ROBB, J.
The record shows Segar did object at the time the State moved to admit Exhibit 1, the marijuana, into evidence. . . . However, the State argues this was not a timely objection because both officers had already testified regarding their discovery of marijuana on Segar’s person. The State contends their testimony already provided sufficient evidence to convict Segar and his objection therefore came too late. The State directs us to Lundquist v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1061 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). There, we concluded the defendant “failed to object to 1) testimony concerning the deputies’ discovery, search, and collection of the marijuana, and 2) the State Police Chemist’s testimony that the plant material collected by the deputies was marijuana with a weight of 182 grams.” Id. at 1067. Under those circumstances, the defendant’s objection to the admission of the actual marijuana was not a timely objection and his claim of error was waived. Id.
Here by contrast, the officers testified only that the green leafy substance recovered from Segar’s pocket “resembled marijuana,” . . . (Officer Grigsby), or was “believed to be marijuana,” . . . (Officer Frazier). Neither officer stated unequivocally that the plant material collected from Segar was in fact marijuana, as would have been required to prove Segar’s conviction beyond a reasonable doubt absent additional evidence. Rather, the officers’ testimony regarding the “alleged marijuana,” . . . was foundational in nature for the purpose of linking Segar to the physical evidence. Segar was not required to object to that foundational testimony, but made a timely objection when the State moved to admit Exhibit 1, the actual marijuana, into evidence. For the same reasons, the actual marijuana was not cumulative of the testimony already presented; its admission affected Segar’s substantial rights and cannot be deemed harmless. See Ind. Trial Rule 61. Thus, we conclude Segar’s claim is not waived and proceed to its merits.
MAY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.