MAY, J.
The trial court improperly ordered Jones to pay fees associated with his trial, specifically, a jury fee, a pauper counsel fee, and a docket fee. . . .
a. Jury Fee
Ind. Code § 33-37-5-19 authorizes the trial court to assess jury costs against the defendant, but limits the amount: “[t]he clerk shall collect a jury fee of two dollars ($2) in each action in which a defendant is found to have committed a crime, violated a statute defining an infraction, or violated an ordinance of a municipal corporation.” The State concedes, and we agree, that the trial court abused its discretion when ordering Jones to pay $1322.60 in jury fees. Therefore, we remand for the trial court to impose a maximum jury fee of $2.00 pursuant to Ind. Code § 33-37-5-19.
b. Pauper Counsel Fee
The trial court assessed a pauper counsel fee on Jones. The State concedes the trial court abused its discretion by imposing pauper counsel fees on Jones without holding an indigency hearing. Three statutes empower the trial court to impose a fee on a defendant for the cost of his appointed representation. See Ind. Code §§ 33-37-2-3, 33-40-3-6, and 35-33-7-6.8 [8 We conclude Jones’ fee was not assessed pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6 because it requires the Public Defender fee be assessed “prior to the completion of the initial hearing,” but Jones’ fee was assessed during the sentencing phase of his trial.] Jones’ fee was not proper under any of them. [Footnote omitted.]
Ind. Code § 33-37-2-3 states in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), when the court imposes costs, it shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the convicted person is indigent. If the person is not indigent, the court shall order the person to pay:
(1) the entire amount of the costs at the time sentence is pronounced;
(2) the entire amount of the costs at some later date; or
(3) specified parts of the costs at designated levels.
* * * * *
(e) If, after a hearing under subsection (a) or (b), the court determines that a convicted person is able to pay part of the costs of representation, the court shall order the person to pay an amount of not more than the cost of the defense services rendered on behalf of the person.
. . . [A]t Jones’s initial hearing, the court found Jones indigent and appointed a public defender. No further hearing was held prior to imposition of the pauper counsel fees. Thus the fee could not be a valid assessment under Ind. Code § 33-37-2-3. . . .
Finally, the third possible statute for imposing pauper counsel fees states in relevant part:
(a) If at any stage of a prosecution for a felony or a misdemeanor the court makes a finding of ability to pay costs of representation under section 7 of this chapter, [footnote omitted] the court shall require payment by the person . . . of the following costs in addition to other costs assessed against the person:
(1) Reasonable attorney’s fees if an attorney has been appointed for the person by the court.
(2) Costs incurred by the county as a result of court appointed legal services rendered to the person.
Ind. Code § 33-40-3-6 (footnote added).
. . .
[T]his trial court did not find Jones could pay for his representation based on the criteria set forth in Ind. Code § 33-40-3-7. It therefore did not have authority to impose the $4527 fee against Jones pursuant to this section of the Indiana Code. . . . .
We accordingly remand for the court to hold an indigency hearing and consider those factors set forth in Ind. Code § 33-40-3-7 to determine whether Jones may be ordered pursuant to any of those statutes to pay any portion of the cost of his representation.
c. Docket Fee
Pursuant to Ind. Code § 33-37-2-3, “when the court imposes costs, it shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the convicted person is indigent.” The State concedes the trial court abused its discretion when assessing the $164 docket fee without holding an indigency hearing to determine what, if any, costs he is required to pay. Therefore, on remand, the trial court should determine during the indigency hearing regarding Jones’ public defender fees whether he can also pay a docket fee, or any portion thereof. [Footnote omitted.]
ROBB, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.