FRIEDLANDER, J.
On March 13, 2009, the trial court entered a consent judgment in favor of Rodney Varble and Norman Chastain and against the Branhams in the amount of $4350.75, plus $99.00 in court costs. On November 12, 2009, the parties appeared before the court and an agreed garnishment order was entered.1 The parties were also ordered to reappear on March 30, 2010 for a status hearing. The Branhams appeared without counsel for each of the hearings.
At the March 30 hearing, the court was informed that no monies had been received as a result of the garnishment order. During subsequent questioning by the attorney representing the judgment-creditors, Quincy informed the court that he has worked for Harrison Auto Salvage, earning $20.00 per day, $100.00 per week, for approximately 3 years. Quincy acknowledged that he has not looked for alternative employment since he began working for Harrison Auto Salvage. Out of his earnings, Quincy testified that he pays $200 per month for a truck that he uses as his means of transportation. Quincy admitted that he purchased the truck for $2500.00 while this action was pending. Shannon advised the court that she receives Supplemental Security Income of $674.00 per month, out of which she pays rent of $400.00. Quincy and Shannon both contribute to the cost of food and utilities. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court ordered the Branhams to pay $50.00 per month toward the judgment and further ordered Quincy to do a job search by submitting five applications a week. The court scheduled a second status hearing for June 16, 2010. This appeal ensued.
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Here, the Branhams, who were not represented by counsel, did not assert any exemptions or in any way object to the trial court’s order that they pay $50 toward the consent judgment in favor of Varble and Chastain. Nevertheless, on appeal the Branhams assert that when a debtor is unrepresented, it is incumbent upon the court to protect the debtor’s constitutional rights and sua sponte “determine which exemptions result in the least burdensome order for the debtor.” Appellants’ Brief at 4. Although the dissent relies upon Mims v. Commerical Credit Corp.[, 261 Ind. 591, 307 N.E.2d 867 (1974)] to credit the Branhams’s assertion in this regard, we do not agree that Mims should be so broadly construed.
In Mims, a debtor who had defaulted on a retail installment contract appealed from a garnishment order entered against her. The trial court’s garnishment order complied with limitations set forth in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), resulting in a garnishment of $2.25 per week, but did not take into account the resident-householder exemption, which would have resulted in a garnishment of $4.20 per week. [Footnote omitted.] The debtor, who was apparently not represented by counsel, did not assert the resident-householder exemption during the proceeding supplemental. The debtor obtained pauper appellate counsel, who questioned whether the legislature had effectively repealed the resident-householder exemption by enacting the UCCC, and, if not, whether the burden to assert such exemption rested with the debtor.
Concluding that the residential-householder exemption survived the adoption of the UCCC, the court addressed the second issue. The Court expressly acknowledged that this court had correctly ascertained the general rule that the burden is upon the debtor to claim the exemption “at an appropriate time during proceedings supplemental.” Id. at 869. The court then expressed its belief that the general rule “should admit of exceptions and modifications consistent with fairness and practical realities.” Id. Keeping in mind the constitutional underpinnings of garnishment exemption statutes, the court prescribed the following procedure:
If a debtor-defendant is represented by counsel during proceedings supplemental, the burden is upon the debtor to affirmatively interpose the resident-householder claim. This, of course, is the general rule cited by the Court of Appeals. If, however, a debtor-defendant is not represented by counsel, the trial court must determine: (1) whether the debtor is a residenthouseholder, and (2) if the debtor is a resident-householder, which exemption (either the UCCC or resident-householder) would be least burdensome on the debtor. The trial court, after due consideration of these matters, shall enter the appropriate garnishment order, being always mindful of the fact that the amount garnished shall never exceed 25% of disposable weekly earnings in excess of $48.00.
Id. at 869-70.
The dissent interprets the court’s newly established “procedure” to mean that trial courts are required to assert, presumably, all exemptions on behalf of debtors who are not represented by counsel in addition to exemptions applicable to garnishments. To adopt the dissent’s view that Mims requires a trial court to assert the myriad of exemptions on behalf of unrepresented debtors in every instance essentially recasts the role of the judiciary from traditional decision-making to one of advocacy for one of the parties. . . . [T]here are numerous exemptions that a debtor is privileged to assert, some of which are applicable only in certain factual situations that may or may not be apparent. To place the burden on the court to assert all exemptions a debtor is entitled to claim would require the court to hold a mini-trial and flush out evidence pertaining to the various exceptions and then determine which exemptions yield the result most beneficial to the debtor.
In our view, the procedure proposed by the Court in Mims was specific to the case before it. Indeed, we note that in the thirty-six years since Mims was decided, there has been no other case to adopt the interpretation of Mims proposed by the dissent. In fact, there is only one reference to Mims pertinent to this case found in Prime Mortgage USA, Inc. v. Nichols, 885 N.E.2d 628 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), wherein the court cited Mims for the proposition that the burden is upon the debtor to assert an exemption. This is the rule we apply here.
The Branhams acknowledge that they did not assert any exemptions at the appropriate time during the proceeding supplemental. Nevertheless, it is clear from the record that the court considered the Branhams’ ability to pay and found their credibility lacking. . . . .
BARNES, J., concurs.
CRONE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part:
I take issue with the majority’s characterization of the Mims requirement as a “newly established ‘procedure[.]’” Slip op. at 6. The supreme court has neither narrowed nor disavowed Mims since it was decided in 1974, and the fact that some trial courts may not follow Mims in the workaday world does not make that case any less binding on them or on us. If our supreme court wants to abandon Mims and abolish the supposed procedural inefficiencies of which the majority complains, that is its prerogative. Until such time, however, all lower courts are bound to follow Mims and its emphasis on “fairness and practical realities.” 261 Ind. at 595, 307 N.E.2d at 869. In so doing, they protect the constitutional right of unrepresented (and thus perhaps unsophisticated) debtors to “enjoy the necessary comforts of life[,]” such as the $2500 truck that Quincy uses for transportation in a largely rural corner of our state. [Footnote omitted.]