but not an additional copy by mail commits no violation would have real world implications placing far too many Hoosiers at risk of becoming a domestic violence statistic.
Therefore, limiting an actual notice exception to instances when it comes from an agent of the State does little to further the protection of petitioners or the protection order process if there is evidence the respondent already has knowledge of the order. Here, Joslyn admitted in statements to police and again during trial that he was aware of the protective order and had read its terms. (Tr. at 286.) That sufficed to prove that he “knowingly” violated the order.
Dickson, Sullivan, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.