BAKER, C.J.
As discussed above, the prosecutor’s analogy to a jigsaw puzzle missing two pieces was used to highlight the difference between “beyond a reasonable doubt” and “beyond all possible doubt.” Tr. p. 227, 285. The prosecutor explained the purpose of the analogy was that “if you have the whole puzzle that would be proof beyond all possible doubt because you could see the whole picture. I just wanted to make sure that you weren’t going to hold me to that higher burden.” Id. at 361. Indeed, it is apparent that the prosecutor was discussing a legal standard rather than specific evidence. Thus, contrary to Adcock’s contentions, there was no misstatement of the evidence.
Also, even assuming for argument’s sake that the prosecutor’s comments and questions to the jurors amounted to misconduct, Adcock also directs us to several cases from other jurisdictions that have condemned a prosecutor’s analogy similar to the one that was presented here. For instance, in People v. Katzenberger, 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 122, 125, ( Cal.Ct.App. 2009), the prosecutor used a Power Point presentation during closing argument where six different puzzle pieces came onto the screen in sequence. The picture was immediately and easily recognizable as the Statue of Liberty, even though two pieces of the puzzle were missing. On appeal, it was determined that the prosecutor had engaged in misconduct because the
presentation, with the prosecutor’s accompanying argument, leaves the distinct impression that the reasonable doubt standard may be met by a few pieces of evidence. It invites the jury to guess or jump to a conclusion, a process completely at odds with the jury’s serious task of assessing whether the prosecution has submitted proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
101 Cal.Rptr.3d at 127. However, the defendant’s conviction was affirmed and it was determined that the prosecutor’s conduct “was not prejudicial, even under a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt,” because “the [trial] court proceeded to instruct the jury with the correct definition of reasonable doubt.” Id. at 128.
And in Lord v. State, 806 P.2d 548, 552 (Nev. 1991), the prosecutor was held to have “improperly quantified the concept of reasonable doubt during closing argument by suggesting that having 90-95% of the pieces of a puzzle suffices to convict beyond a reasonable doubt.” 107 Nev. at 35, 806 P.2d at 552. However, reversal was not warranted because the jury was instructed as to the proper definition of reasonable doubt.
Finally, in People v. Wilds, 529 N.Y.S.2d 325, 327 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), the trial court used the analogy of a jigsaw puzzle of Abraham Lincoln, stating that if the prosecution “makes out its case beyond a reasonable doubt even though some questions are unanswered, even though there [are] some blank spaces in the jigsaw puzzle you will say so you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that this is a [portrait] of Abraham Lincoln.” Id. In reversing the defendant’s conviction, the Wilds court determined that “the average American juror would recognize a jigsaw puzzle of Abraham Lincoln, long before all of the pieces are in place. Obviously, this is not the quantum of proof required in a criminal case.” Id., 529 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
Unlike the circumstances in these cases, the record demonstrates that Adcock also questioned the jurors on voir dire and emphasized that the jury should follow the trial court’s definition of reasonable doubt. Tr. p. 291-92. Thus, Adcock was afforded the opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s analogy and the trial court provided the jury with a detailed instruction that contained the correct definition of reasonable doubt and the State’s burden of proof. Tr. p. 389, 617-18. More specifically, the trial court read the following instruction to the jury directly following voir dire and after the parties’ closing arguments just prior to deliberations:
A reasonable doubt is a fair, actual and logical doubt based upon reason and common sense. A reasonable doubt may arise either form the evidence or from a lack of evidence. Reasonable doubt exists when you are not firmly convinced of the Defendant’s guilt, after you have weighed and considered all the evidence. A Defendant must not be convicted on suspicion or speculation. It is not enough for the State to show that the Defendant is probably guilty. . . . The proof must be so convincing that you can rely and act upon it in this matter of the highest importance.
Tr. p. 388-89.
When considering the statements and questions as a whole that the prosecutor posed during voir dire, we cannot say that Adcock was unduly prejudiced by the jigsaw puzzle analogy or that fundamental error resulted. Moreover, in light of the opportunity that Adcock was afforded to rebut the prosecutor’s comments and the instructions that were given, we conclude that Adcock has failed to show that his due process rights and his right to a fair trial were violated. Thus, we decline to reverse Adcock’s convictions on this basis.6
[6 Although we do not reverse and decline to find that the prosecutor’s comments amounted to misconduct in this instance, we nonetheless caution prosecutors who are tempted to enliven voir dire and/or opening and closing arguments with visual aids or analogies such as the one here, that using such aids to illustrate the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is dangerous and unwise. Moreover, at least one court has acknowledged that “experiments,” including mere graphs, lines, charts, or Power Point presentations, may imperil a prosecutor’s attempt to establish the concept of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Katzenberger, 101 Cal.Rptr.3d at 129.]
NAJAM, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.