NAJAM, J.
. . . Wright ultimately convinced Long to enter into a lease-to-purchase contract, which provided for no down payment and monthly payments of $773.02. Long had stated to Wright that “he was having trouble and he was having some money transferred in from somewhere out of state. I think New Jersey.” . . . The condo was furnished—Wright had not removed any items from the house since his father’s death—but the written contract did not include any provision for the personal property in the condo. Wright intended for Long to purchase the condo furnished, but he also intended to remove some of his father’s personal items after Long moved in.
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. . . Long moved out of the condo, taking all of the personal property, including appliances, with him. Wright only learned of the move after a neighbor called to inform him. Long had not communicated with Wright or given any explanation for the sudden move. When Wright arrived at the condo that day, he found it empty. Wright filed and won a civil action against Long.
The State charged Long with theft, as a Class D felony, alleging that he stole “miscellaneous items” belonging to Wright. [Footnote omitted.] . . . .
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The legislature did not intend to criminalize bona fide contract disputes. . . . But where, as here, the evidence supports a reasonable inference that at the inception of a contract, a party has no intention of honoring the contract, even in part, a criminal conviction may stand. The State presented evidence that Long told Wright that he had no money, but that “he was having some money transferred in from somewhere out of state.” . . . Wright agreed to let Long move into the condo without a down payment, and Long lived there for approximately two and a half months before the first payment came due. In the meantime, Long maintained a “very cordial” relationship with Wright, keeping “almost daily” contact with him. . . . Then, when the first payment became due, Long did not pay, and when Wright asked him about it, Long threatened legal action against Wright for no apparent reason and cut off all communication with him. Finally, Long moved out of the house, taking everything, including appliances, without any warning or explanation to Wright. The trial court considered that evidence and found that Long’s conduct supported a reasonable inference that Long had never intended to pay Wright. Long did not testify, and there is only circumstantial evidence of his intent in the record based upon a consideration of his conduct. A conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence alone so long as there are reasonable inferences enabling the factfinder to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . .
This is a close case, and we have the same concern as that expressed by the trial court about the propriety of a criminal prosecution in what is primarily a contractual dispute between the parties. But we cannot say that the trial court got it wrong in this instance, especially given that Long made absolutely no payments to Wright on the contract and threatened to sue Wright without any apparent justification. The State presented substantial evidence of probative value that Long never intended to pay Wright. Indeed, all of the evidence in the record, considered as a whole, supports the conclusion reached by the trial court that Long exercised unauthorized control over the property.
The sole issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Long’s [theft] conviction. The dissent considers other possible inferences that can be drawn from the evidence and concludes that when the evidence is weighed, there is a “tie” between the evidence for and the evidence against conviction. But, again, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the conviction. See Dallaly v. State, 916 N.E.2d 945, 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). We do not assess witness credibility or reweigh the evidence. Id. We consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Id. We affirm the conviction unless “no reasonable fact finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)). It is not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the conviction. Id.
Finally, Long contends that the property did not belong to Wright because ownership of the property was conveyed to Long when the contract was executed. Thus, Long reasons, he was in lawful possession of the personal property at all relevant times. But, again, the trial court found that Long never intended to make any contract payments to Wright, and, hence, that Long never acquired a proprietary interest in the property. We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support Long’s conviction for theft.
MATHIAS, J., concurs.
KIRSCH, J., dissents with separate opinion:
To constitute theft on the facts presented here, there must be fraud in the inception; i.e., Long entered into this transaction with the intention that he was not going to pay for the property conveyed. There is no direct evidence of such an intention, and to sustain the conviction, there must be circumstantial evidence supporting such an intention beyond a reasonable doubt. My colleagues point to the following evidence as providing such support: First, the fact that Long told Wright that he had no money, but that “he was having some money transferred in from somewhere out of state.” Tr. at 7. Second, the fact that Long’s “very cordial” relationship with Wright changed when he did not make the first payment due under the contract. Third, the fact that Long removed the personal property when he vacated the premises without warning or explanation.
The trial court found, and my colleagues agree, that this evidence supported a reasonable inference that Long never intended to pay Wright. While I believe that these facts are established and are not inconsistent with an intention on the part of Long that he would not pay for the property, I do not think that they give rise to an inference of such an intention.