BOEHM, J.
A patient was injured leaving the hospital on crutches. She sued, asserting a general premises liability claim, and claiming the hospital was negligent in refusing her a wheelchair. The medical malpractice limitations period expired before her general negligence complaint was dismissed for failure to comply with the requirement of the Medical Malpractice Act that a medical malpractice complaint be filed with the Department of Insurance before it is presented to a court. We hold that under these circumstances a medical malpractice complaint alleging the same facts as the dismissed complaint may be deemed a continuation of the first complaint for purposes of the Journey’s Account Statute [“JAS”].
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. . . [U]nder some circumstances the JAS permits a filing after the applicable limitation period to be deemed a “continuation” of an earlier claim. Specifically, the JAS can revive a claim subject to the MMA. Vesolowski v. Repay, 520 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind. 1988). The JAS also applies in the cases of several other statutory schemes. Willman v. Railing, 571 N.E.2d 590, 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (Will Contest Statute); City of Evansville v. Moore, 563 N.E.2d 113, 115 (Ind. 1990) (Wrongful Death Act); Ullom v. Midland Industries, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 491, 492 (S.D. Ind. 1987) (Products Liability Act).
To invoke the benefits of the JAS, a claimant must have commenced a timely action that failed for reasons other than “negligence in the prosecution.” I.C. § 34-11-8-1(a). The timeliness of Eads’s first complaint and its failure are not in dispute. . . .
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Eads’s original action also did not fail for “negligence in the prosecution” by reason of her filing initially as a premises liability claim. The Hospital is correct that “negligence in the prosecution” is broader than its origin in “failure to . . . prosecute as required by Indiana Trial Rule 41(E),” and the term has been said to apply to “any failure of the action due to negligence in the prosecution.” Zambrana v. Anderson, 549 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). Examples of negligence in the prosecution beyond ordinary failure to prosecute are failure to pay the filing fee, Parks v. Madison County, 783 N.E.2d 711, 721 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), and naming the wrong party. Zambrana, 549 N.E.2d at 1081.
There may be instances where the incorrect assertion of a general negligence claim is “negligence in the prosecution.” But we do not agree that dismissal of a general negligence claim for failure to comply with the MMA necessarily precludes application of the JAS. . . .
Though the JAS does not explicitly refer to good faith in the filing of the original action, Indiana courts have implied a good faith requirement. E.g., Basham v. Penick, 849 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). For the same reason we do not find negligence in the prosecution, we are not persuaded that Eads exhibited bad faith when she filed her original claim sounding in general negligence.
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The Hospital suggests that the proposed IDOI complaint cannot be the continuation of the general negligence claim because the IDOI claim seeks different relief. In the first place, the JAS uses “continuation” to describe what an action “be considered” if it meets the criteria of I.C. § 34-11-8-1(b) and the original action meets the criteria of I.C. § 34-11-8-1(a). A plaintiff invoking the benefit of the JAS is not required to prove the second complaint is a “continuation” of the first. The two must assert fundamentally the same claim, but whether one suit is a “continuation” of another is the result of meeting the test of subsections, (a) and (b), not the cause.
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Both complaints allege identical historical facts and assert as the basis of Eads’s claim that the Hospital failed “to ensure that [Eads] has a safe means of egress.” The Court of Appeals nevertheless agreed with the Hospital that the IDOI complaint was not a continuation of the action filed in Superior Court because the former was a claim of medical malpractice and the latter asserted general negligence. The Court of Appeals reasoned that although the facts and parties in the two complaints were the same, “the actual claim—the source of the alleged liability—is wholly different.” Eads, 909 N.E.2d at 1014. We agree that a medical malpractice claim is in some respects, as the Court of Appeals put it, “wholly different” from a general negligence claim. But we do not agree that the differences between the two are the “source of the liability.” The MMA does not create a new cause of action. It merely requires that claims for medical malpractice that are recognized under tort law and applicable statutes be pursued through the procedures of the MMA. Chamberlain v. Walpole, 822 N.E.2d 959, 963 (Ind. 2005). The source of a medical malpractice claim remains basic tort law, which is the same as the source of a general negligence claim, and “[t]here are no more legal elements to the tort of doctor malpractice than there are to other negligence torts.” Burke, 520 N.E.2d at 441. Finally, the JAS requires that the second action be brought not later than the later of three years after the termination of the first action or the limitation period applicable to “the original action,” thus implying that there may be different limitation periods applicable to the two. That is in fact the case here, where the two year general personal injury period is not limited to the occurrence based period applicable to medical malpractice claims.
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Eads’s IDOI claim was submitted two weeks before the original action failed. The Hospital argues that Eads’s proposed IDOI complaint cannot be the continuation of a failed claim because the original action was still pending at the time she filed the IDOI complaint. Although the more common scenario involves the filing of a new action after a claim has failed, the statute does not require that sequence. . . . Given the language of the statute, the greater weight of the notice considerations supra, and the absence of bad faith on Eads’s part discussed supra, we agree with Torres as to the handling of the procedural sequence here. Eads’s IDOI claim, though brought before the failure of the IDOI claim, can be considered a continuation of the original claim.
The trial court’s grant of summary judgment is reversed.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, and Rucker, JJ., concur.