BRADFORD, J.
At some point on or before April 24, 2009, Holmes, by counsel, prepared a Complaint alleging wrongful termination and conversion. On April 24, 2009, Holmes, by counsel, mailed the following documents to the Marion County Clerk via certified mail, receipt number 7005 2570 0000 2779 8333: (1) an original and four copies of Holmes’s Complaint against Celadon; (2) a check in the amount of $ 146.00 made out to the Clerk of the Marion County Courts, the appropriate filing fee; and (3) an original and four copies of the summonses to be served on Celadon. These documents were shown to be delivered to and received by the Clerk of the Marion County Courts on April 28, 2009.
After realizing that he had failed to include an appearance with the documents that he mailed via certified mail to the Marion County Clerk on April 24, 2009, Holmes’s attorney mailed an appearance to the Marion County Clerk pursuant to Trial Rule 3.1 on May 8, 2009. Upon receiving Holmes’s appearance, the Marion County Clerk recorded that Holmes’s complaint and his counsel’s appearance were filed on May 12, 2009.
On February 1, 2010, Celadon moved for judgment on the pleadings, claiming that Holmes’s claims were time-barred by the applicable statute of limitation. Holmes responded to Celadon’s motion on March 3, 2010, alleging that he timely commenced the action on April 24, 2009, when the necessary documents were mailed via certified mail. Celadon replied on March 26, 2010, again asserting that Holmes’s claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitation. On June 3, 2010, the trial court granted Celadon’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the case with prejudice. This appeal follows.
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Celadon also argues that even if the documents listed as being required for commencement of an action in Indiana Trial Rule 3 were filed upon Holmes’s act of mailing them via certified mail on April 24, 2009, the action was nevertheless commenced after the statutorily allotted time period expired because the action did not actually commence until May 12, 2009, when the trial court received Holmes’s counsel’s appearance. In support, Celadon relies on Indiana Trial Rule 3.1 and Marion County Local Rule 49-TR5-205(E) which require that an initiating party file an appearance at the time an action is commenced. Celadon, however, has failed to point to any authority which provides that an action is not commenced for the purposes of the statute of limitations until both Trial Rules 3 and 3.1 are satisfied, and we find none. While there may be some consequence for failing to timely file an appearance, nothing in the rules suggests that the delayed filing of an appearance has any impact on the commencement of the action for statute of limitations purposes.
Because Trial Rule 3 explicitly states that an action commences when the initiating party files the original and necessary copies of the complaint, the prescribed filing fee, and the original and necessary copies of the summons, and the evidence before the trial court indicates that Holmes filed these required documents via certified mail on April 24, 2009, we conclude that Holmes commenced the instant action during the statutorily allotted time. Therefore, we further conclude that the trial court erroneously granted Celadon’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that the action was not filed within the statutorily allotted time frame. Accordingly, we remand this action for the entry of partial summary judgment in favor of Holmes on the question of whether the instant action was timely filed.
DARDEN, J., and BROWN, J., concur.