ROBB, J.
The relevant facts are largely undisputed. Husband and Wife married on August 14, 1971. Husband’s military career spanned twenty-eight years in the Army and Army Reserve until his discharge in 1995. In 1997, Husband was awarded VA disability benefits for tinnitus and thirty-percent hearing loss. In 2003, Husband applied for additional disability benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).
Husband and Wife separated on March 22, 2004, and the following day, Husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. On March 28, 2005, Husband and Wife filed their settlement agreement, which the trial court approved on March 30, 2005 and incorporated into the decree dissolving the parties’ marriage. The settlement agreement provided that “Wife shall have” certain property, including “½ (50%) of Husband’s USAR military retirement/pension plan by QDRO, including survivor benefits.” Exh. 1, at 5.
In November 2005, Husband was awarded disability benefits for PTSD. On December 1, 2007, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (“DFAS”) mailed Wife a letter stating she would begin receiving a portion of Husband’s retirement pay within ninety days after the date Husband would begin receiving retirement pay. Husband turned sixty years old on January 5, 2008, and thus became eligible to begin receiving retirement pay. In February 2008, Husband received his first payment of retirement pay, without any deduction for Wife’s share. DFAS also issued Husband an account statement providing that as of March 3, 2008, his retirement pay would be computed as follows: gross pay of $2,238.00, less VA Waiver of $240.71 and SBP Costs of $145.47, for taxable income of $1,851.82; less federal income tax withheld of $60.15, for net pay of $1,791.67. Exh. E. The “VA Waiver” was a deduction against gross pay for Husband’s VA disability benefits, and the “SBP Costs” were a premium for a survivor benefit of which Wife was the beneficiary. On March 3, 2008, DFAS mailed Husband an account statement providing that as of April 1, 2008, his retirement pay would be computed as follows: gross pay of $2,238.00, less VA Waiver of $240.71, SBP Costs of $145.47, and a “former spouse deduction” of $925.91, for net pay of $925.91. Exh. 7. Thus, Wife would begin receiving payments of $925.91, and pursuant to the former spouse deduction, Husband’s net pay would also be $925.91.
In March 2008, Husband applied for CRSC, following a change in the law that made Husband eligible for CRSC starting on January 1, 2008. Husband’s eligibility for CRSC was based on his “[r]eceiv[ing] VA compensation for combat-related disabilities that result in offset to military retired pay.” Exh. 23. On April 1, 2008, Wife received her first payment from DFAS in the amount of $925.91, and received that same amount in each of the following three months. On May 14, 2008, the Army mailed Husband a letter informing him of his initial approval for CRSC for a combat-related disability of sixty percent. On June 11, 2008, DFAS mailed Husband a letter that informed him his CRSC payment would be $921 per month, retroactive to February 2008, and an election form that stated “CRSC is nontaxable and is not subject [sic] the provisions of the Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act.” Exh. D. Husband then made an election, on June 24, 2008, to “authorize DFAS to recoup all CRDP [concurrent retirement and disability] payments previous [sic] paid from my retroactive CRSC payment.” Id. In effect, in order to receive CRSC, Husband elected to waive a larger amount of his retirement pay than he had previously waived in favor of VA disability benefits.
On July 15, 2008, DFAS mailed Husband an account statement providing that as of August 1, 2008, his retirement pay would be computed as follows: gross pay of $2,249.00, less VA Waiver of $1,006.00, SBP Costs of $146.19, and a former spouse deduction of $548.40, for net pay of $548.41. Thus, as of August 2008, Husband’s and Wife’s net shares of retirement pay were reduced to $548 each per month. However, Husband began receiving a CRSC payment of $1,006 monthly, as reflected in a CRSC pay statement issued by DFAS and dated August 21, 2008. [Footnote omitted.] On September 9, 2008, Wife’s attorney mailed Husband a letter demanding payment of the difference between half of Husband’s gross retirement pay and the amounts Wife was receiving from DFAS.
On April 23, 2009, Wife filed her petition for rule to show cause, arguing Husband was in contempt for depriving Wife of her share of military retirement pay as divided in the parties’ dissolution settlement agreement. Wife argued she was entitled to fifty percent of Husband’s “gross military retirement with no VA waivers, no disabilities, [or] anything taken out,” transcript at 63, and requested the trial court order Husband to pay her the difference between that amount and the amount payable to her by DFAS. Husband filed a request for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.
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. . . [T]he trial court entered judgment in favor of Wife for $11,369.71, the arrearage it found Husband owed Wife as of September 2009, calculated as the difference between half of Husband’s gross retirement pay up to that point and the amounts of retirement pay received by Wife from DFAS. The trial court also ordered Husband prospectively to “either pay [Wife] 50% of his CSRC [sic] benefit within ten (10) days of his monthly receipt of same, or convert his benefits back to CRDP payments during the next Open Enrollment period offered by DFAS.” Id. at 15. . . . Husband now appeals.
