RILEY, J.
. . . PCDCS [Porter County Division of Child Services] investigating case manager Michael Fiala (Fiala) spoke with Mother at the Porter County Jail. Mother admitted to Fiala that she had bought and used crack cocaine prior to getting into the car and driving with J.O. the previous night. Mother also provided Fiala with Father’s name, stated he was J.O.’s biological father, and further explained that Father was incarcerated in the Lake County Jail on an outstanding robbery warrant. Fiala included this information regarding Father’s name and whereabouts in his “Detention Hearing Report to the Court” filed on July 10, 2008. . . . On July 16, 2008, PCDCS filed a verified CHINS petition which did not name Father as J.O.’s biological or alleged biological father, but instead contained the following language: “Paternity of [J.O.] has not been established . . . .” . . . Father was not provided a copy of the CHINS petition, nor informed of the CHINS initial hearing date.
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When balancing these competing interests between a parent and the State, we must also consider the risk of error created by the challenged procedure. Here, the challenged procedure involved the State’s initiation and prosecution of the underlying CHINS and involuntary termination proceedings without ever naming Father as a party to the CHINS case, notifying Father of any of the CHINS hearings, or providing Father with any CHINS documents or orders, including the trial court’s dispositional order and PCDCS’s case plans, notwithstanding PCDCS’s admitted knowledge of Father’s name and whereabouts since the time of J.O.’s initial detention.
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In considering the Mathews v. Eldridge due process factors under these circumstances, it is apparent that the risk of error created by PCDCS’s decision to refrain from naming Father as a party to the case while continuing with the underlying CHINS proceedings in Father’s absence, despite PCDCS’s actual knowledge of Father’s name and whereabouts, coupled with PCDCS’s and the trial court’s blatant disregard of statutory law mandating that Father be provided with notice of all CHINS hearings and copies of all CHINS orders and case plans, resulted in a violation of Father’s right to due process. To hold otherwise, and allow PCDCS, with the assistance of the trial court, to remove a child from his home, commence CHINS proceedings, and ultimately terminate a parent-child relationship while refusing to abide by significant and substantial portions of the CHINS and termination statutes would be incongruous. As stated previously, once the State imparts a due process right, then it must give that right. See A.P., 734 N.E.2d at 1112.
Notwithstanding our holding today, we pause to clarify that we are not commenting upon the sufficiency of the evidence in this case or on the extent to which a county office of the Indiana Department of Child Services must provide services to parents in a CHINS case. Nor should this opinion be construed as adding an additional element to those already required by Indiana’s termination statute. See I. C. § 31-35-2-4; see also A.P., 734 N.E.2d at 1118. Rather, we simply cannot ignore PCDCS’s and the trial court’s failure to follow numerous and substantial statutory mandates in this matter. As such, the situation demands that we reverse the trial court’s termination order on procedural due process grounds.
BAILEY, J., concurs.
KIRSCH, J., dissents with separate opinion:
I fully agree with my colleagues’ conclusion that Father was denied due process during the CHINS proceeding. Indeed, I would be harsher in my criticism of the Porter County Office of Child Services and its knowing and repeated failure to provide Father with the rights due to him. That said, I do not believe that such failures deprived Father of procedural due process with respect to the termination of his parental rights.
. . . .
During the termination proceeding, Father was provided with both notice and the opportunity to be heard. The trial court listened to and weighed Father’s arguments, and its decision to terminate his parental rights was supported by evidence that went far beyond the clear and convincing standard. Finally, the majority’s decision to reverse that decision will result in tremendous disruption to the life of the child and the only home he has known, but will not provide any corresponding benefit.
Other than sperm donation, the Father has made no contributions to the life of this child. . . . .