DICKSON, J.
We first observe that the defendant incorrectly refers to whether delay should be attributed to the State. It has not been uncommon for lawyers and courts to address Rule 4 claims in part by considering whether delay should be “chargeable to the State,” but the role of the State is an irrelevant consideration in the analysis. The Rule does not call for any attribution of delay to the State but only for delay attributable to the defendant or insufficient time due to court congestion or emergency. To resolve a motion for discharge made under Rule 4(C), it is necessary to identify only those delays attributable to the defendant and those attributable to court congestion or emergency. For purposes of Criminal Rule 4 evaluations, the phrase “chargeable to the State” is an unfortunate misnomer, inexact, and potentially misleading. No purpose is served by devoting time and effort to evaluate whether a delay is “chargeable to the State.” The Rule does not involve assessment or attribution of any fault or accountability on the part of the State, but generally imposes upon the justice system the obligation to bring a defendant to trial within a set time period, which is extended by the amount of delay caused by the defendant or under the exception for court calendar congestion or emergency. Employing the rhetoric of “delay chargeable to the State” should be avoided.
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Detective Pryor’s interrogation style was neither threatening nor intimidating. Instead, he was respectful, considerate, and courteous during the interview. The detective’s technique may have had the effect of ingratiating himself with the defendant and putting the defendant at ease, thus eliciting the defendant’s willingness to provide a statement. Whether a product of the detective’s natural style or a calculated technique, such an interrogation style is not inherently coercive because it does not threaten, cause injury, or evoke fear. . . . .
Nevertheless, we find several instances when the defendant’s right to counsel was violated during his interrogation. These relate primarily to the detective’s usual response, when confronted with the defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel, to acknowledge the request but then to keep the conversation going.
The defendant’s right to counsel was first violated at the beginning of the interview when the defendant stated, “I’m in a situation where I feel like . . . I really need an attorney to . . . talk with, and for me.” Appellant’s App’x at 389. This was an unequivocal and unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel. The detective understood this and acknowledged, “you’re absolutely entitled to that sir. . . . I’m not going to violate your rights (inaudible) that way.” Id. But the detective did not cease further interrogation but nevertheless continued by inviting the defendant to talk more, adding, “The only reason I was in here, we know what happened, that’s not why I was in here, I just wanted to know why. It might not be as bad as it appears, but only you know those circumstances, but you’re entitled to an attorney.” Id. This precipitated the defendant to respond, “Yeah, OK. Well I mean ask me, ask me what you want to ask me.” Id. This statement does not constitute a valid waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel for two reasons. First, the detective’s failure to immediately cease all questioning until the defendant’s attorney was present was in violation of Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482, 101 S. Ct. at 1883, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 384. Once the defendant stated, “I really need an attorney,” Appellant’s App’x at 389, the defendant’s right to counsel should have been “scrupulously honored.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S. Ct. at 1630, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726. Instead, the detective’s ongoing conversation initiated further custodial interrogation, and the defendant’s subsequent disclosures were not a product of his own initiation of communication. Pursuant to Shatzer, Roberson, and Edwards, the defendant did not voluntarily waive his right to counsel. Second, when this exchange occurred, the detective had not yet informed the defendant of his Miranda rights. “No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings we here delineate have been given.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470, 86 S. Ct. at 1626, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 721.
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The detective then engaged in further communication, but it does not appear intended to be evocative. Rather, it informed the defendant of the standard procedures that would be followed for the defendant to be able to telephone an attorney. When the defendant volunteered, “Now if we do talk I mean what happens? I mean I don’t want to ‘lawyer up’ as they say, . . . like I say this is a serious thing,” the detective replied, “I mean you’re curious as to what would happen if you wanted to talk? But then again you have to voluntarily make that decision I don’t want to coerce you in any way to make any decisions.” Id. at 395. The defendant’s subsequent statements including, “Go ahead and ask me questions and if I feel comfortable telling you I will tell you,” “I’m willing to answer questions, you know, up to a point I suppose,” and “Well Dan I’m not sure. You know, I mean, I want to be cooperative with you — but, you know, as I said earlier I’m in a serious situation,” id., together suggest either a voluntary waiver or at least an equivocation that would serve to undermine his invocation of the right to counsel. But such purported waiver or equivocation would not have occurred had the detective scrupulously honored the defendant’s unequivocal and unambiguous invocations of the right to counsel by immediately ceasing further communications with him until an attorney was present. Instead, however, the detective prolonged the conversation and thus instigated the subsequent dialogue. This pattern occurred three times. . . . In addition, the detective’s persistent resumptions of communications after the defendant’s invocation of rights runs afoul of Michigan v. Mosley, which warned, “To permit the continuation of custodial interrogation after a momentary cessation would clearly frustrate the purposes of Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine the will of the person being questioned.” 423 U.S. 96, 102, 96 S. Ct. 321, 326, 46 L. Ed. 2d 313, 320 (1975). Because of the detective’s failure to immediately cease further communications following the defendant’s unambiguous and unequivocal invocations of his right to counsel, we cannot give credence to the defendant’s subsequent apparent waiver or equivocation as to his right to counsel. As a result, the videotape and transcript of the police interview of the defendant were erroneously admitted in evidence.
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.