VAIDIK, J.
Timothy Cranston appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated with an alcohol concentration of .15 or greater. Cranston was arrested for drunk driving. He submitted to a B.A.C. Datamaster chemical breath test. The Datamaster machine printed an evidence ticket stating that Cranston’s blood alcohol concentration was .15. At trial, the State introduced the evidence ticket along with foundational testimony from the arresting officer. Cranston argues that the admission of the Datamaster ticket without live testimony from an equipment technician violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. We conclude that the admission of the ticket did not offend Cranston’s confrontation rights. A Datamaster evidence ticket is a mechanically-produced readout which cannot constitute “testimonial hearsay” under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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As mechanically-generated data are not hearsay statements in the first instance, the prevailing view is that they cannot constitute testimonial hearsay for purposes of Crawford and the Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[D]ata are not ‘statements’ in any useful sense. Nor is a machine a ‘witness against’ anyone. If the readings are ‘statements’ by a ‘witness against’ the defendants, then the machine must be the declarant. Yet how could one cross-examine a gas chromatograph?”); United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he witnesses with whom the Confrontation Clause is concerned are human witnesses[.]”); United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230-31 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he raw data generated by the machines do not constitute ‘statements,’ and the machines are not ‘declarants.’ As such, no out-of-court statement implicating the Confrontation Clause was admitted into evidence . . . .”); see also Wright & Graham, supra, § 6371.4.
Accordingly, courts have agreed that the evidence ticket produced by a chemical breath test machine is not testimonial hearsay subject to Crawford and the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., People v. Dinardo, — N.W.2d —, No. 294194, 2010 WL 3984545, slip op. at 5 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2010); State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 146-47 (N.J. 2008); Wimbish v. Commonwealth, 658 S.E.2d 715, 719-20 (Va. Ct. App. 2008); Luginbyhl, 618 S.E.2d at 351; Wright & Graham, supra, § 6371.2.
We concur and likewise conclude that Datamaster evidence tickets are non-testimonial non-hearsay. As such, the tickets do not implicate Crawford and the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
This is not to say, however, that mechanically-produced data like Datamaster results do not require accompanying human testimony. See, e.g., Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 150-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), modified in part on reh’g, 827 N.E.2d 565 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. In Napier, the defendant was charged with operating while intoxicated with an alcohol concentration of .08 or more. Id. at 145. The State introduced his Datamaster evidence ticket at trial, but neither the test operator nor any other live witness testified. Id. at 146. The defendant argued in part that the evidence ticket was inadmissible under the Indiana Code, the court rules, and the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 150. This Court agreed and held that the test results were improperly admitted. Id. at 151. The Court reasoned:
Napier was not only precluded from conducting any cross-examination with respect to the breath test operator’s qualifications, he was not afforded the opportunity to question or attack the purported results of his breath test. Without that “live” testimony, Napier could not challenge those results. And the ability to challenge the breath test results directly pertains to the issue of guilt or innocence in this case.
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In these circumstances, we are of the view that the State’s manner of proving Napier’s breath test results failed because the State failed to lay an adequate evidentiary foundation for their admission into evidence. We must conclude, therefore, that the State’s failure to present any “live testimony” at trial from the officer who conducted the tests runs afoul of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution in light of Crawford. That is, the State failed to establish an adequate evidentiary foundation for the admission of the test results into evidence.
Id. To the extent Napier finds the evidence ticket inadmissible on Sixth Amendment grounds—thus implying that the ticket constitutes testimonial hearsay—we respectfully disagree. But the Napier outcome is probably better understood as a matter of foundation and/or relevancy. “[T]he only way the printout was relevant was if the operator testified that it was used in the proper manner—the real problem, but not one properly within the realm of Crawford.” Wright & Graham, supra, § 6371.2 n.295; see also id. § 6371.4 (“’[M]echanical hearsay’ does require human testimony; someone has to testify that the machine was operating properly at the time it made the statement.”). Or one might say that without testimony from the operator establishing that all proper testing procedures were followed, the State failed to meet the admissibility requirements of the Indiana Code and administrative regulations. See Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5(d); 260 Ind. Admin. Code 1.1-4-8 (2010) (see http://www.in.gov/legislative/iac/). At any rate, the deficiencies addressed in Napier do not present themselves in the case at bar, for here the State supplied the necessary foundational testimony from the test administrator establishing that all approved testing procedures were observed. The State also introduced an official inspection certificate verifying that the Datamaster was accurate and in proper working condition.
We finally note that the only actual hearsay at play in this case was the abovementioned Datamaster certificate of inspection. That hearsay was admissible pursuant to the Indiana Code, see Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5(c), and this Court has routinely held that Datamaster inspection certificates are non-testimonial documents presenting no confrontation problems of their own, see Ramirez v. State, 928 N.E.2d 214, 219-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied; see also Johnson v. State, 879 N.E.2d 649, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); Jarrell v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1022, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Rembusch v. State, 836 N.E.2d 979, 982 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), reh’g denied, trans. denied; Napier, 820 N.E.2d at 150.
MAY, J., and ROBB, J., concur.