DICKSON, J.
While we must endeavor to defer to the jury’s damage determination, this deference is limited when the determination clearly includes a substantial amount attributable to an improper consideration. Here, of the damages itemized in the plaintiff’s closing statement, the amount sought for the decedent’s son was problematic. In requesting damages “to replace this young man’s father for him,” the plaintiff’s counsel invited the jury to calculate an award at a fixed rate for the duration of the decedent’s life expectancy of 37.1 years. Tr. at 2918. Under the Wrongful Death Act and the jury instructions, however, the plaintiff was entitled to damages sustained by the decedent’s son for the loss of love, care, affection, parental training, and guidance only during the son’s dependency, not for the projected remainder of the decedent’s life.
To be entitled to dependent child damages under the Wrongful Death Act, the evidence must establish that a surviving child had a need for and actually received support. Terry v. Stephens, 921 N.E.2d 516, 523 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. While it may be presumed that the decedent’s dependent child would have remained in such dependent status until age eighteen, to project any later period of dependency would require speculation unsupported by the evidence in this case.
In most personal injury and wrongful death cases, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the particular component amounts that comprise a jury’s opaque general verdict. But the damage determination in this case presents a rare exception. As noted above, the plaintiff’s requests aggregated to $25,128,808, and the jury’s total damage determination was $25,000,000—a divergence of only one-half of one percent. This remarkable congruence between the jury’s total damage determination and the aggregate request of the plaintiff’s counsel strongly implies that the jury accepted and implemented the plaintiff’s proposed damage evaluation and calculation. The plaintiff’s requests for $2,125,000 for lost earnings, and $11,300,000 in damages for the surviving widow’s emotional damages, plus $3,952 for funeral and burial expenses, total $13,428,952. Subtracting this amount from the jury’s total damage determination of $25,000,000 leaves $11,571,048, which we estimate to be the portion of the jury’s award attributable to the son’s projected damages for a span of 37.1 years. Because the jury should have considered only the 8 years and 27 days between December 20, 2001, the date of the decedent’s death, and January 15, 2010, the son’s eighteenth birthday, we estimate the son’s portion of the total damage determination should have been reduced by seventy-eight percent, or $9,025,417. We find that awarding the son’s damages for a period of time after his eighteenth birthday is not supported by the evidence but resulted from improper considerations and cannot be explained on any other reasonable ground.
Upon a claim of excessive or inadequate damages, Indiana Appellate Rule 66(C) authorizes several alternatives, including ordering the entry of judgment of damages in the amount supported by the evidence, App. R. 66(C)(4); ordering a new trial or hearing subject to additur or remittitur, App. R. 66(C)(5); making any relief granted subject to conditions, App. R. 66(C)(9); and granting any other appropriate relief, App. R. 66(C)(10). Black’s Law Dictionary explains “remittitur” as “[a]n order awarding a new trial, or a damages amount lower than that awarded by the jury, and requiring the plaintiff to choose between those alternatives.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1409 (9th ed. 2009).
To remedy the error in the jury’s total damage determination without necessarily requiring a full representation of evidence on damages, we elect to grant a new trial subject to remittitur, wherein the plaintiff may instead accept a determination of total damages, before allocation of comparative fault, in the sum of $15,974,583, which represents a $9,025,417 reduction in the jury’s finding of $25,000,000 in total damages.
. . . .
From the evidence, it can be reasonably inferred that the rollover event was precipitated by the failure of a Goodyear tire, but there is no evidence establishing whether it resulted from a tire defect attributable to Goodyear or from normal wear and tear, underinflation, a slow leak, a road hazard or puncture, or any other cause. There is insufficient evidence on which a product liability verdict against Goodyear could have been returned if it were a named party, and thus there is insufficient evidence to support the allocation of fault to it as a nonparty.
