BROWN, J.
. . . On October 28, 2009, the trial court issued an Ex Parte Order for Protection . . . which provided in part that Thomas was “prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or directly or indirectly communicating with [James Smith].” . . . The order also provided that it expired October 28, 2010. The case was then set for hearing.
On November 16, 2009, a hearing was held in the Marion County Superior Court, and Thomas and Smith were present at the hearing. At the end of the hearing and in the court’s presence, Thomas looked at Smith and stated: “Stop calling me, fagot [sic].” . . . Thomas was then immediately arrested in court.
The State then filed an information charging Thomas with invasion of privacy as a class A misdemeanor . . . . [Footnote omitted.] After the presentation of evidence and arguments at a bench trial on January 7, 2010, the court found that Thomas “had knowledge of the order for protection and nevertheless violated it” and found Thomas guilty of invasion of privacy as a class A misdemeanor. . . . Thomas was sentenced to 365 days with 305 days suspended.
. . . .
Thomas argues that “the evidence is not sufficient to show [she] acted with the mens rea to commit invasion of privacy because the courtroom is a neutral zone where some terms of the protective order are naturally suspended for the purposes of conducting judicial proceedings.” . . . Thomas further argues that her “statement to Smith on November 16 was made in extremely poor taste and constituted „gross violation[] of decency and decorum‟ to warrant holding her in direct contempt of court” but that “[n]evertheless, mens rea to commit invasion of privacy cannot be automatically inferred from Thomas’s behavior since other types of activities, which would normally give rise to a violation of the protective order, were permissible in the courtroom that morning.” . . . The State argues that “[t]he protective order itself provided no exceptions in which [Thomas] could lawfully communication [sic] with Smith” and that Thomas “would have had no reason to believe, after a further order of protection was issued, that she could then directly speak to Smith in court or otherwise.” . . . .
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. . . [W]e believe that in the context of this case, there is a more appropriate mechanism to address Thomas’s statement to Smith in the courtroom. Indiana courts have inherent power to punish summarily acts of direct contempt without formal charges or an evidentiary hearing. . . . Direct contempt includes those actions occurring in or near the court, interfering with the business of the court, of which the judge has personal knowledge. . . . .
Under the circumstances set forth in the record, the institution of direct contempt proceedings was the more appropriate action in response to Thomas’s statement to Smith in the courtroom. We reverse and remand with instructions to vacate Thomas’s conviction for invasion of privacy as a class A misdemeanor and, at the trial court’s option, to resume direct contempt proceedings [footnote omitted] to address Thomas’s comment to Smith at the November 16, 2009 hearing. [Footnote omitted.]
DARDEN, J., concurs.
BRADFORD, J., dissents with opinion:
. . . Although I agree that direct contempt proceedings would have been the more efficient and preferred remedy, I find nothing in the statute that precluded the State from choosing to file the invasion of privacy charges. . . . . Here, the statute plainly states that a person who violates a protective order commits invasion of privacy. I find no error and would therefore affirm Thomas’s conviction for invasion of privacy.