RUCKER, J.
In order to terminate the parent child relationship DCS must show by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that “the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.” Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i). The record shows that I.A. was removed from the home of his parents [footnote omitted] because of the lack of parental supervision: two of Mother’s younger children were discovered by police playing in the parking lot of a motel unsupervised and two of Mother’s older children had travelled to a nearby town alone. However at the time I.A. was removed, Mother and Father were not residing in the same household. Instead I.A. was living with Mother and in her sole custody and care. Thus the conditions that resulted in I.A.’s removal – lack of parental supervision – cannot be attributed to Father. “To hold [Father] liable for the conditions that resulted in [Child’s] removal would be to hold [Father] liable for the actions of [Mother].” In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d. 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that conditions for removal from Mother’s home could not be attributed to Father who was not residing with Mother at time children were removed). Therefore, the inquiry in this case is whether there is a reasonable probability that the reason for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
In order to determine whether the conditions which led to the placement of I.A. outside the home of Father are not likely to be remedied, the trial court must first determine what conditions led to DCS placing and then retaining I.A. in foster care rather than placing him with Father. See In re A.A.C., 682 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that when the child is not in the custody of the parent, the focus of the termination inquiry is what conditions led to DCS retention of the custody of the child). Second, the trial court must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. In this case the trial court addressed the second requirement, but not the first. That is to say, although the trial court’s termination order sets forth why placement outside of Father’s home will not be remedied, namely: Father had not bonded with I.A. after six (6) months of Parent-Aide services; Father needed considerable direction regarding simple tasks relating to I.A.’s care; and there had been no progress in the relationship between Father and I.A. despite six (6) months of services; the trial court’s order does not indicate the conditions that led DCS to place I.A. in foster care or the reasons I.A. remained in foster care rather than being placed with Father. In essence, the factors identified by the trial court as conditions that will not be remedied are relevant only if those conditions were factors in DCS’ decision to place I.A. in foster care in the first place. Not only is the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights silent on this point, but also the record before us is silent. Instead, in the several review hearings conducted in this case the trial court’s order simply reflects that I.A. was either placed in foster care or remained in foster care. [Footnote omitted.]
Because there is nothing before us indicating the conditions that led DCS to place I.A. in foster care and to continue I.A.’s out-of-home placement rather than place him with Father, DCS has failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i). Thus, the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights cannot be sustained on this ground.
B. Continuation of the Parent-Child Relationship
As an alternative ground for terminating Father’s parental rights the trial court determined that because Father had “not bonded” with I.A., the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the child’s well-being. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(ii). The record shows that although Father attended the initial CHINS hearing, as well as several review hearings, he did not seek genetic testing or file a petition to establish paternity until sometime in April 2008. After a June test result revealed that Father was the natural parent of I.A., DCS granted Father visitation with I.A. beginning July 11, 2008. Initially, the visits were conducted for an hour to an hour and a half, one day a week outside of Father’s home. Tr. at 46. Thereafter the visits were increased to twice a week and were conducted at Father’s residence. Id. at 46-47. All of the visits were supervised by a parent aide employed by the Lincoln Hills Development Corporation – a social services agency. And Father never cancelled or missed a single visit.
Leanne Halford was the parent aide [footnote omitted] that supervised the visits between Father and I.A. With respect to the issue of bonding Halford testified:
They were real uncomfortable with each other so that’s been our main focus is try to get them to bond as a father and a child should. Still to this day at visits [Father] doesn’t show excitement when [I.A.] arrives. It’s just kind of take him in, get the coat off, go in, have a snack. [Father] still chooses not to have dinner with [I.A.]. Instead, it’s me [and Father], sitting watching [I.A.] eat, which is kind of not the best circumstance for the child. I have encouraged [Father] to eat with him just because that’s a bonding issue as well and interacting at the dinner table.
Tr. at 66-67. Halford continued stating:
[I.A.], still after all this time doesn’t refer to [Father] as daddy. It’s just I feel like the child, he just knows he goes there, visits for a couple hours, two times a week. He leaves, and then there’s no – like I said, when we arrive there’s no hugging or kissing. There’s no [‘]I miss you, what have you been doing.[‘] None of that goes on . . . .
