VAIDIK, J.
It is apparent from Boyd v. State, 766 N.E.2d 396, 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)] that the continuing crime doctrine does not apply to factual situations where a defendant is charged with two or more distinct chargeable crimes. See also Firestone v. State, 838 N.E.2d 468, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (convictions of rape and criminal deviate conduct did not violate continuing crime doctrine because defendant “clearly committed two different offenses at different times”).
Instead, the continuing crime doctrine may apply to those situations where a defendant has been charged multiple times with the same offense, which includes two scenarios. First, a defendant is charged multiple times with the same offense when he or she is charged multiple times with one offense. See Haggard v. State, 445 N.E.2d 969, 972-73 (Ind. 1983) (multiple convictions of criminal confinement), modified on other grounds by Bailey v. State, 472 N.E.2d 1260, 1263 (Ind. 1985); Nunn v. State, 695 N.E.2d 124, 125 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (multiple convictions of attempted murder); Idle, 587 N.E.2d at 718 (multiple convictions of criminal confinement).
Second, a defendant is charged multiple times with the same offense when he or she is charged with an offense and a lesser included offense. See Taylor v. State, 879 N.E.2d 1198, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (convictions of kidnapping and criminal confinement); Boyd, 766 N.E.2d at 401 (convictions of criminal confinement and attempted criminal confinement); Curry v. State, 643 N.E.2d 963, 980-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (convictions of kidnapping and criminal confinement), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
Walker essentially argues that his offenses of burglary, robbery, and criminal confinement were all part of the same continuing crime since they occurred in a short period of time and facilitated his sole purpose of “taking stuff, drugs and money from the people present in the house.” . . . He relies on Buchanan v. State, 913 N.E.2d 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, in support of his contention. In that case, Buchanan called in false bomb threats to two schools, entered a bank brandishing a twelve-gauge shotgun, and ordered bank employees to put money in a duffel bag. Id. at 714. He was convicted of multiple charges, including robbery, three counts of false reporting, and three counts of intimidation. On appeal, a panel of this Court found the continuing crime doctrine applicable:
Here, the record indicates that Buchanan phoned in false bomb threats as a diversionary tactic to facilitate his robbery of the bank, during which he used his shotgun to intimidate the bank‟s employees into giving him the money in the vault. We conclude that these crimes were “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction” and therefore vacate Buchanan’s false reporting and intimidation convictions.
Id. at 720-21 (quoting Riehle, 823 N.E.2d at 296).
To the extent that Buchanan stands for the proposition that a false reporting conviction can be vacated because it is part of the same continuing crime as robbery, we respectfully disagree. Although Buchanan’s convictions for false reporting and robbery were part of the same comprehensive criminal scheme, false reporting was a distinct chargeable crime. In considering the false reporting conviction, the panel in Buchanan was not faced with any of the factual situations in which the continuing crime doctrine has been applied; that is, Buchanan was not charged multiple times with false reporting, nor was there a greater or lesser included offense involved.
Similarly, we conclude that the continuing crime doctrine does not apply here. Walker was convicted of burglary, the robbery of Nicole, and the criminal confinement of Jerry. Each offense was a distinct chargeable crime. He was faced with neither multiple charges of one offense nor charges of an offense and a lesser included offense. We thus affirm Walker’s convictions.
NAJAM, J., and BROWN, J., concur.