VAIDIK, J.
S.D. appeals his juvenile delinquency adjudication for what would be Class C felony child molesting if committed by an adult. Before S.D. was interviewed about the child molesting allegation, he and his guardian were given time to consult with each other. However, the consultation took place in a room where video cameras were recording, and S.D. and his guardian were aware of that fact. S.D. contends that the admission of his subsequent confession constitutes fundamental error. We conclude that there is fundamental error because S.D. was in custody when he confessed and was not given meaningful consultation with his guardian as required by Indiana’s juvenile waiver of rights statute because the video cameras constituted an improper police presence and infringed on the privacy necessary to any meaningful consultation. We therefore reverse.
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Because S.D. was in custody when he confessed, the juvenile waiver statute applies, and S.D. was entitled to meaningful consultation with Spenneberg. See Ind. Code § 31-32-5-1(2)(C).
The meaningful consultation requirement of the juvenile waiver of rights statute is a safeguard additional to the requirement of adult waivers that they be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. Cherrone v. State, 726 N.E.2d 251, 254 (Ind. 2000). The purpose of the meaningful consultation requirement is to “afford the juvenile a stabilizing and comparatively relaxed atmosphere in which to make a serious decision that could affect the rest of his life.” Patton v. State, 588 N.E.2d 494, 496 (Ind. 1992).
Consultation can be meaningful only in the absence of police pressure. Washington v. State, 456 N.E.2d 382, 383 (Ind. 1983); see also Hall, 264 Ind. at 452, 346 N.E.2d at 587 (“[A] meaningful consultation can only occur in the absence of the neutralizing pressures which result from police presence.”). Privacy is essential to a meaningful consultation. See Fowler, 483 N.E.2d at 743 (“The level of privacy accorded appellant and his mother for their consultation was sufficient to permit discussion on the waiver decision.”). The meaningful consultation requirement is met only when the State demonstrates actual consultation of a meaningful nature or the express opportunity for such consultation, which is then forsaken by the juvenile in the presence of the proper authority, so long as the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waives his constitutional rights. Cherrone, 726 N.E.2d at 254.
Here, Detective Lawrence left the interview room to allow S.D. and Spenneberg to discuss whether S.D. would agree to talk and whether Spenneberg would stay in the room. However, the consultation between S.D. and Spenneberg was videotaped, and more importantly, S.D. and Spenneberg were aware of the video cameras in the room. The State even concedes on appeal, “[I]t was evident from the moment they entered the interview room that both Spenneberg and S.D. were aware that they were being recorded.” . . . We conclude that the video cameras constituted an improper police presence and infringed on the privacy necessary to any meaningful consultation. See Bryant, 802 N.E.2d at 494 (consultation not meaningful where police secretly listened to and videotaped consultation between juvenile and his mother).
The State nonetheless points out that, before Detective Lawrence left the room to give S.D. and Spenneberg an opportunity for consultation, S.D. and Spenneberg decided that S.D. would talk, Spenneberg asked S.D. whether he wanted her in the room, and S.D. said that it did not matter to him. The State argues that these facts “suggest[] that neither Spenneberg nor S.D. placed a high premium on a consultation completely free of police presence.” . . . However, an equally plausible explanation is that S.D. and Spenneberg did not place a “high premium” on the consultation because, in light of the video cameras, they knew the consultation would not be private. Regardless, the determinative question, which cannot be answered affirmatively on these facts, is whether S.D. was given meaningful consultation or the express opportunity for meaningful consultation, which S.D. then knowingly and voluntarily waived.
The State also argues that because S.D. and Spenneberg were aware that they were being recorded and failed to ask Detective Lawrence to turn off the cameras or move them to a room without cameras, S.D. and Spenneberg “forsook any right they had to not have their consultation taped.” . . . We cannot agree that the police properly recorded the consultation between S.D. and Spenneberg merely because S.D. and Spenneberg failed to request an environment free from police presence. The burden is on the State to demonstrate that S.D. and Spenneberg were afforded meaningful consultation. The burden is not on the juvenile to ask for it.
We acknowledge that our decision places a burden on police officers to ensure that interview room video cameras do not infringe upon meaningful consultation when a juvenile is involved. However, in light of the purpose of the meaningful consultation requirement – to provide a juvenile with a “stabilizing and comparatively relaxed atmosphere in which to make a serious decision that could affect the rest of his life” – we cannot say that such a burden is too onerous.
. . . Given the dearth of evidence against S.D., we find the admission of S.D.’s confession when he had been deprived of meaningful consultation to be so prejudicial to the rights of S.D. as to make a fair trial impossible. We therefore conclude that the juvenile court’s admission of S.D.’s confession constitutes fundamental error.
MAY, J., and ROBB, J., concur.