BAKER, C.J.
An attorney was facing major surgery and attempting to work with an expert who was unable to get a report completed in a timely fashion. Consequently, the attorney contacted opposing counsel to explain that an extension of time to file his client’s designated evidence in opposition to summary judgment would be needed. Opposing counsel agreed that an extension would be acceptable. Although we encourage collegiality among members of the legal profession, the attorney here should also have filed a formal request with the trial court for an extension of time. Having failed to do so, the trial court was without discretion to accept the technically late-filed documents.
Appellants-plaintiffs Mary and Steve Booher appeal the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of appellee-defendant Sheeram LLC d/b/a Hampton Inn of Elkhart (Hampton Inn) on the Boohers’ negligence complaint. The Boohers argue that the trial court erroneously struck their designation of material facts in opposition to Hampton Inn’s summary judgment motion as untimely. They also contend that there are issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. Finding no error and no issues of fact, we affirm.
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The Boohers first argue that the trial court erred by granting Hampton Inn’s motion to strike their designation of material facts and expert affidavit. Trial Rule 56(C) provides that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment has thirty days after service of the motion to serve a response and any opposing affidavits. Trial courts are authorized to “alter any time limit set forth in this rule upon motion made within the applicable time limit,” if cause is found. Ind. Trial Rule 56(I) (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court has explained that the following “bright line rule” applies to this situation:
“[W]here a nonmoving party fails to respond within thirty days by either (1) filing affidavits showing issues of material fact, (2) filing his own affidavit under Rule 56(F) indicating why the facts necessary to justify his opposition are unavailable, or (3) requesting an extension of time in which to file his response under 56(I), the trial court lacks discretion to permit that party to thereafter file a response. In other words, a trial court may exercise discretion and alter time limits under 56(I) only if the nonmoving party has responded or sought an extension within thirty days from the date the moving party filed for summary judgment.”
HomEq Servicing Corp. v. Baker, 883 N.E.2d 95, 98 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Desai v. Croy, 805 N.E.2d 844, 849 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)) (emphasis added).
Here, the Boohers twice sought and received extensions to respond to Hampton Inn’s summary judgment motion. When their second extension was about to expire, they contacted Hampton Inn to explain that they needed three more weeks. Hampton Inn indicated that it would not oppose a third extension of time. The Boohers, however, failed to file a request with the trial court for a third extension before their deadline passed. Pursuant to the bright line rule set forth above, therefore, the trial court was without discretion to accept the late-filed documents. This would have been the case even if Hampton Inn had not objected.
Although we encourage collegiality among members of the legal profession and endeavor to promote cooperation and conflict resolution outside the walls of the courthouse, in certain circumstances parties must still seek formal relief directly from the trial court. Our Supreme Court has held that this is an example of such a circumstance. Consequently, while we do not find fault with the Boohers’ attorney’s decision to rely on the word of opposing counsel, unfortunately that reliance was not enough—he should still have filed a motion for extension of time with the trial court.
We acknowledge, as did the trial court, that the Boohers’ attorney was working under extraordinarily difficult circumstances—an expert who was out of the country and unable to complete his report in a timely fashion together with a major surgery endured by counsel certainly constituted cause to extend the deadline by three more weeks. Our proverbial hands are tied, however, inasmuch as our Supreme Court has made it clear that the trial court simply had no discretion to accept the untimely filed documents, regardless of the circumstances. Therefore, we are compelled to affirm the trial court’s decision to strike those documents.
BAILEY, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.