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Before turning to Husband’s claims, we review the pertinent legal background. In Griffin v. Griffin, 872 N.E.2d 653 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), this court explained:
In Mansell [v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989)], the United States Supreme Court noted:
Members of the Armed Forces who serve for a specified period, generally at least 20 years, may retire with retired pay. The amount of retirement pay a veteran is eligible to receive is calculated according to the number of years served and the rank achieved. The amount of disability benefits a veteran is eligible to receive is calculated according to the seriousness of the disability and the degree to which the veteran’s ability to earn a living has been impaired.
In order to prevent double dipping, a military retiree may receive disability benefits only to the extent that he waives a corresponding amount of his military retirement pay. Because disability benefits are exempt from federal, state, and local taxation . . ., military retirees who waive their retirement pay in favor of disability benefits increase their after-tax income. Not surprisingly, waivers of retirement pay are common.
Mansell [], 490 U.S. at 583-584 (internal citations and footnote omitted).
The Court noted that it had previously held in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), that the federal statutes then governing military retirement pay prevented state courts from treating military retirement pay as community property. Id. at 584. In McCarty, the Court reasoned, based upon Congress’ refusal to pass legislation that would have allowed former spouses to garnish military retirement pay to satisfy property settlements, that “Congress intended that military retirement pay reach the veteran and no one else.” Id. (citing McCarty, 453 U.S. at 228-232).
In direct response to McCarty, Congress enacted the Former Spouses’ Protection Act, which authorized state courts to treat “disposable retired or retainer pay” as community property. Id. at 584 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1982 ed. and Supp. V)). The statute defined “Disposable retired or retainer pay” as “the total monthly retired or retainer pay to which a military member is entitled,” minus certain deductions. Id. at 584-585 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)). “Among the amounts required to be deducted from total pay are any amounts waived in order to receive disability benefits.” Id. at 585 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B)).
The Court noted that the “Act also created a payment mechanism under which the Federal Government would make direct payments to a former spouse who presented, to the Secretary of the relevant military service, a state-court order granting her a portion of the military retiree’s disposable retired or retainer pay.” Id. at 585. This direct payment mechanism was limited in two ways. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)). First, only a former spouse who was married to a military member “for a period of 10 years or more during which the member performed at least 10 years of service creditable in determining the member’s eligibility for retired or retainer pay,” 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(2), was eligible to receive direct community property payments. Id. Second, the Federal Government would not make community property payments that exceed 50 percent of disposable retired or retainer pay. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(1)). Following the enactment of the Former Spouses’ Protection Act, Gerald Mansell sought to modify his pre-McCarty dissolution decree, which required him to pay half of his retirement pay and disability pay to his former wife. Id. at 586-587. The trial court denied Gerald’s motion, the California Court of Appeals affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied Gerald’s petition for review. Id. at 586. However, based upon the language of the statute, the United States Supreme Court held that “the Former Spouses’ Protection Act does not grant state courts the power to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that has been waived to receive veterans’ disability benefits.”
Id. at 594-595. Id. at 657-58 (footnote and parallel citations omitted).
Legislation creating CRSC as a new type of disability benefit was enacted by Congress and became effective in 2003. The statute governing CRSC provides for a military retiree “who elects benefits under this section” to receive “a monthly amount for the combat-related disability of the retiree.” 10 U.S.C. § 1413A(a). Such amount “may not exceed the amount of the reduction in retired pay that is applicable to the retiree for that month under [38 U.S.C. §§ 5304 & 5305].” 10 U.S.C. § 1413A(b)(2). The statute provides that CRSC payments “are not retired pay.” 10 U.S.C. § 1413A(g).
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B. Pre-Decree Waivers of Retirement Pay
Husband argues that even if the trial court was correct, as we have concluded it was, to interpret the parties’ settlement agreement as referring to an equal division of Husband’s gross rather than net or disposable retirement pay, the trial court still erred by ordering Husband to pay Wife half of his gross retirement pay, including amounts waived by Husband in order to receive VA disability benefits and CRSC or deducted from gross retirement pay as SBP costs. For the reasons stated below, we agree with Husband as regards his pre-decree waivers and deductions from retirement pay but disagree as regards his post-decree waiver and election of CRSC benefits.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Mansell addressed a pre-decree waiver and held that state courts may not “treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that has been waived to receive veterans’ disability benefits.” 490 U.S. at 594-95. Mansell involved a property settlement agreement, and the lower court judgment that Mansell reversed affirmed a denial of a request to modify the dissolution decree incorporating that settlement. Id. at 585-86. Mansell also held more broadly that pursuant to the Former Spouses’ Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408, state courts may treat “disposable retired pay” but not “total retired pay” as property divisible upon divorce. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 589.3 In addition to amounts waived to receive disability benefits, among the amounts required to be subtracted from total, or gross, retirement pay to yield disposable retirement pay are those “deducted because of an election under chapter 73 of this title to provide an annuity to a spouse or former spouse to whom payment of a portion of such member’s retired pay is being made pursuant to a court order . . . .” 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(D). The annuity referred to is the Survivor Benefit Plan (“SBP”), see 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447 & 1448, such as Husband elected to provide for Wife in the present case and for the cost of which amounts are deducted from his gross retirement pay. See In re Marriage of Strassner, 895 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding it was error to not “subtract the monthly SBP premium as required by 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(D)” in calculation of disposable retired pay).