10. Fault Allocation Remedy
The jury in this case determined the relative fault of the parties and the nonparty, assigning the following fault percentages: 33% to the decedent, 31% to Ford, 31% to nonparty Goodyear, and 5% to TRW. But now, with our decision to vacate the 5% fault assigned to TRW and the 31% assigned to Goodyear, the jury’s remaining fault allocations account for only 64% of the total fault contributing to cause the plaintiff’s damages, leaving 36% not allocated. The appropriate appellate remedy is not dictated by existing statutory provisions or case law precedent. And as noted above, Indiana Appellate Rule 66 provides us with a broad range of options.
In seeking to fashion a remedy on appeal that is consistent with the provisions of the Indiana Comparative Fault Act, which governs proceedings at trial, we find inconsistent and opposing guidance. One provision declares, “In an action based on fault that is brought against two (2) or more defendants, the claimant is barred from recovery if the claimant’s contributory fault is greater than the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant’s damages.” Ind. Code § 34-51-2-6(b). If we were to ignore the unallocated fault resulting from our decision today and literally apply only this provision, it would appear to require a final judgment in favor of the defendant Ford, whose 31% fault allocation was exceeded by the 33% allocated to the plaintiff’s decedent. On the other hand, the Act also limits an allocation of less than 100% of the fault: “The percentage of fault of parties to the action may total less than one hundred percent (100%) if the jury finds that fault contributing to cause the claimant’s loss has also come from a nonparty or nonparties.” Ind. Code § 34-51-2-8(b)(1). Because we have determined that fault should not have been allocated to TRW and Goodyear, the remaining jury fault allocations to the remaining parties, Ford and the plaintiff’s decedent, fail to meet the condition to allocate less than 100% of the fault. In addition, for a jury to return a defendant’s verdict, the Act requires that “the percentage of fault of the claimant is greater than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault involved in the incident which caused the claimant’s death, injury, or property damage.” Ind. Code § 34-51-2-8(b)(2). This jury allocated only 33% fault to the plaintiff’s decedent, and thus a defendant’s verdict is inappropriate.
Comment h to section seven of the Restatement Third, Torts: Apportionment of Liability considers the “[j]udicial reallocation of responsibility when an assignment of responsibility is legally erroneous,” and suggests that “[o]ne remedy is for the court to reallocate the nonliable person’s share of comparative responsibility proportionately to the remaining persons,” noting the resulting advantage of avoiding a new trial. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 7, cmt. h (2000). But it then adds, “Nevertheless, interests of justice may sometimes require a new trial.” Id.
In the present case, the jury was instructed that the percentages of fault they determine for the plaintiff’s decedent, Ford, TRW, and nonparty Goodyear “must total 100 percent.” Tr. at 2946–47. By its verdict, the jury found that the comparative fault of the plaintiff’s decedent was only 33% of the total fault contributing to cause the plaintiff’s damages. The allocation of an aggregate 5% fault to TRW presumably reflects the jury’s belief that such percentage related to the defective seatbelt assembly it supplied to Ford for inclusion in the completed vehicle. While reasonable to predict that, without TRW as a party, the jury would have assigned that 5% to Ford as manufacturer of the finished product, we decline to engage in such speculation as a basis to reallocate the jury’s fault attribution on appeal. Even more uncertain is how the jury would have reassigned the fault it erroneously imposed on Goodyear. The Florida Supreme Court has ob-served:
Since liability is inextricably bound up with the apportionment of damages under the doc-trine of comparative negligence, this matter must be left to the jury. When the percentag-es of liability are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, the trial court must treat this defect as an error in the finding of liability itself. The only remedy is to order a new trial on all issues affected by the error.
Rowlands v. Signal Constr. Co., 549 So. 2d 1380, 1383 (Fla. 1989) (footnote omitted).
We conclude that the interests of justice require a new trial to allocate fault, and we remand for a new trial on the issues of comparative fault and its allocation between Ford and the plaintiff’s decedent. If the fault of the plaintiff’s decedent does not exceed that of Ford, the resulting fault allocations shall be applied to the total damages determined in this case in accordance with the principles specified in Indiana Code § 34-51-2-7(b)(4).
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, and Rucker, JJ., concur.