DARDEN, J.
On October 30, 2009, the trial court entered its order, stating, in part, as follows:
Rogers has paid more than his pro rata share of the amounts that have been paid to the banks. He has paid all the amounts alleged in the complaint, more than $88,000, and Small has paid none. Small is liable to Rogers for his pro rata share of the amounts paid. It is not necessary that Rogers have paid the liability in full. . . . The law finds the right of contribution when one party pays more than his share of the common obligation. Here, Rogers paid a portion of the demanded amounts due to the Demands made from the banks and in order to prevent the banks from instituting the threatened lawsuits. Small did not pay at all. Rogers, therefore, paid more than his share and has a right to contribution from his co-guarantors.
(App. 8-9). Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Rogers.
. . . .
Citing to Balvich [v. Spicer, 894 N.E.2d 235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)], Rogers argues that “the undisputed facts demonstrate that Rogers has a right of contribution against co-guarantor Small for $43,050.47, the total amount paid by Rogers in excess of his pro rata share.” . . . Rogers, however, misconstrues Balvich.
. . . .
Among the issues raised, the Balviches argued “the remedy of contribution was not proper because the Spicers ‘did not pay the judgments in full.’” Id. at 245 . . . . In so arguing, the Balviches cited to Indiana Code section 34-22-1-6, which provides:
A person who:
(1) is one (1) of several:
(A) judgment defendants; or
(B) replevin sureties; and
(2) paid and satisfied the plaintiff;
has the remedy provided in section 5 of this chapter against the codefendants or cosureties to collect from them the ratable proportion each is equitably bound to pay.
(Emphasis added).
The Balvich-court found that “[c]ontrary to the Balviches’ claims, the statute does not contain a requirement that the judgment must be paid ‘in full’ or in its entirety.’” Id. at 247. Rather, this court held that Indiana Code section 34-22-1-6 “simply means that the Spicers may pursue the co-loan guarantors pursuant to the judgments that were entered,” where the Spicers paid the creditors and satisfied the judgments as they “pertained to the Spicers’ obligation as evidenced by the release of judgment[s].” Id.
Balvich is distinguishable from the case at hand. In Balvich, the banks reduced the co-guarantors’ debt to two judgments. The Spicers subsequently paid more than their proportionate share of the judgments, thereby satisfying the judgments.
Here, unlike in Balvich, the debt owed by Rogers and Small has not been reduced to judgment. Thus, there can be no satisfaction of the judgment, and therefore, no discharge of the debt. Cf. Titan Loan Inv. Fund, L.P. v. Marion Hotel Partners, LLC, 891 N.E.2d 74, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that where the judgment has been satisfied, the judgment debt is discharged), trans. denied.
Rather, in this case, the debt still exists. Rogers did not discharge the debt, either by paying the debt or a judgment on the debt. See Balvich, 894 N.E.2d at 243 (noting that contribution involves the reimbursement of one who has discharged a common liability). Furthermore, the amounts paid by Rogers do not constitute more than his proportionate share of the more than $5,000,000.00 of debt incurred. He therefore is not entitled to contribution from his co-guarantors at this time. [Footnote omitted.] Finding that Rogers is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we hereby reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for Rogers. [Footnote omitted.]
BRADFORD, J., and BROWN, J., concur.