RILEY, J.
To carry her burden, Stepmother presented evidence indicating that despite receiving a regular income since 2006, Mother failed to pay any child support to father for N.W.’s care. Specifically, Stepmother elicited testimony reflecting that Mother had an income of approximately $24,000.00 in 2006 and approximately $30,000.00 in 2007 through 2009. Stepmother now argues that because Mother had an income and knowingly failed to provide for her minor child’s care, her consent to the adoption is no longer required.
We disagree. The mere showing that Mother had a regular income, standing alone, is not sufficient to indicate Mother’s ability to provide support, “nor can such an inference reasonably be drawn from this evidence.” See In Re Adoption of Augustyniak, 505 N.E.2d 868, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), opinion on reh’g, 508 N.E.2d 1307, 1309 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), trans. denied (Proof of employment and income are necessary components in determining the ability to provide support, but they are not the only components); Matter of Adoption of D.H. III, 439 N.E.2d 1376, 1378 (Ind. Ct App. 1982). As such, Stepmother failed to carry her burden that Mother was able to provide for N.W. but refused to do so.
Regardless, here, the totality of the evidence establishes the opposite, i.e., that Mother provided for N.W. to the best of her ability. At the time of the divorce decree, both parties agreed that due to Mother’s economic situation no child support payments were required. Thereafter, when Mother was denied visitation in March of 2009, Mother filed a contempt citation against Father in the original divorce proceedings for not allowing parenting time as well as a request for modification of custody. Father responded by filing a modification of child support. On October 13, 2009, the trial court entered findings and an order on the parties’ filings, ordering a custodial visitation, establishing parenting time in accordance with the Parenting Time Guidelines, and concluding, that Mother has a “negative child support obligation.” (Appellant’s App. p. 108). As such, no judicial decree was ever entered mandating Mother to pay child support for N.W.
Nevertheless, even though Mother is not subject to a judicial decree, we recognize that Indiana law imposes a duty upon a parent to support her children. Irvin v. Hood, 712 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). This duty exists apart from any court order or statute. Id.; see also In Re Adoption of M.A.S., 815 N.E.2d 216, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Consequently, even though no court order to pay child support may exist, Mother still had a duty to support N.W. However, because the trial court already determined that Mother’s child support is negative, this ‘duty of support’ might be defined in non-monetary terms. In this light, Mother testified that when she exercised her parenting time, she provided N.W. with housing, clothing, food, and other necessities. She took her daughter to different places, including movies and the zoo, and gave her gifts during holidays. While Mother might not have been able to monetarily provide N.W. with much, the child was not neglected nor are there any allegations pointing to neglect.
Based on the evidence before us, we conclude that Stepmother, as the party seeking to sever the Mother-daughter relationship, failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s consent was not required. Although Mother was not required to pay child support pursuant to a judicial order, she remained under a common law duty to provide support to N.W. when able to do so. See I.C. § 31-19-9-8(a). We find that Mother provided to the best of her ability: while creating a nurturing environment during parenting time, Mother supplied N.W. with all the necessities of housing, food, and even mother-daughter outings and gifts.
KIRSCH, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.