BARTEAU, S.J.
A.L. contends that she was deprived of due process of law because Wishard cited one reason for involuntary commitment, severe disability, in the Physician’s Statement but presented an additional reason, dangerousness, at the hearing. A.L. contends that Wishard was obligated to give her pre-hearing notice of every ground that supported Wishard’s request for temporary involuntary commitment.
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A.L. cites to no authority that supports her claim that the due process protections that are applicable to a charging instrument in a criminal case should also be applied to a report filed pursuant to Indiana Code section 12-26-6-5.4 We note a charging instrument in a criminal proceeding serves a different purpose than the Report filed in this case. The purpose of a charging instrument is to provide a defendant with notice of the crime of which he or she is charged so that he or she is able to prepare a defense. Brown v. State, 830 N.E.2d 956, 963 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). By contrast, the purpose of the Report is to inform the trial court: (1) that a mental health facility has examined a person that has been detained; and (2) whether the person is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled and requires continuing care and treatment. See Ind. Code § 12-26-5-5. If, after reviewing the report, the trial court decides to hold a hearing on the petitioner’s request for temporary involuntary commitment, then the detained person must be given notice of the time, place, and date of the hearing. I.C. § 12-26-6-3. Consequently, A.L.’s analogy of the Report to a charging instrument is inapt.
In addition, A.L. was represented by counsel at the final hearing. A.L.’s Counsel cross-examined Wishard’s witnesses and presented evidence on behalf of A.L. in the form of A.L.’s testimony. A.L. does not state how her preparation for the final hearing would have differed had she known in advance that Wishard intended to argue dangerousness in addition to grave disability.
Finally, as we discuss in more detail below, even if one sets aside the question of whether A.L. was dangerous, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial court’s Order because Wishard proved by clear and convincing evidence that A.L. was gravely disabled. See Section II infra.
After considering these factors, we conclude that any error in the trial court’s admission of evidence or consideration of Wishard’s argument as to A.L.’s dangerousness was not a blatant violation of our concepts of fundamental fairness and did not cause substantial and apparent harm to A.L. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did not commit fundamental error and decline to disturb its judgment on this ground.
ROBB, J., and CRONE, J., concur.