Tr. at 72.
We first observe that by concluding Father had not bonded with I.A., the trial court and DCS apparently are referring to what they perceive as insufficient emotional attachment and interaction between Father and Child. The record certainly demonstrates that Father’s parenting skills are lacking. But a case plan for reunification was never developed for Father indicating what was expected of him. And thus, other than parent aide, no services were provided to assist Father in developing effective parenting skills. It is of course true that “the provision of family services is not a requisite element of our parental rights termination statute.” In re E.E., 736 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). But there is nothing in this record demonstrating that the exercise of visitation twice a week for an hour and a half over a six month period with a two-year-old child is sufficient time under the circumstances to establish a bond. Second, and more importantly, other than answering “[y]es, I do” to the general question “Do you believe that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of these children,” Tr. at 49, the DCS case manager testifying on the matter does not explain why this is so with respect to Father and I.A. By contrast we see little harm in extending the CHINS wardship until such time as Father has a chance to prove himself a fit parent for his child.
In sum, DCS has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that by continuing the parent-child relationship, the emotional or physical well-being of I.A. is thereby threatened. See Egly v. Blackford County Dep‟t of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1233, 1234 (Ind. 1992) (noting that clear and convincing evidence need not reveal that “the continued custody of the parents is wholly inadequate for the child’s very survival,” rather, it is sufficient to show that “the child’s emotional and physical development are threatened” by the respondent parent’s custody). The involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme sanction a court can impose on a parent because termination severs all rights of a parent to his or her children. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. Therefore, termination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed. Id. We are not convinced that all other reasonable efforts have been employed in this case to unite this father and son.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson and Sullivan, JJ., concur.
BOEHM, J., dissents with separate opinion:
. . . The ultimate issues in this case are the likelihood that the conditions leading to the child’s removal will not be remedied, and whether continuation of the parental relationship poses a threat to the child. In my view, neither of these is susceptible to the rigorous analysis we seek to apply in determining whether more precise statutory elements are met, or whether the evidence is sufficient to establish a historical fact such as whether the traffic light was red or green.
The statute calls for both of these determinations critical to a termination proceeding in language that appears in the same form as language setting out the elements of a crime or tort. But the determinations the trial court is called upon to make in a termination proceeding turn on questions such as the degree of confidence we have that the parent will in fact maintain a decent home for the child and the reliability of assurances that a straighter path has been found. These determinations call on the trial court to make not only an evaluation of credibility of witnesses, but also an evaluation of the reliability of their assurances as to various assertions and promises. Resolution of these questions often is more in the nature of predictions of future events, not findings as to what has already occurred. As such, an accurate and detailed rationale for a termination is more difficult to write with precision and frequently, as in this case, ultimately turns significantly on what the gut of the finder of fact is telling him or her. Such a finding is not as readily reviewed by an appellate court because it cannot easily be picked apart into its components, and is therefore less susceptible to the analysis an appellate court usually undertakes. Factual determinations are reviewed under the deferential “clearly erroneous” standard. The standard of review in termination cases, however, is all over the map. See James W. Paulsen, Family Law: Parent and Child, 51 S.M.U. L. Rev. 1087, 1124–26 & ns.282–86 (1998) (noting the wide range of the standard of review by appellate courts in various jurisdictions, from de novo to abuse of discretion). Because of the unusual nature of termination determinations, I would give even wider deference to the trial judge’s conclusion as to what is in the best interests of the child, and whether the conditions are likely to improve.
. . . .
In sum, I would not disrupt this child’s current placement based on failure of the trial court to articulate its reasoning in sufficient detail. In recent years, for good reason, we and most states have taken legislative and administrative steps to avoid prolonged and repeated disruptions in a child’s placement. This also favors leaving in place an order that may be on the edge of acceptability but where future review is unlikely to result in a different outcome. I would accept as sufficient the trial court’s ultimate findings that continuation of the parental relationship presents a threat to the child’s well-being and there is a reasonable probability that the conditions leading to placement outside the home will not be remedied.