ROBB, J.
Although acknowledging the juvenile court has the authority to order a determinate or an indeterminate commitment, D.C. contends the trial court erred by ordering both simultaneously. . . . .
. . . Section 31-37-19-6 provides for committing a juvenile to the DOC for an indeterminate term:
Except as provided in section 10 of this chapter and subject to section 6.5 of this chapter, the juvenile court may:
(1) enter any dispositional decree specified in section 5 of this chapter; and
(2) take any of the following actions:
(A) Award wardship to:
(i) the department of correction for housing in a correctional facility for children; or
(ii) a community based correctional facility for children. . . .
Ind. Code § 31-37-19-6(b) (emphasis added). [Footnote omitted.] The parties agree that if the juvenile court awards wardship of a juvenile to the DOC under this statute, the DOC determines both the placement and the duration of the placement. See Matter of Tina T., 579 N.E.2d 48, 61 (Ind. 1991) (noting that if wardship is awarded to the DOC, “such commitment . . . may be terminated upon the determination of the DOC that a less restrictive placement has become appropriate”). Section 31-37-19-10 provides for committing a juvenile to the DOC for a determinate term under certain circumstances:
(a) This section applies to a child who:
(1) is adjudicated a delinquent child for an act that if committed by an adult would be:
* * *
(C) burglary as a Class A or Class B felony under IC 35-43-2-1;
(2) is at least fourteen (14) years of age at the time the child committed the act for which the child is being placed; and
(3) has two (2) unrelated prior adjudications of delinquency for acts that would be felonies if committed by an adult.
(b) A court may place the child in a facility authorized under this chapter for not more than two (2) years.
(c) Notwithstanding IC 11-10-2-5, the department of correction may not reduce the period ordered under this section . . . .
D.C. concedes he falls within the provisions of section 10, as he was adjudicated a delinquent for an act that would be a Class A felony burglary if committed by an adult, was fourteen years of age when he committed the act, and has two prior unrelated delinquency adjudications for acts that would be felonies. The juvenile court stated at the dispositional hearing that “commitment to the Department of Correction on both a determinate sentence under Indiana [C]ode 31-37-19-10 and a commitment in general under Indiana [C]ode 31-37-19-6, is what is called for in this situation.” Transcript at 49. No reported case addresses the interplay between sections 6 and 10.
Section 6 begins, “[e]xcept as provided in section 10 . . . .” D.C. contends the plain language of section 6 therefore precludes a juvenile court from entering a dispositional order with both an indeterminate commitment pursuant to section 6 and a determinate commitment pursuant to section 10. We agree.
Section 6 clearly contemplates a dispositional order that includes elements found in both sections 5 and 6 when it states a juvenile court may enter any order specified in section 5 [footnote omitted] and take any of the actions specified in section 6. See R.J.G. v. State, 902 N.E.2d 804, 806 (Ind. 2009) (noting, in holding juvenile court could order both commitment to the DOC and subsequent probation, that the “menu of dispositional options” is found in sections 5 and 6 which “allow a juvenile court to order „at least one,‟ i.e. potentially multiple, dispositions”). Section 6 does not similarly reference the action described in section 10 as an additional option, but rather, by stating “[e]xcept as provided in section 10,” references section 10 as an alternative option. [Footnote omitted.] The unambiguous language of the statute can only be interpreted to mean any or all of the dispositional alternatives in sections 5 and 6 are available to the juvenile court unless the juvenile fits within the parameters of section 10, in which case section 10 is exclusively describes the available penalty. Cf. In re M.W., 913 N.E.2d at 787 (construing statute stating “[e]xcept as provided under section 2.5 of this chapter, the department [of child services] is not responsible for payment of any costs of secure detention” to unambiguously mean the department is not obligated to pay costs unless the provisions of section 2.5 are satisfied).
The State argues the legislature intended to give the juvenile court the ability to impose up to a two-year period of commitment that could not be reduced by the DOC in its normal course and also allow the DOC to retain the most serious juvenile offenders beyond those two years if it is deemed necessary. We tend to agree the statutes as written do not seem to serve their intended purpose. Section 10 is clearly directed at the most serious juvenile offenders. In W.T.J. v. State, 713 N.E.2d 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), we agreed with the juvenile offender’s assertion that the determinate sentencing statute “is an expression of legislative intent to permit the juvenile a reasonable opportunity to reform through less severe dispositional alternatives before a more severe penalty may be imposed.” Id. at 942. However, if the purpose of section 10 is to impose a more severe penalty on those with more serious juvenile records, making the determinate commitment an exclusive penalty and further limiting the juvenile court to imposing a maximum two-year commitment, rather than permitting additional remedies at the conclusion of the determinate commitment and/or making the two-year limitation a minimum instead of a maximum, does not necessarily serve that purpose. For instance, a fourteen-year old who committed an act that would be burglary as a Class A felony if he was an adult, as D.C. did, but who has no (or only one) prior adjudications for an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult, unlike D.C., could be committed under section 6 to the wardship of DOC until he turned eighteen years of age – or up to four years – and if released earlier, could be continued on probation or subject to other conditions on his release, whereas a juvenile who committed the same act but had two prior felony adjudications and was committed to the DOC under section 10 could only be committed for a maximum of two years. [Footnote omitted.] We acknowledge a juvenile committed under section 6 could also be released in less than two years and therefore ultimately receive a lesser penalty than a juvenile sentenced under section 10. However, at their extremes, sections 6 and 10 when applied separately produce results antithetical to the purpose of the statutes. [Footnote omitted.] Nonetheless, because the plain language of the statutes is unambiguous in making sections 6 and 10 mutually exclusive, we cannot look to legislative intent and construe the statutes to effect that intent.
The juvenile court erred by imposing both an indeterminate commitment under section 6 and a determinate commitment under section 10. Section 6 is applicable “[e]xcept as provided in section 10 . . . .” Because section 10 is applicable to D.C., he is subject to a determinate commitment of up to two years in an authorized facility. We therefore reverse that part of the trial court’s dispositional order imposing commitments pursuant to both sections 6 and 10 and remand for the trial court to issue a new dispositional order imposing only a determinate commitment under section 10.
MAY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.