BROWN, J.
K.B. (“Putative Father”) appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion filed by S.M. (“Mother”) to dismiss his petition to establish paternity of Mother’s child, R.M., based on the doctrine of laches. Because Mother designated evidence in support of her motion to dismiss, we review the trial court’s order as one granting summary judgment. Putative Father raises three issues, one of which we find dispositive, that is whether the designated evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Putative Father’s petition to establish paternity is barred by laches as a matter of law. We reverse and remand. (footnote omitted)
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“The general doctrine is well established and long recognized: ‘Independently of any statute of limitation, courts of equity uniformly decline to assist a person who has slept upon his rights and shows no excuse for his laches in asserting them.'” . . . Laches requires: (1) inexcusable delay in asserting a known right; (2) an implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (3) a change in circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party. . . . .
Putative Father first contends that laches does not apply to paternity cases. In support he cites case law holding that laches does not apply in child support cases. See Trent v. Trent, 829 N.E.2d 81, 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding laches does not apply to child support proceedings because we will not penalize a child for his or her parent’s delay in pursuing child support). From there he extrapolates that, because paternity cases involve an element of child support, laches also does not apply in paternity cases.
This court considered the defense of laches in a similar paternity case, In re Paternity of K.H., 709 N.E.2d 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). There the child was born in 1992 in Japan to an unmarried mother. Mother listed the putative father’s name on the Consular Report of Birth Abroad and the Department of the Navy Birth Certificate. She also admitted in a 1993 letter that the putative father was the child’s biological father. (footnote omitted) The putative father “from time to time contributed unspecified amounts of money, clothing, and toys” to the child. Id. at 1034. In 1996, Mother was murdered in California. An aunt petitioned for guardianship of the child, and then in 1997 putative father petitioned to establish paternity. The aunt argued in relevant part that the putative father’s petition was barred by laches. Considering that argument on the merits, this court held that the aunt had not demonstrated all three elements of laches. Id. at 1036. Specifically, the court concluded that the aunt had not shown prejudice because the “only prejudice which [she mentioned] in her brief [was] the disturbance in [the child’s] life that will result from paternity being established in [the putative father].” Id. The court’s analysis and holding in In re K.H. tend to show that laches may bar a paternity action if the party asserting the defense establishes all of its elements.
To the extent Putative Father argues that laches may not bar a paternity action because such an action would include a child support order, again, we must disagree. That child support was not addressed in In re K.H. is of no moment. A paternity action is not necessarily a child support proceeding. Further, the reasoning behind the prohibition against laches as a defense in child support cases, that support is the entitlement of the child, does not apply here in that there is no statutory or other “entitlement” to a paternity determination. Moreover, the child in this case has been supported by a mother and father throughout his life. The party seeking to establish paternity here is a potential obligor, not the person who would receive support for the benefit of the child. Thus, the reasoning in Trent and similar cases is inapplicable here. Absent relevant Indiana law holding that laches does not apply in paternity cases, we decline to take that leap.
VAIDIK, J., concurs.
NAJAM, J., dissents, on other issues, with separate opinion.