In Griffin, this court applied Mansell’s holding to a post-dissolution contempt petition for enforcement of a property settlement agreement, where the parties agreed to division of the husband’s “military pension,” interpreted by the trial court to mean “any income received after retirement, regardless of the name given such income.” 872 N.E.2d at 655-56. This court held that even though the husband consented in the settlement agreement to division of his military pension, the trial court still lacked authority, pursuant to Mansell, to treat as divisible property that portion of his retirement pay waived to receive disability benefits. Id. at 658 & n.1.
Pursuant to Mansell and Griffin, Indiana trial courts lack authority to enforce even an agreed-upon division of property insofar as it divides amounts of gross military retirement pay that were, previously to the decree, waived to receive disability benefits or elected to be deducted from gross pay as SBP costs to benefit the former spouse. Here, the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife an amount equal to half of his gross retirement pay, prior to any deductions for his VA waiver and SBP costs. This was error because Husband’s election to receive VA disability benefits, as well as his election of a SBP annuity of which Wife was the beneficiary, preceded the parties’ dissolution decree. [Footnote omitted.] We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment insofar as it orders Husband to pay Wife amounts of his gross retirement pay corresponding to half of his (1) VA waiver preceding his election of CRSC benefits, and (2) SBP costs. [Footnote omitted.] We remand this case to the trial court for entry of an order consistent with this opinion, as explained in more detail below.
D. Post-Decree Waiver
The question of post-decree waivers of retirement pay was not addressed in Griffin, where this court explicitly reserved the issue of whether, in future cases, “equitable remedies” could be used to “prevent a spouse from unilaterally and voluntarily diminishing,” by a post-decree waiver of retirement pay, “military retirement benefits awarded to the other spouse in the dissolution decree.” 872 N.E.2d at 658 n.2. This court noted the “majority view” holding in the affirmative, but because “neither party raised or briefed this issue,”[footnote omitted] we “express[ed] no opinion as to whether Indiana courts would adopt the majority view.” Id. Here, by contrast, Wife’s brief raises this precise issue and argues that, in this matter of first impression, this court should adopt the majority view that forbids a military spouse from using a post-decree waiver of retirement pay to unilaterally diminish the benefits awarded the other spouse in the dissolution. For the reasons explained below, we agree with Wife.
Initially we note that a number of states’ courts have concluded Mansell and the Former Spouses’ Protection Act do not preclude state courts from requiring a military spouse to compensate a former spouse when the latter’s share of retirement pay is reduced by the military spouse’s unilateral post-dissolution waiver of retirement pay in favor of disability benefits. . . . The Supreme Court in Mansell recognized that domestic relations are preeminently matters of state law, and state authority in this area will not be displaced unless preemption is “positively required by direct enactment.” 490 U.S. at 587 (quotation omitted). The Mansell holding that state courts may not “treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that has been waived to receive veterans’ disability benefits,” id. at 594-95 (emphasis added), refers to a pre-dissolution waiver of benefits, as was at issue in Mansell, and does not imply that a post-dissolution waiver need be treated the same way. . . . The Former Spouses’ Protection Act also provides that it shall not be “construed to relieve a member of liability for the payment of . . . other payments required by a court order” on the grounds that payments made out of disposable retired pay have exceeded fifty percent of the member’s disposable retired pay. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(6). Thus, while Husband’s election of CRSC was a right provided him by Congress, federal law did not give Husband the authority to simultaneously invoke that right and reduce the amounts received by Wife under the terms of the dissolution decree.
Further, Indiana law prohibits Husband’s election of CRSC from defeating the finality of the dissolution decree and the intent of the parties’ settlement agreement incorporated therein. The parties’ agreement provided that “[n]o modification or waiver of any of the terms of this Agreement shall be valid, unless in writing and executed by both parties hereto.” Exh. 1, at 7. However, by reducing the amount of retirement pay Wife was receiving, and was permitted to receive, directly from DFAS, Husband’s election upset the delicate balance of property rights in which Wife acquired a vested interest when the agreement was incorporated into the final dissolution decree. . . . Thus, Husband’s action violated strong Indiana policies favoring the finality of marital property divisions. . . . In similar circumstances, a number of states’ courts have concluded a former spouse’s vested interest in military retirement pay may not be unilaterally diminished by the military spouse’s post-decree waiver of retirement pay in favor of disability benefits. . . . .
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a military spouse may not, by a post-decree waiver of retirement pay in favor of disability benefits or CRSC, unilaterally and voluntarily reduce the benefits awarded the former spouse in a dissolution decree. The trial court properly ordered Husband to compensate Wife for the reduction in her share of retirement pay caused by his March 2008 election of CRSC, a reduction that became effective in July 2008. [Footnote omitted.] We remand this case to the trial court for entry of an order that Husband compensate Wife, both prospectively and as to the existing arrearage, for the decrease in her share of retirement pay caused by his election of CRSC. [Footnote omitted.]
MAY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.