FRIEDLANDER, J.
On July 3, 2008, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Rodney and Carol Varble and against the Branhams in the amount of $2750.50, plus $96.00 in court costs. According to the entry in the chronological case (the CCS) summary for that date, Quincy agreed to pay $100.00 per week toward the judgment and Shannon agreed to pay $300.00 per month (payable on the 3rd of every month). In November, the Varbles notified the court that the Branhams had stopped making payments toward the judgment. At a contempt hearing held on February 5, 2009, the Branhams were ordered to pay $250 a month until the judgment was satisfied. On April 9, 2009, the parties again appeared before the court and the Branhams agreed to pay $50.00 per week toward the judgment. The Branhams appeared for a status hearing on May 14, 2009, but the matter was continued. On July 7, 2009, the Varbles again notified the court that the Branhams had stopped making payments. The court issued an order for Quincy Branham to appear for a hearing on August 27, 2009. The following day, the court issued a garnishment order to Quincy’s employer, Harrison Auto Salvage, requiring payment of $20.00 a week toward the judgment. On September 28, 2009, an attorney filed an appearance on behalf of the Branhams and challenged the amount of the garnishment through a motion to correct error. Following a hearing on November 10, 2009, the trial court issued an amended garnishment order on November 13, 2009. [Footnote omitted.]
On March 30, 2010, the parties appeared for a status hearing in Cause No. 62C01- 0902-SC-00036, a different case in which Rodney Varble was also a plaintiff. Without advance notice to the Branhams or to counsel of record in this case, the court heard evidence relating to both cases. During the hearing, the court was informed that no monies had been received as a result of the garnishment order. Subsequent questioning by the attorney representing the Varbles revealed that Quincy had worked for Harrison Auto Salvage, earning $20.00 per day, $100.00 per week, for approximately 3 years. Quincy acknowledged that he has not looked for alternative employment since he began working for Harrison Auto Salvage. Out of his earnings, Quincy testified that he pays $200 per month for a truck that he uses as his means of transportation. Quincy admitted that he purchased the truck for $2500.00 while the judgment remained unsatisfied. Shannon advised the court that she receives Supplemental Security Income of $674.00 per month, out of which she pays rent of $400.00. Quincy and Shannon both contribute to the cost of food and utilities. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued the same order for both causes thereby requiring the Branhams to pay $50 per month toward this judgment and obligating Quincy to do a job search by submitting five applications a week. The court scheduled a second status hearing for June 16, 2010. [Footnote omitted.] This appeal ensued.
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Here, the parties were present at the March 30 hearing and counsel for the creditors (i.e., the Varbles) questioned the Branhams about their incomes and expenses. [Footnote omitted.] Quincy and Shannon each informed the court of their weekly/monthly earnings and expenses (without any supporting documentation). As meager as those amounts appear to be, the court recognized that at the end of the month, after the family bills had been paid and food purchased, Quincy somehow had sufficient funds to pay $200 toward a truck that he recently purchased for $2500.00. It was on this basis that the court found that Quincy and Shannon had sufficient funds to pay $50 a month toward this judgment. Implicit in the court’s order is that the court did not find Quincy’s and Shannon’s testimonies regarding their incomes and expenses to be completely credible. Based on the evidence before the court, the court concluded that, exemptions aside, the Branhams established they had sufficient funds to pay $50 a month toward this judgment. We find no error.
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. . . [W]e note that this is a small claims action. To ensure collection of small claims judgments, Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(C), provides that a court “may order a judgment paid the prevailing party in any specified manner. If the judgment is not paid as ordered, the court may modify its payment order as it deems necessary.” While S.C.R. 11(C) does not empower a trial court to harass a judgment debtor, it does provide the court with authority to exercise discretion to enforce a judgment. Such Rule is in line with the purpose of small claims proceedings in that they are meant to be expedited, with attendant reduction in time and expense for both plaintiff and defendant. Here, in setting a status hearing, at which counsel for the judgment-creditors was present, the court was exercising its discretion to enforce the judgment.
Keeping in mind T.R. 69 governing proceedings supplemental and S.C.R. 11, and based on the record before us, we cannot say that the garnishment order was a final judgment and that the trial court erred in requiring the Branhams to appear for a subsequent hearing for proceedings supplemental.
With that said we nevertheless conclude that the court overstepped its authority and abused its discretion when it required Quincy to seek alternative employment by submitting five applications a week. As set forth above, the purpose of proceedings supplemental is to afford the judgment-creditor relief to which it is entitled under the terms of the judgment. See Rice v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 782 N.E.2d 1000. Here, the judgment creditors are entitled to the payment of the money judgment rendered in their favor. Although the court is afforded discretion in proceedings supplemental, we have found no authority that supports the trial court’s order requiring Quincy to seek alternate employment by submitting five applications a week. We therefore reverse this part of the court’s order.
BARNES, J., concurs.
CRONE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part:
I respectfully disagree, . . . with the majority’s determination that the trial court committed no error in ordering the Branhams to pay $50 a month toward the judgment and in requiring repeated court appearances. Regarding the former, it is well settled that “[t]he creditor has the burden of showing that the debtor has property or income that is subject to execution.” Kirk, 585 N.E.2d at 1369 (emphasis added). Stated differently, a creditor has the burden of showing that the debtor has property or income that is not subject to applicable exemptions. [Footnote omitted.] The meager evidence before us strongly suggests that, notwithstanding Quincy’s acquisition of the $2500 truck, [footnote omitted] the Branhams’ property and income would fall within the exemptions provided by law. . . . I believe that it was appellees’ burden to demonstrate otherwise and that they failed to carry this burden. The majority states, “Implicit in the court’s order is that the court did not find Quincy’s and Shannon’s testimonies regarding their incomes and expenses to be completely credible.” Slip op. at 6. Even assuming that appellees’ counsel demonstrated that the Branhams were less than candid, this falls far short of showing that the Branhams in fact had property or income that is subject to execution.
Regarding the trial court’s requirement of repeated court appearances, it is important to remember that “proceedings supplemental are a creditor’s remedy and not the court’s.” Kirk, 585 N.E.2d at 1369. “A second order or examination of the debtor requires a showing by the creditor that new facts justifying a new order or examination have come to the knowledge of the creditor.” Id. Or, put another way,
“If several examinations within a short time of one another have recently taken place, then facts should be shown from which it may be inferred that the judgment creditor will obtain useful information, and the examination is not being used as a club to enforce settlement of claims which the debtor is without property to pay.”
Id. (quoting 33 C.J.S. Executions § 365(3)(g) (1942)). I do not believe that appellees made such a showing here, and I do not believe that Small Claims Rule 11(C) may be used to justify the multiple status hearings scheduled by the trial court in this case. As a practical matter, it is difficult to see how the trial court’s order could lawfully be enforced, given that the Branhams may not be imprisoned for failing to pay the judgment and do not have identified property or income that is subject to execution.