FRIEDLANDER, J.
The trial court entered its order denying Fisher’s motion to discharge on December 15, 2009. In its order, the court set forth the relevant stipulated facts as follows:
3. As indicated by the chronological case summary, incorporated by reference, the parties appeared on December 6, 2001. At that time, the Courtwas advised that the Accused was incarcerated in Floyd County, Indiana onfederal charges.
4. The Accused has been continuously incarcerated on federal charges since that time. The State of Indiana has been aware of that fact at least since December 6, 2001.
5. The State of Indiana has a policy whereby no attempt is made to secure the attendance of an Accused who is incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction, until that person has finished serving their sentence in that jurisdiction. . . .
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7. The accused has consistently, repeatedly and diligently attempted to bring this matter to trial.
Appellant’s Appendix at 41-42. Given these facts, the court concluded:
even in this case where this action has been pending since June 19th, 2001, and the State has been aware of the location of the Accused since December 6th, 2001 but has not pursued prosecution until the Accused finishes his federal sentence, and the Accused has consistently and diligently sought trial in this matter, there is no authority supporting the Accused’s request for dismissal of this action.
. . . .
We begin with Crim. R. 4, which provides for the discharge of defendants when the State delays in bringing a defendant to trial. In essence, Crim. R. 4 is Indiana’s codification of a defendant’s speedy trial rights. Indiana has long held, however, that Crim. R. 4 “does not apply when a person is incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction.” Howard v. State, 755 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). In cases involving speedy trial rights of a defendant incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction, we apply the IAD rather than Crim. R. 4. Howard v. State, 755 N.E.2d 242.
By way of background, we note that the IAD is an interstate compact between forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government that creates uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer. See State v. Robinson, 863 N.E.2d 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. The IAD’s purpose is to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of outstanding charges against persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions. Id. The IAD process begins when the state bringing charges against a defendant in custody in another IAD jurisdiction files a detainer. Id.; see also I.C. § 35-33- 10-4. Once the detainer is filed, the defendant may file a request for final disposition, which triggers the requirement under the IAD that he be brought to trial within 180 days. See I.C. § 35-33-10-4. There is, however, no statutory mandate obligating the State to file a detainer within a set time frame. Indeed, here, the State acknowledges that since learning that Fisher was in federal custody in December 2001, it has taken no action to pursue prosecution of Fisher, including the filing of a detainer under the IAD. Absent the filing of a detainer, the provisions of the IAD are not triggered.
Given that Crim. R. 4 and the IAD do not provide grounds for Fisher’s discharge, Fisher’s argument must then be confined to a constitutional analysis of his right to a speedy trial. . . . .
. . . .
We therefore cannot say that the State necessarily acted in bad faith in not pursuing prosecution. We are left with whether the State’s efforts can be characterized as official negligence.
As noted above, the State acknowledges that it had an affirmative duty to make a diligent and good-faith effort to bring Fisher to trial. The State explains its delay in pursuing prosecution of Fisher by pointing to an express policy to forego prosecution of a defendant until such time as the defendant completes serving time in a foreign jurisdiction.
We observe that as a matter of broad application, the State’s policy is of dubious utility. . . . We certainly cannot approve of a blanket policy to sit back and wait for a defendant to complete his sentence in a foreign jurisdiction, especially under the facts of this case where the delay in prosecution is substantial. While there may very well be valid reasons underlying the State’s express policy to delay prosecution until such time as a defendant finishes serving time in a foreign jurisdiction, the State’s affirmative duty to diligently, and in good faith, pursue prosecution of defendants is the overriding factor to consider.
. . . In this case, we cannot condone the State’s “egregious persistence” in failing to prosecute Fisher for what has now amounted to five years, regardless of whether it was based upon an established, broadly-applied policy. See id.
. . . As the parties stipulated, Fisher “consistently, repeatedly and diligently attempted to bring this matter to trial.” Appellant’s Appendix at 42. That Fisher asserted his right to a speedy trial weighs in his favor.
Finally, we assess the fourth Barker factor—prejudice. Indiana courts have placed the burden of demonstrating actual prejudice on the defendant to prove a speedy trial deprivation. Lee v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1143 (Ind. 1997). The State admits “it appears as though three of the Barker factors may currently weigh in favor of [Fisher],” but nevertheless argues that Fisher is not entitled to relief because at this stage in the proceedings it is premature to make a determination as to whether Fisher has been prejudiced.
. . . .
Finally, Fisher argues that a showing of prejudice is unnecessary where consideration of the first three Barker factors coalesce in the defendant’s favor. See Prince v. Alabama, 507 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1975). Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that “affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. at 655.
. . . Here, in light of our analysis of the first three Barker factors (excessive delay, inexcusable explanation for the delay, and Fisher’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial), we need not address whether Fisher has demonstrated actual prejudice because under the facts of this case, we will presume prejudice.
In sum, the answer to the question presented in this case is: yes, the State has an affirmative duty to pursue prosecution of Fisher and such duty derives from a defendant’s right to a speedy trial as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. As set forth above, our balancing of the Barker factors under the facts of this case leads us to conclude that Fisher’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. Fisher is entitled to relief. We therefore reverse the trial court and remand with instructions to dismiss the underlying action against Fisher.
BARNES, J., and CRONE, J., concur.