BARNES, J.
Here, Kennedy conceded that Keeling possesses the requisite skill, training, and experience to qualify as an expert in the field of DNA forensic analysis. He also has conceded that the ISP lab is properly accredited and has adopted scientifically acceptable methods for DNA testing. Indeed, Kennedy’s expert Chakraborty examined the ISP lab’s manual regarding DNA testing and testified that he found it complied with acceptable scientific guidelines. Additionally, Keeling utilized the Polymerase Chain Reaction (“PCR”) method for the DNA analysis she conducted in this case. That method, through which small DNA samples can be “amplified” in order to permit testing, has passed general muster in Indiana for scientific reliability and admissibility in evidence at trial. Ingram v. State, 699 N.E.2d 261, 263 (Ind. 1998). Once the reliability of a particular scientific process is established and an expert’s qualifications to carry out the testing are not in doubt, questions as to how an expert personally carried out the testing in a particular case generally go to the weight of the evidence, not its foundational admissibility. Id. at 263 n.7. It is only when there are substantial irregularities in a testing process that the line may be crossed into the results being inadmissible. See Smith, 702 N.E.2d at 673.
Kennedy’s substantive challenge to the DNA evidence here goes to the particular manner in which Keeling personally conducted the testing in this case, much as was the case in Ingram. From the hearing on the motion to exclude the DNA test results and the subsequent offer to prove by Kennedy during trial regarding this evidence, it appears that he largely is challenging the manner in which Keeling “called” the existence of alleles recovered from the asphalt and the subsequent matching of those alleles to ones matching Kennedy’s DNA profile. [Footnote omitted.]
As an overview, DNA forensic testing and comparison is accomplished by analyzing certain polymorphic sites, or loci, on the DNA strand. [Footnote omitted.] At each locus a person will have either one or two alleles, which are represented by numbers in the DNA analysis process. When a DNA analyst is presented with a sample from an object, such as the asphalt in this case, the first step is to “call” which alleles are present at predetermined loci. Here, in accordance with ISP lab procedures, Keeling first analyzed fifteen loci (not counting the sex-determinative loci) from the swab taken from the asphalt. The presence of an allele is measured by a standard known as relative reflective units (“RFUs”). Essentially, the higher the RFU number, the more definitive the presence of an allele. The ISP lab, after conducting numerous experiments on the subject, has decided that 80 RFUs is the minimum by which an analyst may “call” the presence of an allele. The vendor who provided the DNA testing equipment to the ISP lab recommends a minimum level of 150 RFUs. However, Carl Sobieralski, technical leader of ISP lab biology section who also evaluates other forensic labs across the country, testified that the 80 RFUs threshold is not out of line with standards adopted by other labs. Alleles in the 80 to 150 RFUs range, however, must be “called” conservatively. This is because purported alleles in that range may in fact be the product of “stutter,” which is an aberration that sometimes arises in the PCR amplification process.
After analyzing the swab from the asphalt, and without knowing the DNA allele profiles of any of the relevant persons (i.e. Augustin, Kennedy, or Willis), Keeling was able to establish a major DNA profile for the sample, based on the presence of either one or two alleles with very high RFU numbers at each of the fifteen loci. However, she also discovered at several loci the presence of other “extra” alleles with much lower RFU numbers. Some of these alleles she decided were “stutter”. Other alleles she did not believe constituted “stutter,” so she left them in her analysis as indicative of the presence of a minor DNA profile that was mixed in with the major profile. In her May 9, 2008 certificate of analysis, Keeling was able to compare the major profile with Augustin’s known profile, but she did not yet have DNA profiles from Kennedy or Willis. After she obtained Kennedy’s DNA sample, she found that all but one of the “extra” alleles she had “called” were consistent with Kennedy’s profile. [Footnote omitted.]
Kennedy contends that Keeling improperly exercised too much discretion in calling (or not calling) the existence of alleles in the first place. Chakraborty criticized Keeling’s non-calling of “extra” alleles that were inconsistent with Kennedy’s profile, while noting (with one exception) that she only called those that were consistent with Kennedy. He also pointed out that after obtaining Kennedy’s DNA profile, she compared it against the asphalt sample while knowing that the profile belonged to him; i.e., the testing was not “blind.” The suggestion appears to be that Keeling, knowing Kennedy’s profile, only called alleles from the rock sample that matched his, either subconsciously or purposely. This ignores the fact, however, that Keeling first tested the rock sample and called the alleles she believed existed on it well before Kennedy’s profile was known.
Kennedy is challenging the very highly technical details of how Keeling conducted her testing. We believe this is the very reason the rules of evidence provide for expert witness testimony. The details of how DNA testing is conducted are beyond the ready grasp of laypersons, or judges and lawyers for that matter. Furthermore, DNA testing is not always a black-and-white science. Keeling, whom Kennedy recognizes as a qualified expert in this field, testified that DNA analysts almost always have to exercise some degree of discretion in testing. Chakraborty also agreed that trained and qualified DNA analysts can have reasonable disagreements regarding proper test results. We believe this clearly is a case where the dispute between Keeling and Chakraborty regarding the precise details of her testing methods goes to the weight of her results, not their admissibility. Kennedy was permitted to and in fact did present to the jury a detailed critique of Keeling’s methods. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the results into evidence.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and CRONE, J., concur.