NAJAM, J.
In 2008, Capital Drywall and Old Fort supplied materials to Complete Construction & Demolition, Inc. (“the Contractor”) for the reconstruction of a hotel on U.S. Highway 31 in South Bend (“the Real Estate”). Neither Capital Drywall nor Old Fort received payment for those materials. On September 9, Pamela Hartman, an Old Fort employee, “contacted the St. Joseph County Auditor’s Office to obtain the name of the owner of record” of the Real Estate. Old Fort’s App. at 107. In a subsequently prepared affidavit (“Hartman Affidavit”), Hartman avers that the “St. Joseph County Auditor’s Office records indicated that Ranjan J. Amin was the owner of record” of the Real Estate. Id. at 108. On September 11, Old Fort filed in the St. Joseph County Recorder’s Office a “Notice of Mechanic’s Lien” directed to Amin and the Contractor. Id. at 67. Old Fort’s Notice of Mechanic’s Lien did not list any other owner of the Real Estate.
. . . .
At the time Old Fort and Capital Drywall filed their notices of intent to hold a mechanic’s lien, JJI was the record owner of the Real Estate. Amin was the former owner and had transferred his interest in the Real Estate to JJI on February 12, 2008. The Warranty Deed showing that transaction was recorded March 12, 2008.
. . . .
Here, Capital Drywall and Old Fort each listed Amin as the owner on their respective lien notices. Amin is the president of JJI. Capital Drywall points out that JJI by counsel sent Capital Drywall a letter pursuant to Indiana Code Section 32-28-3-10 with instructions to file a mechanic’s lien within thirty days or the lien would be void. By such letter, the argument goes, JJI acknowledged receipt of Capital Drywall’s lien notice. And in his deposition testimony, Amin answered that he remembered receiving Old Fort’s lien notice. Thus, JJI had actual notice of Old Fort’s intent to hold a mechanic’s lien, and the first policy underlying the lien statute has been satisfied.
But by failing to list the correct owner of record on the notice of intent to hold a mechanic’s lien, Capital Drywall and Old Fort have not given notice to third party buyers or money lenders. On this point Capital Drywall and Old Fort contend that parties to the litigation were on notice of Old Fort’s lien despite the incorrect designation of Amin as the owner. But “the name of the owner in the Notice of Intent must be similar enough to the name of the record titleholders so that a search of the public record would put a third party on notice that the real estate in question is encumbered.” Suburban Elec. Co., 412 N.E.2d at 297. In other words, the notice contemplated in the policy is notice to potential third party purchasers and money lenders as well as those who already have a known interest in the subject real estate. Here, a judgment and lien search would not have revealed the claimed mechanic’s lien because the notice listed the incorrect owner’ name. See Logansport Equip. Rental, 755 N.E.2d at 1138. Thus, Capital Drywall and Old Fort have not shown that they satisfied one of the policy objectives behind the lien notice requirements in Indiana Code Section 32-28-3-3.
Finally, Capital Drywall and Old Fort contend that no prejudice resulted from their failure to state the true owner of the Real Estate on their respective lien notices. Although the parties have not designated evidence to show any actual prejudice arising from their erroneous lien notices, we conclude that failing to name the true owner of the Real Estate creates an inexcusable potential for prejudice. Again, third party purchasers or money lenders who researched the Real Estate or JJI’s financial status would not have found Capital Drywall’s or Old Fort’s lien notice. As such, third parties would be unaware of those claims against JJI or the Real Estate and the effect, if any, of that claim on JJI’s credit.
Nevertheless, Capital Drywall and Old Fort contend that they substantially complied with the lien notice statute because they listed the property owner as identified in telephone calls with government record keepers. Specifically, Capital Drywall spoke with someone in the Assessor’s Office on April 25, 2008, and then filed its notice of intent to hold a mechanic’s lien six months later on October 24. And Old Fort spoke with someone in the Auditor’s Office on September 9, 2008, and filed its notice of intent to hold a mechanic’s lien on September 11. In both instances the owner’s identity was obtained by telephone, and both were apparently told that Amin was the owner of the property. [Footnote omitted.]
The statute requires that the lien notice include the name of the property owner. Capital Drywall and Old Fort relied on hearsay to identify the owner, but a sworn statement and notice of intention to hold a mechanic’s lien is an affidavit that must be made upon the personal knowledge of the affiant. Thus, for purposes of filing a mechanic’s lien, a mechanic’s lien claimant does not have a right to rely on telephone hearsay to identify the property owner and does so at its own risk.
MATHIAS, J., concurs.
BAKER, C.J., concurs in result with separate opinion:
The majority concludes that because a lien notice must be premised upon an affidavit made upon the personal knowledge of the affiant, it is improper for a claimant to rely upon information gleaned from a telephone conversation with an employee of the county auditor’s office. I do not think this analysis is necessary because the relevant portion of the statute requires that the lien notice describe the name of the owner as set forth in the latest entry in the transfer books. This language implies that the claimant must review the transfer books in person rather than rely upon information provided by an employee of the auditor’s office. I believe this to be a Draconian requirement and suspect that it was not what the General Assembly intended in drafting this statute. That said, the language of the statute is plain and must be strictly construed. Therefore, I concur in the result reached by the majority.