RILEY, J.
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Initially, we want to note our concern with the application of the Marion County Circuit Court’s mass tort litigation rules to this case. Trial courts may establish local rules for their own governance only as long as these rules are not inconsistent with rules prescribed by the supreme court or by statute. See Ind. Trial Rule 81. These local rules are generally procedural, intended to standardize the practice within that court, to facilitate the effective flow of information, and to enable the court to rule on the merits. Meredith v. State, 679 N.E. 2d 1309, 1310 (Ind. 1997). Once a local rule is made, all litigants and the court are bound by the rules of the court. State v. Decatur Circuit Court, 219 N.E.2d 898, 899 (1966).
A rule of court is a law of practice, extended alike to all litigants who come within its purview, and who, in conducting their causes, have the right to assume that it will be uniformly enforced by the court, in conservation of their rights, as well as to secure the prompt and orderly dispatch of business. Furthermore, a rule adopted by a court is something more than a rule of the presiding judge; it is a judicial act, and when taken by a court, and entered of record, becomes a law of procedure therein, in all matter to which it relates, until rescinded or modified by the court.
Magnuson v. Billings, 152 Ind. 177, 180 (1899). Pursuant to these general guidelines, the Marion County Circuit Court’s mass tort docket has exercised its power to draft local rules to facilitate the efficient resolution of mass tort cases.
The procedural posture and facts—or lack thereof—of this case can only be truly understood within the framework of the Marion Circuit Court mass tort litigation rules. Under these local rules, a case that is neither exigent nor set for trial is considered “stayed.” See LR49-TR40 Rule 711(H). While a party is permitted to file documents in a stayed case, the typical time for response does not begin until the case is set for trial. See LR49-TR40 Rule 711(H). Because the instant case is neither exigent nor scheduled for trial, it is considered a stayed case pursuant to local rule 711(H). The exception to the rule requiring no activity in a stayed case is with respect to an initial summary judgment motion filed pursuant to local rule 714.
Local rule 714 provides a limited opportunity for a party in a stayed case to file a summary judgment motion. Because an initial motion for summary judgment is filed prior to discovery, “[o]nly summary judgment motions that raise issues for which no significant discovery is deemed necessary for the preparation and filing of the motion may be filed as an initial summary judgment motion.” See Rule 714(A). It is generally understood by the Marion County Circuit Court that an initial motion for summary judgment is designed to be used by a party against whom a claim has been asserted in an effort to secure judgment on the claim prior to engaging in discovery or extensive litigation.
However, we caution that a trial court should not blindly adhere to all of its local rules. “Although our procedural rules are extremely important, it must be kept in mind that they are merely a means for achieving the ultimate end of orderly and speedy justice. We must examine our technical rules closely when it appears that invoking them would defeat justice; otherwise we become slaves to the technicalities themselves and they acquire the position of being the ends instead of the means.” Meredith v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1309, 1311 (Ind. 1997) (quoting American States Ins. Co. v. State, 283 N.E.2d 529, 531 (Ind. 1972)). Before a court may set aside its own rule, and it should not be set aside lightly, the court must assure itself that it is in the interest of justice to do so, that the substantive rights of the parties are not prejudiced, and that the rule is not a mandatory rule. Meredith, 679 N.E.2d at 1311.
In the instant case, ESMW took advantage of local rule 714 and filed an initial motion for summary judgment in the stayed case claiming that its cause falls within the protection of CSOR, I.C. § 32-30-1-5(d), which provides:
(d) An action to recover damages, whether based upon contract, tort, nuisance, or another legal remedy, for:
(1) a deficiency or an alleged deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, construction, or observation of construction of an improvement to real property;
(2) an injury to real or personal property arising out of a deficiency; or
(3) an injury or wrongful death of a person arising out of a deficiency;
may not be brought against a designer or possessor unless the action is commenced within the earlier of ten (10) years after the date of substantial completion of the improvement or twelve (12) years after the completion and submission of plans and specifications to the owner if the action is for a deficiency in the design of the improvement.
Thus in order to fall within the purview of the statute, which would bar Sharon’s complaint, ESMW was required to designate evidence establishing that (1) its work constituted “an improvement to real property” and (2) the complaint was brought more than ten years after the date of substantial completion of the improvement. See I.C. § 32-30-1-5(d)(1). In other words, to thoroughly evaluate ESMW’s initial motion for summary judgment, we are required to interpret the statute.
Analyzing Indiana’s relevant case law, it should be noted that this jurisdiction has never clearly characterized “an improvement to real property.” See, e.g., J.M. Foster, Inc. v. Spriggs, 789 N.E.2d 526 (Ind. 2003), reh’g denied. Thus, to evaluate what can be considered an improvement to real property, we need to inquire as to the scope of work performed by ESMW. However, the application of local rule 714 prevents us from pursuing this analysis. Because local rule 714 allows an initial motion for summary judgment to be filed prior to discovery, the facts before us are necessarily limited to those included in Sharon’s complaint. Specifically, ESMW designated portions of Sharon’s Master Complaint, where Sharon alleged that ESMW, as contractor, “sold, distributed, installed, applied and/or removed asbestos-contained products to which [Gale] was exposed.” (Appellee’s App. p. 17). Her complaint further alleged that ESMW “applied or removed asbestos-containing products or asbestos-insulated equipment to which DECEDENT was exposed.” (Appellee’s App. p. 17). Finally, the complaint stated that ESMW “manufactured, sold, installed or caused to be installed, used, distributed, and/or otherwise placed into the stream of commerce, asbestos and/or asbestos-containing products . . . .” (footnote omitted)
A proper analysis of the statutory language “improvement to real estate” necessitated detailed discovery. We believe that the trial court should not have adhered to the local rule as it failed to achieve “the ultimate end of orderly and speedy justice.” See Meredith, 679 N.E. 2d at 1310. In sum, this cause did not lend itself to the application of local rule 714.
….
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of ESMW as Sharon’s claim is barred by the CSOR.
Affirmed.
KIRSCH, J., and BAILEY, J., concur