SHEPARD, C.J.
As courts continue to deal with questions of language, the issue arises how to determine whether criminal defendants understand what is occurring in the courtroom. Here, a Spanish-speaking drug defendant who pleaded guilty to two felonies seeks post-conviction relief on grounds that he thought he was pleading only to one felony and that his misunderstanding was the product of faulty interpreting. We conclude that the post-conviction court should appoint a certified interpreter to create an official version of the plea hearing.
. . . .
On July 7, 2004, the State charged Diaz with (1) possession of methamphetamine weighing three grams or more with intent to deliver and (2) dealing in methamphetamine weighing three grams or more, both counts as class A felonies under Indiana Code § 35-48-4-1 (2008). After his arrest, Diaz hired attorney David Newman to represent him.2 Newman’s firm employed an interpreter to help them in their regular representation of Spanish-speaking clients. . . . Newman met with Diaz in jail on several occasions. The two communicated through the firm’s interpreter, Josephine Navarro. Navarro had previously worked helping with translations in the traffic and misdemeanor courts at the St. Joseph County Courthouse, but she did not have any formal training on how to interpret. . . . .
Beatrice Lara served as the interpreter for the guilty plea hearing under an appointment by the court. [Footnote omitted.] She provided the court and Diaz with Spanish interpreting of the proceeding. (Ex. 1, at 2.) Lara proffered her qualifications to the trial court, explaining her native language was English, that she learned Spanish from her father, and that she had spoken Spanish while staying in Mexico for a few months. (Ex. 1, at 3.) Lara had translated for courts, “about 20 times” in the last two or three years. (Ex. 1, at 4.)
. . . .
Diaz filed a petition for post-conviction relief in February 2007, claiming that he did not enter into his guilty plea knowingly and intelligently and that he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He later added allegations that the guilty plea hearing had not been properly translated.
The post-conviction court held evidentiary hearings in March and October of 2008. During the bifurcated hearings, Diaz presented the testimony of interpreter Christina Courtright. Courtright executed an affidavit and testified that she was certified by the Indiana Supreme Court Division of State Court Administration and had been interpreting in Indiana courts for three years. Courtright believed there were three problems with the interpreting of the guilty plea hearing: some words were omitted or paraphrased, some words were mistranslated, and the interpreter answered Diaz’s questions without referring the questions back to the court. . . . .
Courtright prepared a chart which illustrated her conclusions. . . . The first column referenced the page and line number of the text in the transcript of the guilty plea hearing. The second column contained the English words spoken by the trial judge during the hearing. The third column contained the English equivalent of what the interpreter actually said in Spanish. Diaz moved to admit the chart as Petitioner’s Exhibit 5, but the State objected on the basis of hearsay and the court sustained the objection.
. . . .
Courtright is an expert in speaking Spanish and an expert in Spanish-English and English-Spanish interpreting, certified by an arm of this Court. Had she been permitted to do so, Courtright would have used the chart to explain the various errors she believed occurred during the guilty plea hearing.
We see the chart not as hearsay but as a demonstrative exhibit prepared to facilitate a complete and accurate summary of the conclusions Courtright reached after reviewing the recording of Diaz’s guilty plea hearing. “Demonstrative evidence is evidence offered for purposes of illustration and clarification.” Wise v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1192, 1196 (Ind. 1999). To be admissible, the evidence must be sufficiently explanatory or illustrative of relevant testimony to be of potential help to the trier of fact. Id.
An important element of the present controversy is whether what was being said by the court was accurately interpreted for Diaz and vice versa. The State argues that because Courtright was able to testify about what she believed were the main problems with the interpretation provided for Diaz, the refusal of the chart was harmless error. Still, the true benefit of her expertise was hindered by the exclusion of her chart. When the question at issue is the accuracy of the interpreting at a plea hearing, we see the use of the chart or a similar demonstrative exhibit as being nearly inevitable. Refusing to admit the chart on grounds of hearsay was error.
. . . .
Diaz urges that his plea was not “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary” in violation of his constitutional rights. . . . His theory is that because he was not provided with accurate interpreting of the guilty plea proceedings, “he did not understand exactly what charges he was pleading guilty to.” . . . His central contention is that he thought he was pleading guilty to one count, not two.
. . . .
As for how proceedings should be translated, Diaz invites us to consider People v. Cunningham, 546 N.W.2d 715, 716 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996). . . . In Cunningham, a defendant appealed convictions for criminal sexual conduct, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial because the interpreter interfered with his right to cross-examine a witness. 546 N.W.2d at 716. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, being persuaded that inadequate interpreting of the complainant’s cross-examination denied the defendant his right to confront the witness. Id. at 717. The court reasoned the interpreter did not interpret each question and answer, but instead had a conversation with the witness that was not conveyed to the trier of fact. Id. at 716. The court also determined that the accuracy of the interpreting was lacking and it appeared that the interpreter directly responded to some questions on the basis of her understanding of the witness’s prior testimony. Id. at 717.
On such occasions, the court rightly said, summaries of what was stated will not do. An interpreter must “give the witness the precise form and tenor of each question propounded, and . . . in like manner translate the precise expressions of the witness.” Id. If an interpreter converses with the witness in his or her own fashion, the court cannot tell which testimony is genuine or what may be admissible. Id. [Footnote omitted.] Still, occasional lapses in translation will not render a proceeding fundamentally unfair. Id.
We think these concepts represent important best practices, and indeed these principles and others are reflected in Indiana’s regime for certifying interpreters. [Footnote omitted.]
. . . .
One need not denigrate the value of experts hired by the litigants to understand the helpful role of a court’s own appointed expert. Just as our procedures contemplate appointment of independent psychologists or psychiatrists when a court has reasonable grounds to doubt a defendant’s competence to stand trial, when a court has reason to believe there is an interpretation issue the court may need to appoint its own competent, disinterested expert. [Footnote omitted.]
We conclude the evidence before the post-conviction court does not reveal whether Diaz was provided with accurate interpreting.
We therefore direct the trial court to commission its own translation of the plea hearing and the sentencing hearing. It should then rehear such evidence as the parties find pertinent to the question of whether Diaz’s plea was voluntary and intelligent.
On this point, the interpreting at the guilty plea hearing is important but not necessarily dispositive. As Justice Douglas wrote for the Court, “The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show” that an accused waived his rights with intelligence and understanding. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962). Thus, on the key question of whether Diaz understood he was pleading guilty to two counts in return for forbearance about other offenses, evidence about what occurred during the guilty plea hearing, and during the sentencing hearing, and in his lawyer’s office, and in writing, and otherwise, is all probative.
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.